Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 202330Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 201805Z NOV 25 – 202330Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH. Kinetic operations remain in the immediate execution phase on the Pokrovsk axis. The introduction of new disinformation regarding peace negotiations requires immediate tactical counter-IO.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

UNCHANGED (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE): The primary RF objective remains the Pokrovsk-Mirnohrad Axis, leveraging the FAB-3000 strike zone west of Mirnohrad to exploit a breach and sever the M-30/T-05-15 (Kostiantynivka Ground Lines of Communication - GLOC). This axis is critical for UAF sustainment.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

UNCHANGED (FACT): Dry conditions persist, favoring rapid, off-road mechanized movement by RF forces. The RF assault urgency is driven by this narrow window before expected weather deterioration.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF POSTURE (FACT/JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE): The kinetic ground assault by elements of the 40th and 155th OMBR is assessed to be either in the immediate execution phase or initiating contact west of Mirnohrad. CRITICAL UPDATE (FACT): The multi-axis air pressure campaign is confirmed.

• Shahed UAVs are reported inbound toward Okhtyrka, Sumy Oblast, from the northeast.
• CONFIRMED STRIKE (FACT): A drone strike has successfully targeted the Slobidskyi district of Kharkiv, as confirmed by the Mayor. This confirms the secondary RF objective of fixing UAF AD in the northeast is being executed simultaneously with the main ground effort.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Demonstrated capability for synchronized Combined Arms Breach Operations (FAB-3000 followed by 40th/155th OMBR) coupled with synchronized, multi-domain pressure via air (UAV) and information warfare. Intentions (JUDGMENT):

• Primary (IMMINENT - Ground): Achieve rapid mechanized breach on the Pokrovsk axis.
• Secondary (IMMINENT - Air): Fix UAF air defense assets and degrade critical infrastructure in the northeast (Kharkiv/Sumy) via the confirmed, dispersed UAV wave. The confirmed strike in Kharkiv indicates RF prioritization of urban infrastructure targets.
• Tertiary (IMMEDIATE - Cognitive): Sustain the deliberate Information Warfare (IO) campaign (TASS/FT peace plan narrative) to degrade UAF morale and C2 stability while kinetic pressure is maximized.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed execution of the dispersed UAV strike profile across Kharkiv and Sumy (Okhtyrka) confirms the RF shift to a simultaneous, multi-domain operational plan intended to maximize AD resource strain across two separate operational areas (Donbas ground fight vs. Northern/Eastern infrastructure protection).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain constrained by the Perm rail sabotage, yet tactical sustainment for the assault forces (40th/155th OMBR) is sufficient for the next 24-48 hours. The high activity at GRAU Missile Arsenals suggests rapid preparation for a follow-on strategic strike wave, which requires significant internal RF logistical effort.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating high synchronization capacity across domains (Ground, Air, Information), indicating centralized control is effectively managing the current critical operation. The simultaneous timing of the Mirnohrad breach, the UAV wave, and the IO spike points to effective operational C2 integration.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are on maximum readiness status on the Pokrovsk axis. The confirmed drone strike in Kharkiv and the inbound UAVs toward Sumy necessitate immediate AD/EW resource allocation decisions, validating the RF intent to stretch UAF AD coverage. UAF strategic reach remains demonstrated by the Perm rail sabotage success.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: Strategic friction imposed by the Perm rail sabotage continues to degrade RF strategic depth.
• Setback (Confirmed): The successful drone strike in Kharkiv confirms that the RF pressure campaign is achieving localized tactical success, forcing AD commitment away from the main Pokrovsk effort.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate operational constraint is the requirement to defend high-priority infrastructure in the northeast (Kharkiv, Sumy energy/military installations) while ensuring maximum AD and counter-fire capability is maintained over the critical Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

STATUS (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The deliberate disinformation campaign, focusing on the highly specific "peace plan before 27 Nov 25" narrative, is currently being amplified across RF media channels. This is directly aimed at undermining morale at the operational level.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The combination of the physical terror (FAB-3000) and the cognitive attack (peace deal narrative) creates an environment of maximum uncertainty and stress, specifically targeting the will of frontline units to sustain fierce resistance during the breach attempt.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The disinformation campaign attempts to immediately nullify the morale-boosting effect of the recent high-level US DoD visit to Kyiv.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Multi-Domain Escalation)

1. Ground Force Commitment (0-2 Hours): RF mechanized forces achieve sustained, high-intensity kinetic contact with UAF forward defense lines on the Pokrovsk axis, attempting to bypass or clear the Mirnohrad breach zone.
2. Infrastructure Targeting (1-3 Hours): The remaining Shahed UAVs (Sumy/Okhtyrka axis) execute strikes on high-value military or energy infrastructure, forcing UAF AD expenditure and confirmation of secondary damage.
3. SpN Interdiction (2-4 Hours): RF Spetsnaz teams activate pre-positioned IEDs or conduct ambushes along the Kostiantynivka GLOC, synchronized to maximize the disruption during the main ground push.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Operational Paralysis)

1. Operational C2 Breakdown: The combination of successful SpN interdiction, a deep mechanized penetration on the Pokrovsk axis, and pervasive disinformation leads to a localized, cascading failure of UAF command and control in the sector. This results in the loss of fire control over the Kostiantynivka GLOC and an uncontrolled tactical withdrawal.
2. Strategic Strike Success: The ongoing logistics surge at the GRAU Arsenal culminates in a large-scale missile strike (likely Kh-101/Iskander mix) within the next 24-48 hours, successfully targeting critical UAF AD/Logistics hubs outside the main combat area.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3: Maximize Counter-Mobility Fires (IMMEDIATE - TACTICAL).

   • Action: Commit the maximum available long-range indirect fire assets to saturate the rear and flanks of the confirmed mechanized columns attempting to exploit the Mirnohrad breach corridor. Target identified or suspected RF assembly areas and trailing logistics immediately. Prioritize destroying RF engineering and bridging equipment to hinder momentum.
   • Rationale: Isolate the spearhead of the breach and slow the RF advance before they achieve operational depth.

2. J6/J7: Prioritized Mobile Air Defense Allocation (IMMEDIATE - AD/EW).

   • Action: Rapidly deploy and utilize available mobile AD units (SHORAD/VSHORAD) to address the confirmed UAV wave tracking toward Sumy/Okhtyrka. Maintain fixed AD (PATRIOT/NASAMS) coverage over the critical Pokrovsk sector and key rear area logistics hubs supporting the Donbas front.
   • Rationale: Maintain high AD coverage over the main ground effort (Pokrovsk) while addressing the secondary, distracting UAV threat efficiently with lower-cost, mobile assets.

3. STRATCOM/J2: Rapid, High-Level Counter-Disinformation Campaign (CRITICAL - COGNITIVE).

   • Action: Immediately task the Chief of General Staff or President Zelensky to deliver a brief, public, recorded statement within the next 90 minutes explicitly denying the "27 Nov Peace Plan" rumor and reinforcing the commitment to continued defense. Distribute via all military and national media channels.
   • Rationale: Counter the synchronized IO attack immediately to stabilize morale and prevent battlefield uncertainty from amplifying tactical setbacks.

4. J3/J4: Activate Secondary GLOC Security Measures (IMMEDIATE - LOGISTICS/C2).

   • Action: Implement maximum security and limited-contact patrols along secondary/tertiary GLOCs in the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka corridor. Assume the primary GLOC is under active SpN surveillance and potential interdiction. Shift all critical resupply convoys to alternate routes immediately.
   • Rationale: Mitigate the predicted SpN threat vector by reducing high-value targets on the main road and ensuring uninterrupted flow of critical AT and artillery ammunition to forward units.

//END SITREP//