Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 200630Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 200030Z NOV 25 – 200630Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. All indicators support the transition to the execution phase of the RF offensive on the Pokrovsk Axis, synchronized with continuous high-intensity Information Operations (IO).

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk): Remains the decisive terrain. The preceding FAB-3000 strike on Mirnohrad has created a critical breach point, likely neutralizing established UAF strongpoints and simplifying the terrain for armored maneuver.
• Russian Deep Rear (Ryazan/Perm): Confirmed explosions reported by residents in Ryazan Oblast (0038Z). This follows the Perm rail sabotage, indicating sustained UAF deep-strike/Special Reconnaissance (SR) operations aimed at critical RF infrastructure.
• Occupied Territories (TOT): RF continues aggressive measures to enforce information isolation, including satellite dish confiscation and requiring RF passports for communication services (0045Z). This aims to neutralize UAF intelligence collection and reinforce centralized RF narratives prior to the anticipated tactical "victory" at Pokrovsk.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• The current period covers late-night to early-morning conditions. Low visibility continues to favor RF mechanized movement and drone penetration (as evidenced by UAF AD updates 0017Z). Ground saturation following recent rain events remains a secondary constraint on RF off-road maneuver but is offset by the cleared, urban breakthrough zone.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Posture: RF forces are expected to be executing final assault formations or commencing the breach maneuver as of this reporting time, utilizing the cleared Mirnohrad zone. RF media is prioritizing images of tanks and armored vehicles ("Танки войны" 0015Z), supporting the narrative of an imminent, powerful mechanized push.
• UAF Posture: UAF AD forces are actively engaged in tracking and mitigating RF UAV groups (0017Z), confirming persistent pressure on Ukrainian air space management. UAF OC East forces remain under extreme pressure but are expected to execute pre-planned blocking fires and defense-in-depth measures.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Urban Hardpoint Neutralization: Demonstrated capability to deploy extremely heavy, guided ordnance (FAB-3000) to nullify fortified urban areas immediately preceding a ground assault. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Hybrid IO/Kinetic Synchronization: RF maintains the ability to coordinate domestic political attacks (Azarov 0014Z) with high-intensity military operations to compound psychological pressure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Intentions:

• Achieve Operational Breakthrough: The primary objective is securing a decisive, non-reversible penetration through the Pokrovsk defensive line, forcing a UAF operational withdrawal and securing a strategic narrative victory.
• Preempt Reinforcement: RF strategic intent (GRAU activity, as noted in previous reporting) is likely focused on preparing a strategic strike package to sever UAF deep logistics/reserve staging areas once the ground assault commits.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Focus on Urban Clearing: The confirmed FAB-3000 usage is a shift from standard glide bomb employment (FAB-500/1500), indicating that the RF C2 is prioritizing speed and lethality in the breakthrough zone over maintaining the integrity of adjacent areas.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF frontline logistics are currently focused on providing fuel and munitions for the committed assault units (40th/155th OMBR).
• Deep RF logistics are under confirmed strain due to the Perm sabotage (previous report) and potential further SR attacks (Ryazan reports 0038Z). This friction may affect long-term sustainment but is unlikely to stop the immediate operational thrust.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains effective, having executed the critical FAB-3000 strike and synchronized information dissemination (IO).
• The continued deployment of UAV groups indicates effective control of the intelligence-fire cycle, necessary for adjusting the mechanized assault route based on real-time BDA of the bomb strike.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• OC East: UAF forces are now facing the culmination of the RF preparation phase. Defense integrity hinges on the effectiveness of pre-planned counter-fire, the readiness of tactical reserves, and the successful execution of defense-in-depth measures to channel the RF mechanized breakthrough.
• Deep Operations: Confirmed activity in the RF rear (Ryazan) validates the UAF capacity for deep-strike operations, diverting RF attention and resources away from the immediate front.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: Sustained deep-strike operations against critical RF infrastructure (Perm, Ryazan) demonstrates initiative and forces RF C2 to allocate resources for rear area security.
• Setback: The loss of Mirnohrad hardpoints via FAB-3000 represents a significant tactical setback, requiring immediate adaptation of the UAF counter-maneuver plan.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Counter-Armor Systems: Immediate requirement for Javelin, NLAW, and other dismounted anti-armor systems to counter the armored column expected to breach the Mirnohrad area.
• Artillery Ammunition: Critical expenditure expected on counter-battery and saturation fire missions against the RF assault columns.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Political Instability Narrative (Azarov): RF state media (TASS) continues the campaign of political subversion, leveraging former Ukrainian officials (Azarov) to assert that President Zelenskyy will be forced to dismiss key staff (Yermak). The goal is to project an image of UAF internal collapse simultaneous with the military offensive. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• False Peace Rumors: Ongoing diffusion of rumors concerning a 28-point Trump peace plan (0625Z) and diplomatic "imitation" (0024Z) aims to erode international and domestic confidence in Kyiv's negotiating position and further demotivate frontline troops.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Public morale is under extreme stress, balancing the terror of the FAB-3000 strike (Mirnohrad) with the brief positive morale boost from deep-strike successes (Perm). The defense of Pokrovsk is now a critical psychological objective.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The Driskill/George visit (previous report) provides a counter to the peace plan rumors, but the constant circulation of high-level US peace proposals risks creating strategic ambiguity regarding long-term Western commitment.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Initial Assault and GLOC Interdiction)

1. Initial Thrust: The main RF mechanized thrust (elements of 40th/155th OMBR) will exploit the FAB-3000 impact zone near Mirnohrad, utilizing the cleared terrain to rapidly advance toward the main Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka road.
2. Kostiantynivka Closure: RF Spetsnaz or dedicated assault engineers will execute the interdiction of the Kostiantynivka GLOC, likely via pre-positioned IEDs or coordinated sabotage, designed to immediately sever resupply routes to the committed UAF tactical reserves.
3. IO Amplification: RF state media will immediately report a "decisive breakthrough" and "uncontrolled UAF retreat" within 4 hours of the main assault launch, regardless of actual tactical success.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Strategic Operational Paralysis)

1. Strategic Strike Synchronization: Following initial ground penetration, the RF Strategic Missile Force will launch the reconstituted missile package (GRAU cargo) against UAF operational depth (Dnipropetrovsk logistics, Poltava rail yards, and confirmed forward operating airfields).
2. Bypass and Encirclement: RF mechanized forces bypass sustained resistance at Pokrovsk, focusing on seizing high-speed avenues of advance (main roads) to establish a de facto operational encirclement, aiming to capture or destroy UAF forces east of the Kostiantynivka-Pokrovsk line.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OC EAST: Initiate Immediate Counter-Fire Plan (CRITICAL).

   • Action: Do not wait for visual confirmation of the armored breach. Commence saturation artillery and GMLRS fires onto the known staging areas and the anticipated breach channel between Mirnohrad and Pokrovsk (MLCOA).
   • Rationale: Kinetic mass is required to disrupt the speed of the RF mechanized exploitation phase. Fires must be executed before the columns gain momentum through the cleared zone.

2. J4/OC East: Execute GLOC Interdiction Response (URGENT).

   • Action: Immediately deploy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Spetsnaz Hunter-Killer teams to sweep and secure the Kostiantynivka GLOC. Simultaneously, activate all designated secondary/unpaved supply routes, regardless of terrain difficulty.
   • Rationale: Severing the main GLOC is critical to the MDCOA. Proactive counter-SpN measures and resilient resupply pathways are required to maintain combat effectiveness.

3. STRATCOM/MoD: Counter-Narrative Deployment (URGENT).

   • Action: Issue immediate, localized, video-based communications (via local/community channels) from field-grade officers confirming that tactical reserves are deployed, re-emphasizing the success of deep strikes (Perm/Ryazan), and refuting the political collapse narrative.
   • Rationale: Morale is highly fragile following the FAB-3000 strike. Localized, trusted communication is essential to maintain unit cohesion under kinetic and psychological pressure.

//END SITREP//