DTG: 201715Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 201700Z NOV 25 – 201715Z NOV 25
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The Pokrovsk execution phase is underway, with the immediate tactical threat shifting toward synchronized mechanized maneuver and sustained logistical interdiction. This analysis integrates real-time IO/PSYOP data with previous confirmed kinetic and strategic logistics assessments.
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (UNCHANGED)
Pokrovsk Axis: Focus remains on the breach point at Mirnohrad. RF mechanized elements (assessed as 40th/155th OMBR) are maneuvering to exploit the area cleared by the FAB-3000 strike. The immediate decisive objective remains the severance of the Kostiantynivka Ground Line of Communication (GLOC).
Seversk Axis: New, unverified RF Information Operation (IO) messaging suggests deteriorating UAF posture near Seversk. While lacking kinetic confirmation, this indicates potential RF intent to draw UAF attention or reserves north/east of the main Pokrovsk effort.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (UNCHANGED)
Maneuver remains feasible. The transition to unfavorable weather for unpaved roads (impending mud season) continues to favor RF Spetsnaz (SpN)/FPV interdiction tactics against UAF secondary GLOCs.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Posture: High synchronization between deep-strike (FAB-3000), mechanized maneuver, and SpN/FPV tactical logistics interdiction (as confirmed in previous reporting). RF is simultaneously applying diversionary pressure (UAV toward Sumy) and psychological pressure (Seversk claims).
UAF Posture: UAF reserves are executing deployment to blocking positions. The critical vulnerability is confirmed logistical protection on secondary routes, necessitating immediate hardening and increased EW counter-measures.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities (Refined):
Massed Tactical Ordnance (FAB-3000): Proven capability to instantly neutralize fortified urban areas, accelerating the timeline for mechanized breakthrough. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Adaptive, Synchronized Interdiction: Confirmed capability to rapidly shift FPV/SpN targets from primary to secondary GLOCs following UAF tactical adaptation. This reflects excellent RF ISR and low-latency C2. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
High-Tempo Strategic Reload: Extreme activity at the GRAU Missile Arsenal suggests the capability to execute a high-volume, potentially multi-wave strategic missile strike within the next 48-96 hours. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Intentions:
Primary Intent (Pokrovsk): Achieve operational paralysis by severing the main GLOC (Kostiantynivka) while forcing a breach (Mirnohrad), leading to the isolation and collapse of the Pokrovsk defensive grouping.
Secondary Intent (IO/Seversk): Utilize IO to fix UAF attention and reserves away from the main assault axis, or to probe/create opportunities on a secondary front (Seversk/Siversk Salient).
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
The continued focus on terror ordnance (FAB-3000) and the immediate shift to targeting UAF secondary logistics routes indicates that RF operations emphasize shock, speed, and logistical denial. RF tactics are effectively leveraging the multi-domain environment (heavy fire support + hybrid FPV/SpN interdiction).
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF Forward: Immediate kinetic capability (ammunition and heavy ordnance) appears sustained and high, facilitating the current breach attempt.
RF Deep Logistics: The Perm railway sabotage is a confirmed strategic success for UAF, imposing medium-term friction, particularly on fuel and heavy materiel transport. RF will likely attempt to mitigate this via alternative rail routes and increased reliance on road transport, increasing vulnerability to deep UAF strike/sabotage.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 remains robust, demonstrated by the synchronization of strategic logistics (GRAU reload), major kinetic force deployment (FAB-3000/OMBRs), and specialized hybrid units (SpN/FPV). The immediate IO response (Seversk claims) reflects an integrated, high-tempo information environment management. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Readiness levels for frontline units remain high, but the threat of logistical cutoff is critical. The UAF must prioritize logistical protection and rapid reserve deployment over the next 4-6 hours.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Strategic Success: Perm railway sabotage continues to provide a strategic, asymmetric advantage, imposing costs on RF sustainment.
Tactical Setback: Confirmed losses on secondary GLOCs expose a major vulnerability that RF is actively exploiting. The window to stabilize logistics is rapidly closing.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
IMMEDIATE: Prioritization of EW and anti-drone assets for logistical convoy protection (ZU-23-2, directional jammers).
AD CONSTRAINT: The diversionary UAV strike on Sumy and the anticipated strategic missile wave (GRAU activity) place extreme pressure on finite UAF air defense stocks and platform availability.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
New RF IO (Thematic): The "Два майора" post celebrating Western recognition of Russian "innovations" (assessed to be FPV/glide bomb tactics) aims to bolster internal RF military morale and project a narrative of technological/tactical superiority.
New RF IO (Directional/Diversionary): The "Поддубный" claim regarding deteriorating UAF posture in Seversk is assessed as a deliberate, low-cost information probe intended to: a) Create uncertainty in the UAF High Command; b) Force UAF reallocation of ISR resources; or c) Pre-position the narrative for an actual, secondary RF push in the Seversk Salient. (ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT - MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
UAF morale is stressed by the terror impact of the FAB-3000 strike. Counter-messaging detailing the severity of the Perm sabotage remains the highest priority for morale reinforcement.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
High-level US DoD visits continue to neutralize the RF-promoted "peace plan" narrative, confirming sustained commitment.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Synchronized Thrust)
Mechanized Assault Commitment (0-4 Hours): The 40th/155th OMBR initiates the main assault, leveraging the clear advantage created by the FAB-3000 strike. Movement will be swift and focused on flanking or overwhelming the remaining UAF fixed defenses around Mirnohrad toward the GLOC.
GLOC Closure (0-6 Hours): Spetsnaz and high-volume FPV attacks achieve confirmed, sustained closure of the main Kostiantynivka GLOC and impose debilitating friction on the newly activated secondary/tertiary routes.
IO Sustainment: RF will continue diversionary claims (Seversk) and kinetic distractions (Sumy UAV) to fragment UAF response efforts.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours
(UNCHANGED - Operational Exploitation)
Logistical Collapse and Encirclement: RF achieves logistical denial for a period exceeding 12 hours. The mechanized force rapidly exploits this, bypassing the main UAF concentration near Pokrovsk and establishing blocking positions to the west, forcing a mass, disorganized UAF tactical retreat under heavy pursuit fire. This MDCOA is significantly more likely given the confirmed FPV/SpN efficacy against secondary GLOCs.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-2 Hours (TACTICAL)
Confirmed RF Mechanized Contact: First contact between UAF forward observers/security elements and the main body of the 40th/155th OMBR moving through the Mirnohrad breach.
Confirmed IMINT/ISR of RF heavy armor massing >1km west of the Mirnohrad blast zone. (DECISION POINT: J3 must authorize the firing of all available pre-planned artillery fires and initiate the tactical reserve engagement plan.)
0-4 Hours (LOGISTICS)
Logistics Operational Readiness Check: UAF J4 reports ability to sustain forward units (ammunition, fuel) for the next 24 hours via protected convoys on secondary routes.
J4 confirmation that convoy losses on secondary/tertiary routes are <5% AND EW protective measures are fully operational. (DECISION POINT: If J4 status is red, J3 must immediately review fire consumption rates and begin preparations for controlled unit exfiltration/shortening of lines.)
48-96 Hours (STRATEGIC)
Strategic Missile Threat Manifests: SAR/IMINT confirms transfer of strategic missile stocks (e.g., Kh-101/Iskander) from GRAU to forward launch sites (e.g., Astrakhan/Kursk).
CR confirmation regarding missile types/quantities at GRAU. (DECISION POINT: UAF High Command must reposition AD assets to protect critical C2 nodes and reserve staging areas in anticipation of the second strike wave.)
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - TACTICAL AXIS
40th OMBR Immediate Vector: Specific, confirmed axis of advance for the 40th OMBR following the FAB-3000 strike. Is the force massing for a direct push or attempting a rapid northern/southern flank around the breach point?
IMINT/ISR (Mirnohrad and Flanks): Task short-range ISR assets (drones, manned observation posts) to monitor the immediate rubble zone and the adjacent open terrain for organized RF movement. (UNSATISFIED - PRIORITY 1)
LOW
CRITICAL - COUNTER-AA
Mobile AA System Location/Engagement Zone: Locate and characterize the operational area of the newly observed disguised mobile AA/anti-drone system that is challenging UAF ISR dominance.
WPNINT/TECHINT (Pokrovsk Flanks): Task FPV/ISR assets to conduct high-risk sweeps specifically designed to bait/force the system to expose its signature/location. (UNSATISFIED - PRIORITY 1)
LOW
HIGH - DIVERSIONARY ASSESSMENT
Seversk RF Force Presence: Verify kinetic data (troop movement, artillery preparation) corresponding to the RF IO claims regarding UAF posture deterioration near Seversk.
IMINT/SIGINT (Seversk Salient): Increase monitoring of RF communications and forward security posts in the Seversk region to confirm if IO is matched by kinetic reality. (UNSATISFIED - PRIORITY 2)
Action: Immediately transition the logistical command structure (J4) into a 'High-Risk Operations' footing. All convoys on secondary routes must be escorted by dedicated, armed anti-drone teams and operate with mandatory, active EW jamming devices (directional jammers) set to disrupt common FPV frequencies (5.8 GHz).
Rationale: The threat to logistics has transitioned from theoretical to confirmed/immediate. Active defense is the only solution to mitigate RF SpN/FPV superiority on vital secondary routes.
J3: Execute Pre-Planned Counter-Fires on Breach Corridor (IMMEDIATE - TACTICAL).
Action: Do not wait for a full battalion-sized deployment confirmation. Upon confirmation of the first company-sized element of heavy armor passing the initial FAB-3000 blast zone, J3 must initiate the pre-planned artillery and strike fires (CCF) on the established breach corridor.
Rationale: The time window for RF exploitation is extremely short. Immediate, maximum fire concentration is required to delay the assault and prevent RF from gaining tactical momentum.
J2/STRATCOM: Counter-IO on Seversk and Maximize Perm Sabotage (URGENT - COGNITIVE).
Action: J2 must confirm the kinetic reality of the Seversk claims (CR 6.3). STRATCOM should treat the Seversk claim as psychological warfare and immediately saturate media channels with the success of the Perm railway sabotage and the confirmed strategic logistical damage inflicted on RF.
Rationale: Prevent the RF IO narrative from forcing UAF command to divert limited reserves to a potentially inactive front, while simultaneously boosting morale stressed by the Pokrovsk escalation.
