Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 201725Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 201725Z NOV 25 – 201725Z NOV 25 (Refined from 201745Z NOV 25 previous SITREP) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH. Kinetic situation remains high-tempo on the Pokrovsk axis, but the current intelligence update focuses heavily on the cognitive domain and RF internal security, suggesting a brief pause in the confirmed mechanized exploitation phase.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

FACT: The Pokrovsk-Mirnohrad Axis remains the primary decisive effort for RF forces. The area west of Mirnohrad is currently an urban debris field following the FAB-3000 strike (Previous SITREP). ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The continued focus on deep-rear RF logistical sabotage (Perm) and the immediate surge in RF internal security propaganda (Zaporizhzhia arrest video) confirms the RF command is reacting strategically to UAF deep-strike capabilities. The current front is kinetically stable but highly volatile.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

UNCHANGED: Dry conditions facilitate RF maneuver, but the looming transition to wet weather places immense pressure on the RF timeline for breaching the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF POSTURE: RF mechanized forces (40th/155th OMBR) are likely consolidating initial gains near Mirnohrad debris field, preparing for the primary thrust toward the GLOC (Previous MLCOA). UAF POSTURE: UAF units are holding defensive perimeters around the critical GLOC segments. Kyiv has lifted the ballistic missile alert (FACT), indicating immediate strategic strike threat has abated momentarily, allowing C2 to focus on the Pokrovsk tactical battle.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities: RF continues to demonstrate multi-domain proficiency. New intelligence indicates an emphasis on internal security messaging coinciding with deep-strike setbacks. Intentions:

• Primary Intent (Tactical): Complete the mechanized breakthrough and sever the Kostiantynivka GLOCs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Secondary Intent (Information/Internal Security): The repeated broadcast of the arrest of a "Donbas Battalion" member by ROSGVARDIA SOBR (Akhmat) in Zaporizhzhia (FACT) is an IO effort designed to project state control and counter the UAF narrative of effective deep-strike and domestic instability (Perm Sabotage). It serves to reassure the domestic Russian audience and demoralize residual UAF elements in occupied territories.

Key Threat Indicators (Dempster-Shafer Beliefs): The current belief structure is dominated by non-kinetic/cognitive factors, suggesting a shift in the immediate intelligence focus:

• Communication Blackout in [Region] (0.517920 belief score): This score is unusually high and indicates potential localized EW activity or communication restriction, possibly masking the ongoing consolidation or preparation phase near Mirnohrad.
• Military Action: Special Forces Operation by [Side] in [Region] (0.143159 belief score): This likely correlates with the RF claims of the SOBR/Akhmat internal security operation, indicating continued high-risk activity in occupied areas, diverting UAF ISR.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF adaptation is evident in the swift deployment of internal security counter-IO (the detention video) to manage the cognitive impact of the Perm sabotage. This shows RF C2 is acutely aware of the internal morale threat posed by UAF deep operations.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain strategically stressed due to the Perm sabotage (Previous Daily Report). Tactically, forward logistics are sufficient for the immediate assault elements (40th/155th OMBR).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains assessed as HIGHLY EFFECTIVE in managing both kinetic operations and complex internal security/information operations simultaneously. The immediate response to the Perm sabotage with the detention video demonstrates rapid integration of IO assets.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces remain focused on holding the Pokrovsk perimeter. The lifting of the ballistic threat in Kyiv (FACT) is a brief respite, allowing J3 to fully dedicate resources and attention to the eastern front.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Strategic Success: The impact of the Perm rail sabotage continues to ripple through the RF command structure, forcing a visible internal security counter-response.
• Cognitive Success: Kyiv is actively working to maintain domestic morale by promoting national symbols (the Christmas Tree messaging - FACT), demonstrating normalcy and resilience against RF terror strikes.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint remains protecting the GLOCs and ensuring high-reliability resupply before the RF mechanized thrust can exploit the FAB-3000 clear zone.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO (Internal Security Focus): The primary new element is the ROSGVARDIA/Akhmat video detailing the arrest of a UAF-affiliated fighter in Zaporizhzhia. This is a specific counter-IO designed to:

1. Project strength and domestic control in annexed regions.
2. Discredit UAF elements as "terrorists" (FACT: "признан террористической организацией").
3. Directly respond to the Perm sabotage by showcasing RF internal security effectiveness. UAF Counter-IO (Morale/Resilience Focus): Kyiv's emphasis on cultural events (Christmas Tree dedication to Sofia frescoes - FACT) aims to build confidence and morale in the rear area (Belief Score for Confidence Building in Kyiv: 0.069108).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic sentiment is being stabilized by Kyiv's dual strategy: showcasing strategic victories (Perm) and maintaining civic normalcy (Kyiv cultural events).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

No new diplomatic developments in this reporting period. Focus remains on leveraging previous statements of unified EU support (Kallas).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Mechanized Assault and IO Integration)

1. Mechanized Thrust (0-4 Hours): RF forces (40th/155th OMBR) will initiate the mechanized advance from the Mirnohrad FAB-3000 impact area, aiming to achieve physical contact with UAF holding positions 5-7 km west of the breach.
2. GLOC Interdiction Synchronization (2-6 Hours): SpN elements will engage pre-positioned targets on the M-30/T-05-15 GLOCs, attempting to synchronize the logistical cutoff with the main assault to maximize UAF disorganization.
3. IO Sustainment: RF will continue to saturate the info-space with "Defense Collapse" messaging, supported by high-emotion internal security claims (the Akhmat video), aiming to paralyze UAF C2 decision-making.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Operational Penetration)

1. RF armor bypasses UAF strongpoints and secures a firing position (direct or indirect) overlooking the M-30/T-05-15 corridors. This forces UAF tactical withdrawal from Pokrovsk to avoid encirclement, yielding a major operational victory to the RF.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3: Execute Counter-Fire Preparedness (CRITICAL - TACTICAL).

   • Action: All indirect fire assets covering the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad axis must be placed at Condition 1 (Ready to Fire). Pre-calculate fire missions on high-probability RF maneuver corridors identified in the CRITCAL-TACTICAL AXIS gap.
   • Rationale: The mechanized thrust is imminent (MLCOA). Immediate, overwhelming fire is required to break up the assault formation before it achieves operational speed.

2. J6/STRATCOM: Proactive Communication Hygiene (URGENT - COGNITIVE).

   • Action: Issue an immediate, internal-only advisory to all C2 elements and frontline units: The RF internal security video (Akhmat/Donbas arrest) is part of a deep information operation (IO) intended to divert attention from the Pokrovsk breakthrough. Do not discuss or allow the narrative to be amplified. Maintain focus on the front.
   • Rationale: This narrative is a direct attempt to draw attention away from the core kinetic threat following the success of the Perm sabotage.

3. J4: Secure Tertiary Routes and Alternate Logistical Hubs (URGENT - LOGISTICS).

   • Action: Given the imminent threat to the M-30/T-05-15, immediately designate and pre-stock two tertiary logistical hub sites utilizing unpaved routes, ensuring they are protected by air defense (SHORAD) and EW assets.
   • Rationale: Prepare for the most dangerous course of action (MDCOA) involving the complete closure of the main GLOCs, ensuring sustainment can continue via secondary means, even if heavily constrained by terrain.

//END SITREP//