Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 202330Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 201805Z NOV 25 – 202330Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH. Kinetic operations remain in the immediate execution phase on the Pokrovsk axis. The introduction of new disinformation regarding peace negotiations requires immediate tactical counter-IO.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

UNCHANGED (FACT/JUDGMENT): The immediate operational objective for the RF remains the Pokrovsk-Mirnohrad Axis, specifically exploiting the breach cleared by the FAB-3000 west of Mirnohrad to sever the M-30/T-05-15 (Kostiantynivka GLOC). The terrain remains highly favorable for rapid mechanized maneuver.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

UNCHANGED: Dry conditions persist, favoring rapid, off-road mechanized movement by RF forces. The urgency of the RF assault remains driven by the narrow window before expected weather deterioration.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF POSTURE (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE): Elements of the 40th and 155th OMBR are assessed to be initiating or in the immediate execution phase of the mechanized assault toward the UAF defensive perimeter west of Mirnohrad. No confirmed reports of successful deep penetration as of 202330Z NOV 25. UAF POSTURE (FACT): Air defense alerts have been raised in the northeast. New reports confirm a new group of Shahed UAVs is tracking along the Donetsk/Dnipropetrovsk border, currently heading toward Kharkiv Oblast. This indicates a multi-axis pressure operation intended to fix UAF air defense assets or degrade rear-area infrastructure supporting the Donbas front.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE): Demonstrated capability for synchronized, high-speed combined arms breach operations preceded by extreme kinetic force (FAB-3000). Confirmed capability to launch coordinated drone attacks targeting rear-area logistics simultaneously with main ground efforts. Intentions:

• Primary (IMMINENT - Ground): Achieve rapid mechanized breach on the Pokrovsk axis to sever the Kostiantynivka GLOC and force a large-scale tactical withdrawal.
• Secondary (IMMINENT - Air): Fix UAF air defense assets and degrade critical infrastructure in the northeast (Kharkiv/Dnipropetrovsk) via the confirmed UAV wave, reducing UAF capacity to reinforce the Donbas front.
• Tertiary (IMMEDIATE - Cognitive): Flood the information environment with targeted disinformation (e.g., TASS/FT peace plan narrative) to degrade UAF morale and sow distrust between the civilian and military leadership at the precise moment of maximum kinetic pressure.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary adaptation remains the synchronized kinetic assault (40th/155th OMBR) with a multi-domain air pressure campaign (UAV wave toward Kharkiv) and immediate information pressure. The simultaneous timing of the UAV wave and the ground assault indicates a highly coordinated multi-domain operational plan.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain constrained by the Perm rail sabotage, yet tactical sustainment for the immediate assault forces (40th/155th OMBR) is judged sufficient for the next 24-48 hours. Strategic sustainment remains vulnerable.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating high synchronization capacity across domains (Ground, Air, Information), indicating centralized control is effectively managing the current critical operation.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are on maximum readiness status on the Pokrovsk axis. The confirmation of a new UAV group necessitates the immediate re-tasking of air defense assets from central to northeastern sectors. This stretch on air defense capacity is a direct operational constraint.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: Strategic friction imposed by the Perm rail sabotage continues to degrade RF strategic depth.
• Setback: The pressure on UAF air defense capacity and the requirement to divert AD/EW assets to address the Kharkiv-bound UAV threat potentially degrades air defense coverage over the critical Pokrovsk sector.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate constraint is the need for dual-priority resource allocation: heavy indirect fire to interdict the mechanized assault on the Pokrovsk axis versus the immediate requirement for AD/EW assets to counter the UAV threat toward Kharkiv.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

CRITICAL NEW DEVELOPMENT (FACT): RF state media (TASS) is disseminating a highly specific, time-sensitive disinformation narrative claiming US officials expect President Zelensky to sign a "peace plan" before 27 November 25. ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT (HIGH CONFIDENCE): This is a deliberate, synchronized Information Warfare operation designed to achieve maximum psychological impact at the moment of the RF mechanized assault. The specific date (27 Nov) and source attribution (FT/Ukrainian officials) are designed to maximize credibility and sow doubt among frontline troops regarding the purpose and utility of continued fierce resistance.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is now facing a dual shock: the physical terror of the FAB-3000 strike and the cognitive attack claiming an imminent, unfavorable peace deal. This combination targets the motivation to fight at the critical operational juncture.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The RF disinformation campaign directly attempts to undermine the effect of the highly visible US DoD official visit to Kyiv, which previously reinforced confidence in sustained support.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Multi-Domain Pressure)

1. Main Assault Confirmation (0-2 Hours): RF mechanized forces achieve kinetic contact with UAF forward elements on the Pokrovsk axis, attempting to maintain speed through the breach zone.
2. UAV Strike Execution (2-4 Hours): The Shahed UAV group proceeds to designated targets in Kharkiv Oblast (likely energy infrastructure or military installations), forcing UAF to expend AD resources and diverting attention from the ground fight.
3. IO Amplification: RF and linked 'Voyenkor' channels saturate the digital space with the "peace deal" narrative, linking it to the alleged futility of resisting the current breakthrough attempt.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Operational Exploitation)

1. C2 Failure under Pressure: The combined shock of the ground breakthrough, GLOC interdiction (SpN), and the psychological impact of the "peace plan" disinformation leads to a localized UAF Command and Control failure (e.g., unit withdrawal without authorization, communication collapse), allowing RF forces to exploit the breach and establish fire control over the Kostiantynivka GLOC.
2. Air Defense Saturation and Damage: The UAV wave, followed shortly by the forecasted strategic missile strike (from GRAU Arsenal activity), successfully destroys a high-value UAF AD asset (e.g., PATRIOT battery or a major air base), leading to sustained RF air superiority over the entire Donbas operational area.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3: Maximize Counter-Mobility Fires (IMMEDIATE - TACTICAL).

   • Action: Commit the maximum available long-range indirect fire assets (including ATACMS if necessary) to saturate the rear and flanks of the confirmed mechanized columns attempting to exploit the Mirnohrad breach corridor. Target assembly areas and trailing logistics elements immediately behind the main assault wave.
   • Rationale: Preventing reinforcement and isolating the spearhead is critical for turning the RF breach into a localized, attritional engagement before they achieve operational momentum.

2. J6/J7: Prioritized Air Defense Allocation against UAVs (IMMEDIATE - AD/EW).

   • Action: Instead of diverting fixed AD assets from the Pokrovsk critical sector, rapidly deploy and utilize available mobile AD units (e.g., Gepard, SHORAD systems, mobile EW platforms) to intercept the confirmed UAV wave tracking toward Kharkiv.
   • Rationale: Maintain high AD coverage over the main effort (Pokrovsk) while addressing the secondary, distracting UAV threat efficiently.

3. STRATCOM/J2: Rapid, High-Level Counter-Disinformation Campaign (CRITICAL - COGNITIVE).

   • Action: Immediately task senior military or government officials (Minister of Defence/Chief of General Staff) to issue a public, recorded statement within the next 90 minutes explicitly and forcefully denying the TASS/FT/27 Nov peace plan narrative. This message must be distributed immediately via encrypted UAF internal channels, military command networks, and all national media.
   • Rationale: The IO attack is synchronized with the kinetic attack. A high-confidence, immediate counter-message from the highest levels is required to stabilize morale and prevent command uncertainty during the critical breakthrough attempt.

//END SITREP//