DTG: 200700Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 200630Z NOV 25 – 200700Z NOV 25
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. New intelligence confirms a massive, sustained RF UAV saturation attack synchronized with the anticipated ground offensive on the Pokrovsk Axis. The transition to the execution phase is confirmed.
Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk): The area of operations (AO) is now fully primed for mechanized maneuver following the FAB-3000 strike on Mirnohrad (Previous SITREP). The terrain between Mirnohrad and Kostiantynivka is the current focus of the impending breakthrough.
Airspace (Deep Ukraine): Confirmed massive RF drone saturation attack (136 UAVs launched). This indicates an attempt to achieve air domain superiority/parity over deep logistics nodes and C2 centers ahead of the strategic missile phase (GRAU activity).
Kharkiv Oblast: Continuous RF kinetic pressure (6 settlements struck). This secondary axis serves to fix UAF reserves and dilute AD resources.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Low visibility conditions (pre-dawn/dawn) remain, favoring RF UAV penetration and mechanized movement. Ground conditions (recent rain) may moderately constrain off-road maneuver but are unlikely to deter the main mechanized column utilizing the cleared zone.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Posture: RF forces are executing the synchronized kinetic-IO plan. The massive UAV launch confirms the priority of Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Target Acquisition (ISR/T) ahead of the ground assault. Frontline units (40th/155th OMBR) are highly likely engaged in the initial phase of the breakthrough maneuver, utilizing the Mirnohrad breach point.
UAF Posture: UAF AD Forces (Air Force/OC South) successfully neutralized 106/136 incoming UAVs/drones (77.9% success rate). This high volume of engagement confirms AD resources are heavily tasked. UAF Ground Forces (OC East) are expected to be committing to defense-in-depth measures.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Massive UAV Saturation: Demonstrated capacity to launch a coordinated wave of 136 UAVs/drones in a single overnight period (80+ being Shahed loitering munitions). This is designed to overwhelm UAF AD and ensure deep penetration for kinetic and ISR missions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Hybrid Warfare (C4ISR/Logistics): Confirmed use of COTS drones (Mavic 3 Pro) for frontline logistics (resupply) and tactical ISR, augmenting formal RF military assets. This decentralized capability is highly resilient. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Intentions:
Degrade UAF AD and C2: The massive drone wave aims to exhaust missile interceptor stocks and target C2 nodes prior to the expected strategic missile wave (GRAU).
Maintain Tactical Advantage (Pokrovsk): The high-volume kinetic and IO synchronization indicates a focus on achieving rapid, non-reversible tactical success at Pokrovsk.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
Increased Drone Volume: The 136 UAV launch confirms a tactical shift toward higher-volume drone attacks, designed to strain UAF AD systems beyond their optimal rate of fire, likely preceding a larger strategic missile strike.
Decentralized COTS Log/ISR: Confirmed reliance on volunteer/private sector procurement (Arkhangel Spetsnaz Project) for critical COTS assets (Mavic 3 Pro), mitigating official RF logistics failures.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF frontline units are demonstrably prioritizing COTS technology acquisition for immediate needs (drones).
Deep RF logistics remain strained by UAF sabotage (Perm), but the GRAU activity spike suggests a successful, rapid effort to reconstitute the strategic missile strike package.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 remains robust, successfully synchronizing the massive UAV wave across multiple axes (Kharkiv/Deep Ukraine) concurrent with the anticipated Pokrovsk ground maneuver. This multi-domain coordination is a high-level capability.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
AD Posture: UAF Air Force demonstrates highly effective AD with 106/136 shootdowns/suppressions. However, the volume of attack (136 assets) necessitates critical review of interceptor expenditure rates and remaining stocks.
Kharkiv Defense: UAF forces are successfully holding the line, absorbing attacks in 6 settlements. Continued pressure here necessitates a high allocation of defensive resources, reducing the ability to free up reserves for Pokrovsk.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Success: Effective AD response (77.9% success) against an unprecedentedly large drone wave minimized damage to C2 and logistics nodes.
Setback (Implicit): The sheer volume of the drone attack implies that some assets (30 unaccounted for by interception/suppression) successfully reached their target areas, meaning some degree of damage or ISR collection was achieved by the enemy.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
AD Interceptors: Critical requirement for immediate replenishment of short-to-medium range interceptor stocks following the massive overnight expenditure.
Anti-UAV EW: Need to rapidly deploy or reposition Electronic Warfare (EW) assets to augment kinetic AD capabilities against the anticipated persistent UAV threat.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
Internal Political Subversion (RF): RF state media (TASS) continues to leverage US political figures (Lindsey Graham/Trump) to disseminate information regarding sanctions and trade tariffs (500% duties). This attempts to signal to the RF domestic audience that Western support is unreliable or transactional. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Historical/Ideological Conflict (RF): RF channels (Colonelcassad) utilize POWs/detained personnel to disseminate anti-Ukrainian ideology (Bandera claims, 1991 borders), targeting domestic morale and reinforcing the RF narrative that UAF troops are fighting a flawed cause.
Socio-Psychological Messaging (RF): RF media attempts to diffuse social pressure through non-military messaging (e.g., "Economical men preferred by women"), suggesting the civilian population should focus on internal, non-war issues—a tactic to normalize the ongoing conflict.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
Public sentiment is likely divided: the strategic success of deep strikes (Perm) and effective AD (106 shot down) provides a morale buffer, but the scale of the drone attack (136 launched) and the persistent shelling in Kharkiv maintain high levels of civilian anxiety.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
US diplomatic activity (Driskill/George visit) and US Senate comments (Graham) provide conflicting signals that may be exploited by RF IO. The UAF must ensure a clear, unified message regarding international support stability.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Initial Exploitation and Deep Preparation)
Mechanized Breakthrough Confirmation: RF ground forces (40th/155th OMBR) will confirm successful penetration through the Mirnohrad breach point and establish a bridgehead across the UAF tactical defensive line.
Sustained UAV Operations: Despite AD successes, RF will launch follow-on, smaller waves of ISR and strike UAVs to continuously monitor the Kostiantynivka GLOC and track UAF tactical reserve movements.
IO Escalation: RF media will immediately seize on any minor territorial gain near Pokrovsk, falsely claiming the capture of major settlements to coincide with the high-volume drone attack narrative.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours
Strategic Missile Wave (GRAU Activation): Within the next 12-24 hours, the missile stocks reconstituted at the GRAU Arsenal (high activity spike) will be deployed, resulting in a large-scale strike package aimed at high-value UAF strategic depth targets (rail hubs, air defense sites, large reserve staging areas). This wave will follow the drone saturation phase, designed to strike depleted AD systems.
Flank Envelopment: If UAF reserves are committed solely to frontal defense near Pokrovsk, RF forces will attempt a high-speed flanking maneuver around Pokrovsk's north or south, utilizing mobile detachments to sever the main defense grouping from the western supply line.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-2 Hours (TACTICAL)
Confirmed Initial Contact/Engagement: UAF forces confirm engagement with RF mechanized assault force near the Mirnohrad impact zone.
Forward Observation Post (FOB) reports sustained direct fire or heavy armor sightings. (DECISION POINT: OC East must confirm the commitment of forward anti-tank ambush teams and authorize the execution of blocking fire plans.)
2-6 Hours (LOGISTICS/AD)
AD Interceptor Stocks Critical: AD forces report low missile stocks following high-volume engagement.
J4/Air Force report shows inventory below operational threshold. (DECISION POINT: UAF High Command must immediately request fast-track resupply/transfer from Western partners and prioritize the allocation of remaining stocks to critical infrastructure protection.)
Specific telemetry/launch alerts received. (DECISION POINT: J2/J3 must elevate force protection status nationally, disperse C2 elements, and prepare civilian population for an imminent, large-scale air attack.)
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - KINETIC EFFECT
40th OMBR Penetration Status: Verify if the RF mechanized forces have achieved a breach or are currently bogged down in debris/counter-fire.
ISR/UAV (Pokrovsk Axis): Immediate and continuous high-resolution EO/IR coverage focusing on the main roads west of Mirnohrad.
LOW
HIGH - STRATEGIC THREAT
GRAU Arsenal Cargo Profile: Determine the specific missile types being loaded/transferred at the GRAU Arsenal (59.9719, 29.3124).
UAF AD Interceptor Status: Accurate real-time inventory of interceptor stocks (NASAMS/Patriot/SA-series) following the 136-drone wave.
J4/Air Force Report: Require immediate consolidated inventory accounting from all AD units.
HIGH
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
J2/J3: Prioritize Counter-Mechanization and Anti-Spetsnaz Operations (CRITICAL).
Action: Commit the forward blocking force and anti-tank teams immediately to positions channeling the RF thrust away from key GLOCs. Assume Spetsnaz elements are already positioned on the Kostiantynivka road (MDCOA). Increase C-IED sweep frequency.
Rationale: Preventing the armored column from gaining operational speed and securing the main supply route (Kostiantynivka) are the two highest-priority kinetic objectives now.
AIR FORCE/J4: Critical AD Stock Management (URGENT).
Action: Immediately reallocate high-value, high-demand interceptors (e.g., Patriot, NASAMS) solely for C2 and Strategic Asset protection. Shift greater responsibility for low-altitude, high-volume threats (Shaheds) to dedicated mobile fire groups and MANPADS teams, conserving long-range assets for the inevitable strategic missile wave (MDCOA).
Rationale: The 136-drone wave was likely a consumption test. Conserving high-end interceptors is paramount for surviving the upcoming GRAU-initiated missile attack.
STRATCOM/MoD: Refute Political Subversion and Reframe Tactical Success (URGENT).
Action: Immediately publish and amplify the success rate of the AD (106 shot down) and the confirmed strategic sabotage operation (Perm) across all domestic and international channels. Issue stern, authoritative rebuttals to any claims of internal political collapse or unreliable Western support.
Rationale: Combat fatigue and psychological pressure are peaking. Clear articulation of successes and C2 stability is necessary to maintain unit cohesion under fire.
