Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 201745Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 201725Z NOV 25 – 201745Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The operational picture remains dominated by the confirmed escalation (FAB-3000) and the high confidence of imminent mechanized assault (MLCOA). The only new intelligence is the lifting of the air alert in Zaporizhzhia, which reinforces the focus on the Eastern front.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

FACT: The Pokrovsk-Mirnohrad Axis remains the primary decisive effort for RF forces. The area west of Mirnohrad is currently a cleared breach zone following the FAB-3000 strike (Ref: Previous Reports). ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The primary focus remains the Kostiantynivka Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs - M-30/T-05-15). RF maneuver forces (40th/155th OMBR) are positioning to exploit the cleared terrain to reach the GLOCs, bypassing or isolating UAF strongpoints near Pokrovsk.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

UNCHANGED: Dry conditions currently favor RF off-road maneuver. The transition to anticipated wet weather remains a temporal constraint on the RF operational timeline, reinforcing the urgency of the current assault phase.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF POSTURE: RF mechanized forces (40th/155th OMBR) are assessed as being in the immediate pre-assault formation, prepared to move across the cleared Mirnohrad breach zone. UAF POSTURE: UAF units are holding defensive perimeters around the critical GLOC segments. The lifting of the air alert in Zaporizhzhia (FACT), coinciding with the lifting of the Kyiv alert, allows UAF High Command to fully concentrate C2, ISR, and air defense assets on the immediate ground threat in Donetsk Oblast.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities: RF demonstrates significant capacity for terrain clearance (FAB-3000) and multi-domain synchronization, combining kinetic assault with high-tempo Information Operations (IO). Intentions (Reinforced):

• Primary Intent (Tactical - IMMINENT): Execute the mechanized breakthrough and sever the Kostiantynivka GLOCs to force an operational withdrawal. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Secondary Intent (Strategic - BUILDING): Rapidly reconstitute strategic missile strike capability, evidenced by the extreme activity at the GRAU Missile Arsenal (Ref: Daily Summary Score 47.07), suggesting preparation for a follow-on strategic wave designed to impact UAF C2/Logistics deeper in the rear area.

Key Threat Indicators (Updated Assessment): The primary immediate indicator remains the physical movement of the 40th/155th OMBR from confirmed staging areas toward the Mirnohrad breach.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The use of the FAB-3000 is a significant tactical adaptation, replacing protracted heavy artillery preparation with a single massive ordnance impact to quickly create a maneuver corridor. This indicates RF C2 is committed to a high-risk, high-speed approach to meet operational timelines.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain strategically vulnerable due to the Perm railway sabotage (Ref: Previous Reports). However, tactical forward sustainment is judged sufficient for the immediate assault phase (0-48 hours).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains assessed as HIGHLY EFFECTIVE in prosecuting simultaneous, high-tempo kinetic operations and strategic IO efforts (e.g., the immediate Akhmat/Zaporizhzhia counter-IO to the Perm sabotage).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are in maximum readiness to repel the mechanized assault. The lifting of the air alerts in central and southern Ukraine allows C2 to focus operational fire support and reserves solely on the Pokrovsk axis.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Strategic Success: The Perm rail sabotage continues to degrade RF strategic mobility and forces a costly internal security response, imposing friction on the enemy command structure.
• Tactical Setback: The loss of hardened defensive positions near Mirnohrad due to the FAB-3000 has increased the vulnerability of forward UAF elements.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate resource requirement is a sustained, high-volume fire suppression capability to interdict the inevitable mechanized advance before it reaches close-quarters combat distance. The primary constraint remains the vulnerability of the Kostiantynivka GLOCs to SpN/IED attack.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Campaign Theme: Collapse and Internal Treason. RF IO is heavily focused on domestic security projection (Akhmat video) and amplifying claims of operational success (unverified ATACMS destruction). UAF Counter-Narrative: Resilience and Strategic Reach. UAF communication must continue to emphasize the strategic impact of the Perm sabotage and the stability of the command structure (reinforced by visible high-level US DoD officials in Kyiv).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Frontline morale is under pressure due to the terror impact of the FAB-3000. This must be counteracted immediately by disseminating confirmed tactical and strategic victories (Perm) and assuring the reliability of GLOCs and resupply.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The physical presence of senior US DoD officials in Kyiv (Ref: Daily Summary) provides a strong counter to "peace plan" rumors and reinforces the UAF narrative of sustained international military commitment.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Synchronized Breach)

1. Mechanized Assault Initiation (0-2 Hours): RF Battalions (40th/155th OMBR elements) will commence the full-scale mechanized assault, moving rapidly through the Mirnohrad breach zone, utilizing integrated air/loitering munition support to suppress UAF observers and anti-tank teams.
2. GLOC Interdiction (1-3 Hours): SpN elements will execute coordinated IED/ambush operations on the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC, timed to coincide with the main mechanized effort to maximize UAF C2 disruption and logistical paralysis.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Operational Exploitation)

1. RF mechanized forces achieve penetration through the UAF defensive layer and establish a direct fire control point on the Kostiantynivka GLOCs. This successful interdiction forces the isolation of UAF Pokrovsk grouping, necessitating an immediate, high-risk withdrawal under pressure.
2. Strategic Strike Escalation: The high level of activity at GRAU Missile Arsenal culminates in the launch of a major strategic missile wave (Iskander/Kh-101), targeting UAF operational reserves and major ammunition depots near Dnipro and Kryvyi Rih to eliminate recovery capacity.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3: Execute Pre-Planned Counter-Fire Missions (IMMEDIATE - TACTICAL).

   • Action: Immediately transition the planned counter-fire missions for the 40th/155th OMBR (Ref: MLCOA) from planning to execution upon first confirmed movement out of the staging areas. Utilize cluster munitions and artillery-delivered scatterable mines on high-probability flanking routes.
   • Rationale: Overwhelming fire must disrupt the RF formation before it reaches the UAF defensive line to negate the advantage gained by the FAB-3000 clear zone.

2. J6/STRATCOM: Isolate and Counter RF IO (URGENT - COGNITIVE).

   • Action: Issue a C2-level Directive that prohibits the discussion of the "Akhmat/Donbas arrest" video among frontline units. Simultaneously, saturate communication channels with imagery and confirmation of the strategic friction imposed by the Perm rail sabotage.
   • Rationale: The cognitive domain is being attacked to undermine morale and divert focus. Reinforce frontline unit confidence with confirmed strategic victories.

3. J4: Hardened Reserve Deployment and GLOC Defense (CRITICAL - LOGISTICS).

   • Action: Immediately commit the designated Engineer Combat Support Unit (ECSU) to the defense of the main Kostiantynivka GLOCs. Increase patrol frequency and deploy EW/counter-drone assets along the M-30/T-05-15 to detect and deter SpN interdiction teams.
   • Rationale: The main effort (mechanized assault) is synchronized with the supporting effort (SpN GLOC interdiction). Securing the logistics route is now equally critical as holding the line of contact.

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