DTG: 200900Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 200700Z NOV 25 – 200900Z NOV 25
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. New General Staff reporting confirms sustained, high-volume engagement on the Pokrovsk Axis. Deep-strike operations against RF logistics (Ryazan NPZ, Perm rail) are confirmed, partially mitigating the immediate threat of the RF kinetic surge. The focus remains on countering the mechanized breakthrough and preparing for the strategic missile wave.
Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk): Confirmed as the primary focus of sustained combat. The density of combat engagements (55/200 reports in 24 hours) indicates that the RF offensive (40th/155th OMBR) is fully engaged. Key terrain remains the breach zone near Mirnohrad and the vital supply line leading toward Kostiantynivka.
Deep RF Rear: Confirmed successful UAF deep kinetic and sabotage actions targeting RF fuel logistics (Ryazan Oil Refinery, Perm railway). This successfully imposes strategic friction and delays fuel availability for large-scale RF maneuver/air operations.
Kharkiv/Kupiansk Axis: RF artillery is actively utilizing cluster munitions (Cluster BК) near Kupiansk, sustaining pressure on the northern flank to fix UAF defensive reserves.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Pre-dawn/dawn low visibility has passed. Current conditions (approx. 0900L) likely favor air and ISR operations. Ground conditions remain muddy, as implied by logistics appeals for vehicles capable of handling rough terrain (Dva Mayora requests). Mud moderately favors the defender by slowing RF mechanized maneuver off-road.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Posture: RF mechanized forces (Group Vostok) are confirmed fully committed to battle along the Pokrovsk axis. RF C2 is attempting to maintain operational tempo despite confirmed logistical damage in the deep rear. RF air defense claims the destruction of 65 UAF UAVs over 8 Russian regions, confirming UAF deep-strike capability remains persistent and high-volume, challenging RF domestic defense.
UAF Posture: UAF forces are engaged in high-intensity combat operations (55/200 confirmed engagements). Medical units (e.g., 47th OMBR stabilization point) are operating under high pressure, treating combat casualties near the Pokrovsk axis. UAF deep-strike capability remains effective, focusing on RF logistics. Force Readiness is HIGH for kinetic defense, but Logistical Sustainability (Medical/AD Interceptors) is MODERATE/LOW.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Sustained Mechanized Assault: RF maintains the capability to sustain high-volume, high-density mechanized assault on the Pokrovsk Axis (Confirmed 55/200 engagements).
Information Warfare (IO): RF continues to leverage high-level ideological and socio-psychological themes (Nuremberg parallels, 'Nazism', internal corruption claims against Kyiv) to justify the war and degrade UAF morale and international support reliability (Trump plan rumors).
Artillery Dominance: Confirmed use of cluster munitions (Kupiansk) indicates continued reliance on massed, area-effect artillery fires to suppress UAF positions.
Intentions:
Achieve Tactical Breakthrough (Pokrovsk): The immediate intention is to leverage the Mirnohrad breach to gain operational depth and force a UAF disengagement.
Impose Attrition (Kharkiv/Kupiansk): Maintain intense pressure on the northern axis to prevent the relocation of UAF reserves.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
Increased IO Targeting of Western Support: New messages specifically exploit rumors of US 'peace plans' and political figures to create uncertainty regarding long-term Western commitment.
Internal Russian Concessions (Implicit): RF media is openly acknowledging a severe shortage of qualified crisis psychologists for combat veterans, suggesting internal challenges related to personnel sustainment and morale recovery. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF Fuel Logistics: CRITICAL FRICTION. Confirmed successful UAF drone strikes on the Ryazan NPZ and sabotage of a fuel train in Perm (deep rear) significantly complicates RF fuel supply chains, potentially affecting maneuver elements on the Pokrovsk Axis within 48-72 hours.
Frontline Logistics: RF units rely heavily on crowd-sourced funding for key equipment (Dva Mayora request for vehicles, EW, radios), indicating continued systemic shortfalls in official supply chains, especially for high-tech items. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 remains effective in coordinating the Pokrovsk ground assault with persistent pressure on secondary axes and synchronized strategic IO. However, FSB reports on preventing the assassination of a high-ranking MoD officer in DNR indicate persistent UAF SOF/Intelligence penetration within RF-controlled territory. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
UAF forces are successfully holding ground defense under massive pressure (55/200 engagements reported on Pokrovsk axis).
Medical Strain: The confirmed operation of a high-volume stabilization point (47th OMBR) implies a high casualty rate commensurate with the intensity of the RF mechanized push.
Successes: Confirmed strategic kinetic effect on two major RF logistics nodes (Ryazan NPZ, Perm Rail). Continued high rate of resistance on the Pokrovsk Axis.
Setbacks (Implicit): The RF ability to engage in 55/200 combat engagements and launch 65+ UAVs against the RF rear shows the sheer volume of assets UAF must counter, leading to severe attrition of resources (personnel/interceptors).
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
Personnel/Medical: High operational demand for medical evacuation and stabilization assets, particularly the forward deployment of trauma teams (Dempster-Shafer hypothesis supports Troop/Medical Concentration).
GLOC Security: The Kostiantynivka GLOC remains critically vulnerable to Spetsnaz interdiction as the main RF thrust advances.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF IO Themes: Heavy focus on historical narratives (Nuremberg, Nazism) to justify aggression (TASS, Putin commentary). High emphasis on alleged Western betrayal/unreliability (Trump peace plan, Lindsey Graham/AXIOS rumors) to cause strategic anxiety in Kyiv.
UAF Counter-Messaging: UAF channels are effectively leveraging verified kinetic successes (Ryazan, Perm) to boost domestic morale and project capability. High-volume official memorializing (Minute of Silence, KMVA) aims to maintain national unity and honor sacrifice.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
Public morale is under immense strain due to the intensity of fighting (Pokrovsk) and persistent RF artillery use (Kupiansk). Deep strikes on RF territory (Perm, Ryazan) provide necessary morale lifts, but require continuous kinetic reinforcement to remain effective against the terror of the FAB-3000 attack.
RF domestic channels signal internal stress by discussing military psychological support shortages, indicating the casualty rate is politically difficult to manage domestically.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
The RF propaganda machine is heavily exploiting unverified rumors of a US "peace plan" (WSJ/NBC News reports cited) that would restrict UAF sovereignty (No NATO, no foreign troops). This messaging is designed to create a wedge between Kyiv and its major Western partners.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Consolidation and Secondary Exploitation)
Sustained Pressure/Breach Confirmation (Pokrovsk): RF will continue to utilize massed infantry and armor to consolidate control over the Mirnohrad breach zone and attempt localized penetration into UAF second-echelon defenses.
Spetsnaz Interdiction: RF Spetsnaz or other SOF elements are highly likely to execute the planned ambush/attack on the Kostiantynivka GLOC, attempting to synchronize the logistics cutoff with the high-intensity frontal combat.
Increased Lancet/Drone Use: Due to the fuel pressure from the Ryazan/Perm strikes, RF will likely substitute high-cost manned air support with persistent, high-volume Lancet/COTS drone usage to maintain ISR and precision strike capability against UAF command posts and armored columns.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Strategic Decapitation Strike)
Strategic Missile Attack (GRAU Execution): Following the UAV exhaustion of UAF AD (Previous SITREP) and the confirmed strategic surge at the GRAU Arsenal, RF will launch the reconstituted strategic missile wave against critical UAF national C2 nodes, key logistics hubs (especially rail arteries outside of the immediate Donbas area), and depleted Patriot/NASAMS sites. This will aim for a temporary strategic paralysis.
Operational Encirclement (Pokrovsk): If UAF forces are successfully fixed by the frontal assault, RF mechanized elements (40th/155th OMBR) will attempt to execute a wide-area flanking movement, bypassing urban centers to sever UAF forces defending Pokrovsk from their western supply lines.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-4 Hours (TACTICAL)
Spetsnaz Activation/GLOC Closure: Confirmed kinetic engagement or IED detonation on the Kostiantynivka road.
ELINT/COMINT confirming Spetsnaz net activity or visual/ground reports of roadblocks/ambush. (DECISION POINT: J4 must authorize immediate diversion to tertiary GLOCs and commit security elements to clear the Kostiantynivka road using combined arms.)
12-24 Hours (STRATEGIC AD)
Pre-Missile Launch Warning: Detection of strategic bomber dispersal or definitive cargo movement (Iskander/Kh-101) from GRAU Arsenal.
CRITICAL GEOINT/SAR confirmation. (DECISION POINT: UAF High Command must enter maximum force protection posture, disperse critical mobile assets (AD, ATACMS launchers), and pre-alert medical services in expected impact zones.)
24-48 Hours (OPERATIONAL)
RF Fuel Shortage Impact: Confirmation that RF fuel resupply rates to the Donbas maneuver elements have dropped below 50% of operational need due to Perm/Ryazan strikes.
J2/GEOINT monitoring of RF forward refueling points. (DECISION POINT: OC East must authorize localized counter-attacks/exploitation probes targeting immobilized or fuel-constrained RF vehicle parks.)
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - STRATEGIC WEAPONRY
GRAU Arsenal Cargo Profile: Determine the specific missile types being loaded/transferred at the GRAU Arsenal (59.9719, 29.3124).
40th OMBR Exploitation Vector: Verify the specific routes and speed of the RF mechanized column following initial contact near Mirnohrad.
ISR/UAV (Pokrovsk Axis): Continuous EO/IR surveillance of main and secondary roads leading west/northwest from the Mirnohrad impact area.
LOW
MEDIUM - COUNTER-FORCE CLAIMS
ATACMS BDA Verification: Confirm or deny RF claims of destroying two UAF ATACMS launchers in Kharkiv.
HUMINT/SIGINT/TECHINT (Kharkiv): Cross-reference RF targeting data with UAF maintenance/asset tracking logs.
MEDIUM
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
J3/OC East: Commit Security Elements to Kostiantynivka GLOC (IMMEDIATE).
Action: Do not wait for kinetic confirmation. Deploy dedicated motorized infantry and EW assets to patrol the Kostiantynivka road continuously, with explicit orders to suppress C4ISR elements and clear any suspected Spetsnaz staging areas. Activate secondary, pre-prepared dirt/farm GLOCs now.
Rationale: Loss of the Kostiantynivka supply line during the breakthrough will critically undermine the defense of Pokrovsk and lead to a rapid ammunition shortage.
AIR FORCE/J2: Disperse and Conceal High-Value Assets (URGENT - MDCOA Mitigation).
Action: Immediately relocate all high-value missile systems (Patriot/NASAMS batteries) to pre-scouted alternative sites, and ensure all remaining ATACMS and HIMARS launchers are widely dispersed and under continuous EW protection. Assume all current locations are compromised due to the massed UAV reconnaissance phase.
Rationale: Preparing for the strategic missile wave (MDCOA) is the highest strategic priority; maximizing the survivability of deep-strike and air defense assets is key to the continuity of the war effort.
STRATCOM: Proactive Counter-IO on Western Support (URGENT).
Action: Issue high-level statements reaffirming UAF sovereignty and non-negotiability regarding NATO membership and foreign troop basing. Use US diplomatic visits (Driskill/George) as visual evidence to directly refute RF claims that international support is wavering or conditional on peace concessions.
Rationale: RF IO exploiting 'peace plan' rumors targets military and public resolve. A strong, unified response is required to maintain internal cohesion.