Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 201730Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 201700Z NOV 25 – 201730Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The Pokrovsk operational environment is now confirmed to be in the execution phase, with the immediate tactical threat shifting from preparatory fire (FAB-3000) to mechanized maneuver and synchronized logistical interdiction (SpN/FPV).

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis: The primary effort remains focused on exploiting the breach point created by the FAB-3000 strike on Mirnohrad. RF mechanized elements (40th/155th OMBR) are judged to be maneuvering for entry into the cleared zone, with the immediate objective being the severance of the Kostiantynivka GLOC.
• Air Defense Corridor: The immediate vicinity of Kostiantynivka and secondary/tertiary roads is the primary engagement zone for RF Spetsnaz logistical interdiction and the newly identified mobile, disguised anti-air systems.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Unchanged. Maneuver remains feasible. The impending shift to colder, wetter weather will exacerbate logistical challenges on unpaved secondary routes, favoring the RF interdiction strategy.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Posture: RF forces maintain synchronization between heavy kinetic forces (OMBRs), Spetsnaz interdiction, and specialized point defense (mobile AA/anti-drone systems). No immediate C2 breakdown observed.
• UAF Posture: UAF reserves are executing the immediate deployment to blocking positions as recommended, but the vulnerability of secondary GLOCs to SpN/FPV remains the critical operational friction point.
• New Event: Confirmed launch of a Shahed-type Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) from Kursk Oblast, Russia, with an initial course toward Sumy. This confirms sustained RF pressure across multiple axes to draw UAF Air Defense (AD) resources away from the Pokrovsk main effort.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Synchronized Interdiction: The capability to immediately target UAF secondary logistics routes via SpN and FPV assets ("Akhmat") suggests effective, near-real-time sensor-to-shooter linking, severely restricting UAF maneuver. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Air Denial: The deployment of mobile, disguised short-range air defense systems provides RF with a localized, relocatable method to neutralize UAF ISR/FPV superiority in the immediate vicinity of the mechanized assault's flanks. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

Intentions:

• Operational Paralysis: RF intends to prevent the UAF from effectively reinforcing or resupplying Pokrovsk defenses by achieving Logistical Paralysis on all GLOCs, primary and secondary.
• Distraction/Diversion: The UAV launch toward Sumy is assessed as a classic diversionary tactic intended to: a) Force UAF AD asset repositioning; and b) Generate political/psychological anxiety in a rear area, thus reducing focus on the Pokrovsk breach.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• The immediate, confirmed targeting of UAF logistics on tertiary routes following the UAF adaptation to use them indicates RF intelligence collection and C2 adaptation speed are highly effective (low-latency).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Kinetic: RF continues to demonstrate sufficient immediate kinetic capacity (FAB-3000 use) and is actively reconstituting strategic missile stocks (GRAU Arsenal surge).
• RF Deep Logistics: The Perm railway sabotage presents a medium-term constraint on fuel and materiel flow to RF forward deployments, a significant UAF friction point.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• C2 effectiveness remains HIGH, evidenced by the multi-domain synchronization (heavy armor, Spetsnaz, IO, and diversionary UAV strikes).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• UAF readiness is high, but logistical protection on secondary routes is assessed as critically inadequate given confirmed enemy adaptation. The need for specialized convoy protection is immediate.
• UAF Air Force is responding to the UAV threat from Kursk, drawing limited AD resources away from the immediate front.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Strategic Success: The Perm railway sabotage is a strategic success, imposing significant friction on RF logistics (medium-term benefit).
• Tactical Setback: Confirmed losses on secondary GLOCs indicate that RF adaptation is outpacing UAF protective measures on these vital routes.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• IMMEDIATE: Need for mobile, mounted anti-drone systems (e.g., ZU-23-2, directional jammers) and specialized escort teams for logistics convoys operating on secondary routes.
• AIR DEFENSE: Prioritization of AD resources must weigh the psychological impact of the Sumy UAV threat versus the critical need to protect C2/ISR platforms on the Pokrovsk axis.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Internal/Cognitive): The messages from WarGonzo regarding the diplomat issue in Armenia, and Fighterbomber's video from the Dubai Airshow, are low-relevance/distraction noise. The focus remains on strategic messaging:
  • Terror by Ordnance (FAB-3000): Maximizing the psychological impact of the Mirnohrad destruction.
  • Unverified Claims: Continuing the unverified claim of destroying UAF ATACMS launchers to stress UAF deep-strike capability.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Morale is being tested by the one-two punch of the FAB-3000 terror strike and the immediate threat to logistical survival (FPV interdiction). Counter-propaganda showcasing the Perm sabotage is critical for immediate morale lift.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• International support (US DoD officials in Kyiv) acts as a high-level counter-narrative to RF "peace plan" rumors, maintaining confidence in sustained external aid.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Thrust and Interdiction)

1. Mechanized Assault Commitment (0-4 Hours): The 40th/155th OMBR commits to the main assault through the Mirnohrad breach, utilizing UGVs (NRTK "Courier") and intense suppression fire to clear the path toward Kostiantynivka.
2. Decisive Logistical Strike (0-6 Hours): SpN and FPV assets will launch a coordinated, high-volume attack against logistics convoys and known temporary UAF logistics nodes along secondary/tertiary routes to achieve a complete, temporary shutdown of resupply lines.
3. Diversionary Pressure: RF will sustain UAV/Loitering munition pressure on rear/northern axes (e.g., Sumy, Kharkiv) to fragment UAF AD resources.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(Unchanged - Operational Exploitation)

1. Logistical Collapse Leading to Encirclement: RF mechanized forces successfully exploit a 12-hour window of zero logistical resupply (caused by FPV/SpN interdiction) to bypass fixed UAF positions and establish operational blocking positions west of Pokrovsk, forcing a disorganized withdrawal toward the west under heavy fire.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J4: Enhance and Arm Convoy Protection (CRITICAL - LOGISTICS/FORCE PROTECTION).

   • Action: Immediately dedicate fast-moving utility vehicles armed with anti-drone measures (EW jammers, shotgun teams, or ZU-23-2 mounts) to operate as mandatory escorts (minimum 1:5 ratio) for all logistical convoys on secondary GLOCs.
   • Rationale: The threat to logistics is immediate and confirmed. Passive measures (night movement only) are insufficient; active defense is required to negate SpN FPV superiority.

2. J2/J7: Proactive EW Counter-Interdiction (URGENT - C2/ISR).

   • Action: Deploy mobile, low-power directional EW assets to known chokepoints on secondary GLOCs (e.g., bridge crossings, narrow passes) with the specific task of jamming common SpN FPV frequencies in 24/7 rotations.
   • Rationale: Disrupt the C2 link between SpN spotters and FPV strike assets before they can engage convoys.

3. J3/J2: Prioritize Counter-AA and ISR Overkill (IMMEDIATE - TACTICAL).

   • Action: Accept calculated risk of asset loss and employ saturation FPV attacks or artillery on any location where the new disguised mobile AA system is suspected of operating, regardless of collateral value.
   • Rationale: Neutralizing the new mobile AA system is paramount to restoring UAF ISR dominance, which is required to track the 40th/155th OMBR and prevent MDCOA operational encirclement.

//END SITREP//