Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk): The immediate threat remains the exploitation of the Mirnohrad breach zone by RF mechanized forces (40th/155th OMBR).
Deep Kinetic Pressure (Pavlohrad, Ternopil): RF forces continue long-range pressure via Shahed UAVs (Pavlohrad confirmed strikes) and strategic strikes (Ternopil residential strike aftermath confirms 26 civilian casualties). This aims to dilute UAF AD assets and degrade national morale, complementing the ground effort.
RF Rear Area: UAF deep-strike campaign remains effective, evidenced by the reported sale of the twice-attacked Salavat Refinery (Bashkortostan) due to financial losses, and reported strikes on RF power substations in Kursk Oblast (16,000 personnel without power).
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Nighttime operations remain favored by RF for UAV and strategic strikes (Pavlohrad/Ternopil footage). Muddy ground conditions (from previous reports) continue to influence the speed of the anticipated RF mechanized advance on the Pokrovsk axis.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Posture: RF forces are executing a synchronized three-pronged strategy:
Ground assault staging (Pokrovsk).
AD depletion and infrastructure targeting via persistent UAV/glide bomb strikes (Pavlohrad confirmed).
Counter-force strikes/IO targeting UAF deep-strike assets (Unverified ATACMS claim, continued focus on rear area targets).
UAF Posture: UAF Emergency Services (DSNS) are critically engaged in major rescue/recovery operations (Ternopil residential strike aftermath, 26 confirmed casualties), indicating sustained high operational tempo responding to RF terror strikes. UAF deep-strike capability against RF critical infrastructure (Salavat Refinery sale, Kursk power strikes) is confirmed to be imposing sustained economic friction on the RF war machine.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Sustained Terror Strike Capability: RF maintains the capability to execute high-casualty strikes against civilian centers far from the front line (Ternopil, 26 killed) while simultaneously conducting tactical clearance (FAB-3000 at Mirnohrad). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Hybrid Warfare Integration: RF successfully integrates heavy kinetic pressure (Pokrovsk) with pervasive Information Warfare campaigns aimed at fracturing UAF political resolve (Zelenskyy summoning Servant of the People faction, US "peace plan" rumors).
Intentions:
Achieve Immediate Operational Depth: Exploit the window created by the FAB-3000 strike to bypass UAF defenses rapidly and gain ground toward Pokrovsk before UAF tactical reserves can stabilize the line.
Impair National Stability: Use mass casualty strikes (Ternopil) and political disinformation to degrade UAF domestic political and morale cohesion during the critical tactical moment.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
Confirmation of Deep Strike Counter-Response: UAF deep strikes against Russian logistics (Perm rail, Salavat refinery attacks) are now verifiably causing economic and strategic consequences (Gazprom selling off assets due to losses). This validates the UAF attrition strategy against RF sustainment.
Focus on Power Infrastructure (RF Border): UAF strikes targeting substations in Kursk Oblast indicate an effort to reciprocate RF targeting of Ukrainian energy infrastructure and impose localized friction on RF border military logistics and civilian support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF Logistics (Fuel): CRITICAL FRICTION INCREASED. The decision by Gazprom to sell the twice-attacked Salavat refinery directly correlates UAF deep strikes with major RF financial and logistical costs. This amplifies the effect of the Perm rail sabotage, increasing the urgency for RF ground forces (40th/155th OMBR) to seize objectives quickly before fuel constraints become severe (48-72 hours). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF C2: Political attention is being paid to strategic infrastructure defense, evidenced by the Kursk governor reporting on UAF substation attacks, implying a need to dedicate military/security resources to defending rear areas.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 remains robust enough to coordinate the Pokrovsk ground operation simultaneously with strategic kinetic strikes (Ternopil) and persistent pressure on energy targets (Pavlohrad). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Deep Strike Posture: UAF maintains effective, sustained deep-strike capability against RF logistics and infrastructure (Perm, Salavat, Kursk substations). This capability must be maintained and leveraged to maximize the friction on RF ground operations in the coming hours.
DSNS Stress: Rescue and recovery efforts in Ternopil demonstrate the severe strain placed on UAF civilian and military support elements by RF terror tactics.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Successes: Verified strategic impact of refinery strikes (Salavat sale). Confirmed kinetic strikes on RF border power grid (Kursk).
Setbacks: High civilian casualty count confirmed in Ternopil (26 dead). The imminent RF mechanized assault (MLCOA) is the primary tactical setback risk.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
AD Interceptors: Interceptors remain the critical constraint, particularly ahead of the confirmed GRAU arsenal buildup (MDCOA). The persistent use of Shaheds (Pavlohrad) is designed specifically to exacerbate this shortage.
Personnel/Morale: The political environment (Zelenskyy gathering Servant of the People faction) coupled with mass casualty strikes (Ternopil) requires rapid, transparent messaging to prevent localized morale degradation.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF IO Themes (CRITICAL): The narrative promoted by "Alex Parker Returns" citing The Telegraph regarding a US peace plan proposing the transfer of control over Donbas in exchange for "rent payments" is highly toxic. This narrative is intended to:
Suggest foreign powers (US) are already negotiating the surrender of Ukrainian territory.
Frame the war as a corrupt transaction rather than a fight for national sovereignty.
This new "rent payment" framing is a refinement of previous territorial concession rumors. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
Public sentiment is being attacked simultaneously by terror (Ternopil casualties) and political anxiety (Donbas "rent" rumors). The political response (Zelenskyy gathering faction) risks being interpreted as internal disagreement unless immediately framed as a strategic coordination effort.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
The need to physically counter the US peace plan rumors (Section 3 of previous report) is now paramount given the specificity of the new "rent payment" claim. US official presence must be maximized in media coverage.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Breakthrough and Fixation)
RF Mechanized Assault (Pokrovsk): The immediate mechanized assault by elements of the 40th/155th OMBR through the FAB-3000 cleared zone is imminent (0-4 hours), attempting to achieve rapid operational breakthrough and sever tactical contact lines.
Synchronized GLOC Interdiction: RF Spetsnaz or dedicated reconnaissance forces will launch a synchronized kinetic interdiction against the Kostiantynivka GLOC to prevent reinforcement/resupply of UAF frontline units countering the main assault.
Maximum IO Exploitation: RF IO will maximize the political tension surrounding the Zelenskyy faction meeting and the "Donbas rent" rumors to exacerbate political instability simultaneous with the ground assault.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Strategic Kinetic Paralysis & Political Coercion)
Massed Strategic Missile Strike: The confirmed GRAU Arsenal surge will culminate in a major strategic missile strike targeting key rail hubs (Poltava/Dnipropetrovsk), AD systems, and critical C2 nodes to paralyze UAF strategic maneuverability for 24-48 hours.
Tactical Encirclement: Failure to stabilize the Pokrovsk line, combined with the successful closure of the Kostiantynivka GLOC, leads to the operational envelopment of UAF forward defenses near Pokrovsk, forcing a major positional defeat.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-4 Hours (TACTICAL)
RF Main Assault Confirmation: Visual confirmation of main battle tank (MBT) or BMP columns bypassing the Mirnohrad ruins.
ISR/UAV confirming movement of at least 15 armored vehicles past the initial contact line. (DECISION POINT: J3 must confirm release of tactical fire support and reserve assets to specified blocking positions.)
0-8 Hours (LOGISTICS)
Kostiantynivka GLOC Failure: First reports of significant convoy loss or sustained closure of the main GLOC due to IED/ambush.
HUMINT/Recon reports confirming physical obstruction or kinetic engagement. (DECISION POINT: J4 must initiate emergency resupply via tertiary routes using soft-skin vehicles with armored escort.)
12-24 Hours (STRATEGIC AD)
Pre-Strike AD Alert: SIGINT confirming launch signatures or strategic bomber ingress from ABs identified near Monchegorsk.
CRITICAL GEOINT/ELINT confirming strategic asset activity spike. (DECISION POINT: UAF High Command must implement AD deception plan and initiate dispersal of high-value AD mobile assets.)
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - TACTICAL EXPLOITATION
40th OMBR Composition/Vector: Determine the precise strength and primary axis of advance for the RF mechanized assault force (battalion vs. company size, specific roads used).
ISR/UAV (Pokrovsk Axis): Continuous high-resolution drone coverage of key roads leading west from Mirnohrad.
LOW
HIGH - STRATEGIC WEAPONRY
GRAU Arsenal Cargo Profile: Determine the specific missile types being loaded/transferred (Iskander vs. Kh-101) to optimize AD planning for the MDCOA.
GEOINT/SAR (GRAU): Task high-res imagery for crate dimension and movement analysis. (Priority 1 Refinement)
LOW
HIGH - COUNTER-FORCE CLAIMS
ATACMS BDA Verification: Confirm or deny RF claims of destroying two UAF ATACMS launchers in Kharkiv.
HUMINT/TECHINT (Kharkiv): Immediate verification against UAF asset tracking logs. (UNSATISFIED)
MEDIUM
MEDIUM - RF REAR DEFENSE
Impact of Kursk Substation Strikes: Assess the military impact (if any) on RF border force logistics or C2 resulting from the Kursk power grid strikes.
OSINT/HUMINT (Kursk Region): Monitoring RF official and social media reports regarding service outages and military impact.
Action: The time for preparation is over. Immediately initiate pre-planned artillery and rocket-assisted scatterable mine strikes on identified primary RF staging areas and likely routes of advance (as determined by the FAB-3000 strike location). Do not wait for direct contact with the breach force.
Rationale: Imposing attrition on the assault force before it gains momentum is the best way to prevent operational depth penetration.
J4/Logistics Command: GLOC Transition and Security (CRITICAL - IMMEIDATE).
Action: Explicitly declare the Kostiantynivka GLOC compromised. All high-value cargo (ammunition, fuel) must be moved on secondary routes, secured by dedicated combat engineer teams for rapid IED clearance. Air/Drone ISR must be tasked for continuous overhead surveillance of the secondary routes.
Rationale: The simultaneous failure of the frontline and the primary resupply route is the primary failure mode (MDCOA).
STRATCOM/J2: Direct Counter to Peace Plan Disinformation (URGENT).
Action: Directly address the "Donbas rent" rumor (Alex Parker Returns). Issue an official, high-level statement from the Presidential Office and MoD refuting the claim as a malicious RF information operation designed to coincide with the kinetic assault. Highlight the successful UAF strikes (Perm, Salavat) as proof of continued offensive capability.
Rationale: The political anxiety must be defused immediately to prevent internal political friction from disrupting tactical C2 during the critical 12-hour window.
