Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 201200Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 200700Z NOV 25 – 201200Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH. Tactical situation at Pokrovsk remains volatile. Confirmation of RF deep-strike focus on UAF energy infrastructure validates ongoing MDCOA. New claims of RF tactical gains require immediate BDA.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk): Remains the main effort. The area around Mirnohrad (FAB-3000 strike zone) is the confirmed RF breach point.
• Velyka Novosilka/Gulyaypole Axis (Zaporizhzhia): RF claims the capture of Zatishye and Veseloe ("Group Vostok" 114th msp/127th msd). These claims, if confirmed, indicate RF is attempting to widen the assault zone and fix UAF reserves away from the critical Pokrovsk sector. (ANALYTICAL JUDGEMENT: Likely exaggerated but indicates heavy pressure in the area.)
• Deep Rear Targets: RF forces executed a new wave of strikes against UAF energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv Oblasts. This sustained targeting confirms the MDCOA to degrade UAF ability to sustain winter operations.
• RF Deep Rear Disruption: Further reporting confirms ongoing severe disruption to RF logistics. Sverdlovsk Oblast railway lines remain unserviceable following the fuel cistern fire/sabotage on the Shamary-Kordon line, delaying the vital Moscow-Vladivostok line. This incident, combined with the Perm rail sabotage, imposes systemic friction on RF strategic movement.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No significant change. Ground conditions likely remain favorable for mechanized assault across primary axes but challenging for cross-country movement on secondary/tertiary routes, potentially favoring RF reliance on cleared paths.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Posture: RF is executing a two-level coordinated effort:
  1. Tactical-Operational: Committed ground forces on the Pokrovsk axis, reinforced by claimed gains in Zaporizhzhia (Zatishye, Veseloe).
  2. Strategic-Distant: Sustained missile/UAV strikes targeting UAF C2 and energy infrastructure (Confirmed multi-oblast energy strikes, continued search/rescue in Ternopil).
• UAF Posture: UAF continues robust deep-strike operations against RF logistics (Sverdlovsk rail disruption confirmed). Frontline units are absorbing heavy kinetic strikes (FAB-3000 in Mirnohrad, renewed KAB threat over Donetsk/Synelnykivskyi District, Dnipropetrovsk). SBU reports successful counter-intelligence operations (Limansk collaborator detention).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Air Superiority in the Close Deep Zone: RF maintains the capability to employ heavy glide bombs (KABs/FAB-3000s) on key fixed defenses, rapidly clearing urban terrain for mechanized forces. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Strategic Targeting: RF demonstrates the capacity to simultaneously target four key regional energy grids (Chernihiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. High-Payload UAS (Emerging Threat): RF continues to test and refine heavy-lift UAVs ("Slon" drone capable of 90kg payload/15-17km range). (ANALYTICAL JUDGEMENT: This system, if mass-produced, represents an increased threat for frontline resupply interdiction and heavy munition delivery.)

Intentions:

• Achieve Operational Success at Pokrovsk: RF's priority remains breaching the Mirnohrad line and advancing toward Pokrovsk. The claims in Zaporizhzhia (Zatishye/Veseloe) are intended to draw UAF reserves away from this main effort.
• Degrade UAF Resilience: Cripple UAF winter energy generation capacity while using terror strikes (Ternopil) to reduce morale and civil support for the war effort.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• FAB-3000 Use Confirmed: Escalation in ordnance to ensure penetration of UAF hardened defenses immediately prior to ground assault.
• Shift in RF Deep Logistics Vulnerability: UAF deep strikes are now verified as impacting critical RF national rail infrastructure beyond simple fuel depots, imposing strategic economic friction that complicates RF long-term troop rotation and equipment movement.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics (Rail): CRITICAL FRICTION. The unconfirmed sabotage of the Perm line is now compounded by the confirmed Sverdlovsk rail disruption. Both incidents affect the strategic movement of fuel, equipment, and troop rotations from Eastern Russia (e.g., Vladivostok). (ANALYTICAL JUDGEMENT: This limits RF ability to replace combat losses or sustain a prolonged offensive past 72-96 hours without severe localized shortages.)
• RF Logistics (Near Front): Continued reliance on support foundations ("Vechie") for tactical supplies (medicines, gear) suggests formalized military logistics systems are inadequate or stressed near the contact line.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains effective at coordinating multi-domain strikes (strategic energy targeting and ground assault). Internal political signaling (Supreme Court liquidating 'Party of Growth') suggests ongoing efforts to consolidate domestic power even during high operational tempo, reinforcing centralized C2. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Deep Strike Posture: UAF maintains strategic initiative in the RF deep rear, significantly impacting RF rail logistics (Sverdlovsk, Perm). This capability is an essential force multiplier that must be sustained.
• AD Posture: The new multi-oblast energy strikes (Chernihiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv) confirm UAF AD assets are being stressed across wide geographic areas. Confirmed repeat explosions in Chernihiv indicate successful follow-on strikes or multiple salvos overwhelming local AD.
• Frontline Adaptation: UAF forces, specifically Naval Infantry, are observed utilizing improvised cage armor on logistics vehicles and successfully integrating FPV drones (confirmed by Naval Infantry post, likely capturing or receiving drone components).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: SBU counter-intelligence success (Limansk). Sustained, strategic logistical disruption confirmed in Sverdlovsk Oblast.
• Setbacks: Confirmed multi-oblast energy strikes indicate significant degradation to national electrical grid integrity. The RF claims of taking Zatishye/Veseloe (if true) represent an unwelcome tactical advance that forces defensive redeployment.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• AD Interceptors: Interceptors and point defense systems are CRITICALLY required to protect static energy infrastructure against renewed missile/KAB/Shahed attacks.
• BDA/ISR: Urgent need for high-resolution ISR confirmation on RF claims of Zatishye and Veseloe capture to validate the front line integrity near Gulyaypole.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Political Coercion): The circulation of new US "peace plan" details, claiming UAF must waive NATO entry for several years and forbid foreign peacekeeping forces (via РБК-Україна citing WSJ), serves to undermine UAF sovereignty and frame Western support as conditional and coercive. This leverages the pre-existing political friction surrounding territorial surrender rumors. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF IO (Internal Unity/Morale): RF channels (Colonelcassad, Дневник Десантника) are heavily focused on displaying civilian/volunteer support (aid convoys, logistics) and claimed tactical victories (Veseloe, Zatishye, Kupiansk fighting), aimed at boosting internal RF morale and validating the 'Special Military Operation' narrative.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Public morale is under extreme pressure from mass casualty strikes (Ternopil, where 22 are still missing) and continuous infrastructure degradation (new energy strikes).
• The widespread circulation of US 'peace plan' terms (even if via secondary Ukrainian sources) requires an immediate, high-level, multilateral refutation to preserve political cohesion.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The statement by Senator Marco Rubio that "Establishing peace in Ukraine requires concessions from both sides" (via Оперативний ЗСУ) adds legitimacy to RF IO narratives about forced negotiations and territorial concessions. UAF STRATCOM must contextualize such statements to prevent interpretation as official US policy.
• Estonian PM Kallas's insistence that any plan must be agreed upon by Ukrainians and Europeans provides a necessary counter-balance to the US/Russian negotiation rumors.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Focus on Pokrovsk and Infrastructure)

1. Pokrovsk Assault: RF elements of the 40th/155th OMBR will initiate or sustain the mechanized thrust through the Mirnohrad breach zone, focusing on bypassing initial hardpoints using the open ground created by the FAB-3000.
2. Sustained Energy Pressure: RF will continue targeted strikes against regional power transmission and generation assets, particularly in the already hit regions (Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv) to achieve localized grid failure and impede the rapid deployment of AD assets.
3. IO Amplification: RF channels will maximize coverage of claimed RF territorial gains (Zatishye/Veseloe) alongside the US "peace plan" details to generate maximum political instability coinciding with the main Pokrovsk assault.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Strategic Paralysis and Deep Penetration)

1. Tactical Envelopment (Pokrovsk): The rapid ground assault, combined with successful interdiction of the Kostiantynivka GLOC (still the highest risk), leads to the isolation and tactical encirclement of UAF forward units near Pokrovsk, forcing a major, costly withdrawal or surrender.
2. Strategic Missile Saturation: The high activity at the GRAU Arsenal culminates in a massed ballistic/cruise missile strike, overwhelming dispersed UAF AD systems and achieving significant sustained damage to key rail hubs (Poltava/Dnipropetrovsk) and command centers.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/OC East: Execute Pre-Planned Counter-Attack Fires and Validate Frontage (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Continue aggressive interdiction fires on the Pokrovsk axis staging areas. Simultaneously, redeploy high-priority ISR assets (UAV/EW) to the Velyka Novosilka/Gulyaypole axis to confirm/deny RF claims of capturing Zatishye and Veseloe.
   • Rationale: The threat to the flank (Zaporizhzhia) must be immediately verified to prevent RF from forcing the dilution of forces needed to hold Pokrovsk.

2. J2/STRATCOM: Coordinated Refutation of Peace Plan (URGENT).

   • Action: J2 must supply STRATCOM with concrete examples of RF logistical friction (Sverdlovsk/Perm rail disruptions) and successful UAF counter-force operations (Limansk collaborator capture). STRATCOM must use this data to aggressively refute the "concession" and "NATO waiver" rumors as RF IO, emphasizing UAF strategic leverage is increasing due to deep strikes. Secure public statements from high-level EU officials (e.g., Kallas) reinforcing the need for Ukrainian consent.
   • Rationale: The political/cognitive domain threat is now synchronized with the kinetic assault and must be met with a decisive counter-narrative.

3. J4/Logistics Command: Energy Contingency Deployment (CRITICAL).

   • Action: Immediately initiate the deployment of mobile power generation units to C2 and critical AD sites in the newly struck oblasts (Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv) to maintain operational continuity in the face of expected follow-on strikes. Prioritize fuel security for these backup assets.
   • Rationale: RF is systematically targeting energy infrastructure; C2 and AD must be protected to prevent the MDCOA of strategic paralysis.

//END SITREP//