DTG: 200030Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 192335Z NOV 25 – 200030Z NOV 25 (Immediate Update)
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. Current enemy actions strongly validate the MLCOA derived from the previous reporting period, focusing on softening the immediate front lines via heavy air-delivered ordnance.
Donetsk Region (Pokrovsk Axis): Confirmed continued tactical aviation activity and the use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs/FABs) in the Donetsk area (200009Z NOV 25). This directly supports the expected mechanized assault by providing terminal kinetic preparation for the 40th/155th OMBR.
Northern Sector (Chernihiv): Confirmed deployment of an RF UAV on a westward trajectory over northern Chernihiv Oblast (192354Z NOV 25). This UAV is likely targeting C2 nodes or attempting to fix UAF AD assets away from the decisive Pokrovsk axis or the Dnipropetrovsk GLOCs.
Southeastern Sector: Confirmed activity of RF tactical aviation in the southeastern direction (200004Z NOV 25). This indicates integrated air support for the imminent ground offensive or continued suppression of UAF deep-strike platforms.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Night conditions continue to favor RF aerial surveillance and the delivery of air-dropped ordnance (KABs/FABs). Visibility constraints increase the difficulty of tactical counter-air operations against low-flying tactical aviation.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Posture: RF forces are employing synchronized fire support (KAB/FAB strikes) immediately preceding the anticipated ground thrust. This confirms a highly centralized and time-sensitive execution phase.
UAF Posture: UAF Air Force is actively tracking and reporting inbound aerial threats (UAVs and tactical aviation). Defensive forces at Pokrovsk are under continuous kinetic and psychological pressure. Warning status in Zaporizhzhia (0001Z) indicates UAF C2 is actively managing the expanding threat geometry across the eastern front.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Guided Bomb Saturation: RF demonstrates the capability to use tactical aviation and Guided Aerial Bombs (GABs/KABs) for sustained, pinpoint preparation fire against UAF defensive positions in the immediate zone of expected breakthrough (Donetsk/Pokrovsk). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Psychological Warfare (PsyOps): RF state media continues to employ captured personnel (Volchansk P.O.W. interview) to systematically undermine UAF morale, specifically targeting leadership and logistics failures (lack of MEDEVAC, abandonment). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Intentions:
Softening the Breach Point: The primary, immediate intent is to utilize GAB strikes to destroy remaining hardpoints in the Pokrovsk-Mirnohrad area, ensuring minimal resistance for the subsequent mechanized push.
C2 and Political Erosion: RF IO campaigns are intensely focused on delegitimizing Ukrainian political and military leadership (Umerov/Azarov comments, TASS political messaging) to create internal instability that complements the kinetic assault.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
Integrated Fire Support: RF has maintained a high tempo of kinetic action (FAB-3000 follow-on with GAB/KAB strikes) without immediately committing the mechanized reserves. This suggests greater patience or a final effort to ensure maximum degradation of UAF defensive fire before the breach attempt.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF frontline ordnance stocks (GAB/KABs) appear sufficient to sustain the current air-supported preparation tempo.
The effects of the Perm rail sabotage have not yet manifested on the frontline; the logistical pressure point remains the Kostiantynivka GLOC closure threat.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 remains effective, coordinating deep air strikes (GABs/KABs) across multiple sectors (Donetsk, Chernihiv UAV activity), indicating synchronized intent to isolate the battlefield preparatory to the ground attack.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
OC East: UAF forces are enduring intense GAB/KAB bombardment. Readiness levels remain critical. The immediate focus must be hardening C2 and maintaining morale against the combined kinetic and IO assault.
Air Force (PS ZSU): Active warning systems demonstrate continued vigilance against incoming aerial threats, confirming UAF AD assets are operational and tracking threats across multiple axes (Chernihiv, South-East, Donetsk).
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Success: UAF AD tracking capabilities are robust, providing crucial early warnings despite sustained RF aerial activity.
Setback: Continued exposure of forward defenses to heavy guided ordnance (GAB/KABs) risks personnel losses and critical equipment damage immediately before the main assault.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
Air Defense Munitions: Critical requirement for AD munitions to counter the multi-axis UAV and tactical aviation threat (Dnipropetrovsk GLOC, Chernihiv/Kyiv axis).
Counter-Artillery/AD C2 Redundancy: Need for rapid establishment of mobile/redundant C2 nodes capable of surviving GAB strikes and the expected strategic missile wave (MDCOA).
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
Internal Divisions (KEY RF Narrative): RF IO is heavily pushing narratives of political infighting, leadership crises (Umerov testifying against Zelensky, Azarov predicting government collapse), and secret US/RF peace deals (Daily Telegraph quote). This aims to sow internal panic and delegitimize UAF political resolve just as the tactical situation becomes critical. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Military Morale Attack: The Volchansk POW video is a textbook PsyOp, intended to convince frontline troops that they will be abandoned, denied MEDEVAC, and left without ammunition.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
Public sentiment is resilient but is being directly challenged by the heavy kinetic escalation (FAB-3000) and coordinated RF PsyOps. The immediate need is a successful tactical defense at Pokrovsk to neutralize the negative IO effects.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
The RF propaganda regarding secret US/RF negotiations without EU/Ukrainian participation aims to undermine the unity of the NATO/EU coalition, particularly targeting states like Slovakia (PM Fico), who may be receptive to such narratives.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 2 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Final Preparatory Fires and Assault Initiation)
Terminal Bombardment: RF Tactical Aviation will execute a final wave of high-density GAB/KAB strikes focused on key intersection points and identified UAF strongpoints immediately adjacent to the Mirnohrad FAB-3000 zone.
GLOC/SpN Trigger: RF Spetsnaz teams are expected to execute the interdiction of the Kostiantynivka GLOC immediately upon confirmation of the readiness of the main mechanized assault force. This will be the trigger for the 40th/155th OMBR.
Breach Initiation: RF mechanized forces (40th/155th OMBR, Battalion size) will initiate the main ground assault through the bomb-cleared sector towards Pokrovsk, relying on speed to bypass lingering resistance.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours
Strategic Missile/GAB Barrage (GRAU follow-on): RF forces launch the reconstituted missile wave (as previously analyzed) synchronized with continued GAB/KAB strikes, targeting UAF reserve concentration areas and secondary C2 nodes across Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, ensuring no large-scale reinforcement can reach OC East.
Exploitation and Severance: Successful RF penetration towards Pokrovsk coupled with the closure of the Kostiantynivka GLOC severs the primary defense line. The RF objective shifts to establishing fire control over the main road network leading west, solidifying the operational breach.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-1 Hours (TACTICAL)
Kostiantynivka Compromise: Confirmed kinetic engagement or IED BDA on the GLOC.
ISR/SIGINT confirms fire fight or explosion on the main supply route. (DECISION POINT: J3/J4 must confirm the diversion of all traffic to secondary routes and deployment of pre-positioned Counter-SpN assets.)
1-3 Hours (OPERATIONAL)
RF Main Assault Launch: RF armor crosses the final defensive line near Mirnohrad.
ISR confirms a battalion-sized mechanized thrust. (DECISION POINT: OC East must commit designated reserve forces and authorize pre-planned HIMARS/GMLRS saturation fires onto the assault column.)
3-12 Hours (STRATEGIC)
GRAU Missile Strike Initiation: Launch of a high-density, multi-type missile strike against Eastern UAF operational depth.
Early Warning Systems/ELINT detect mass signatures indicating large-scale ballistic/cruise missile launch. (DECISION POINT: UAF High Command must implement contingency plans for C2 redundancy and air defense resource maximization.)
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - KINETIC EFFECT
ATACMS BDA Verification: Confirm or deny RF claims regarding the destruction of two ATACMS launchers in Kharkiv.
IMAGERY/HUMINT: Task high-resolution ISR/Satellite assets to the alleged strike area. Request HUMINT verification from local assets.
LOW
HIGH - TACTICAL FOCUS
GLOC SpN Confirmation: Verify presence, disposition, and readiness of SpN assets near Kostiantynivka.
SIGINT/ELINT/ISR: Intensive low-level UAV ISR sweep of the main supply route and adjacent wooded areas. Task local C2 for increased patrol frequency.
MEDIUM
HIGH - STRATEGIC INTENT
GRAU Missile Cargo Characterization: Determine the type and volume of ordnance being moved at the GRAU Missile Arsenal.
SAR/IMINT: Re-task high-resolution SAR to characterize crate size/volume to distinguish between ballistic (Iskander) and cruise (Kh-101) components.
Action: Commit the designated anti-armor tactical reserve (Brigade/Battalion group) to blocking positions now. Do not wait for confirmation of the ground breach. Deployment should be complete within T+60 minutes.
Rationale: Enemy fire preparation (FAB-3000, KAB/GABs) is complete. The ground assault is imminent (MLCOA). Pre-positioning reserves is the only way to effectively counter the speed of the anticipated exploitation.
STRATCOM/MoD: Counter-IO Surge (URGENT).
Action: Immediately launch a public affairs campaign specifically refuting RF claims of abandonment and political collapse. Focus resources on neutralizing the Volchansk P.O.W. narrative by emphasizing successful UAF MEDEVAC procedures and the tactical success of the Perm sabotage.
Rationale: The IO attack is synchronized with the kinetic attack. Maintaining morale and trust in C2 leadership is critical to preventing panic during the expected breakthrough attempt.
J2/Air Force Command: Prioritize AD for Logistics Hubs (URGENT).
Action: Reallocate available Mobile Air Defense systems to the Dnipropetrovsk logistics hub and the secondary GLOC entry points west of Pokrovsk. Accept higher risk for non-essential area defense.
Rationale: The incoming UAV threat to Dnipropetrovsk and the operational success at Pokrovsk hinge on continued resupply. Active protection of these GLOCs/hubs must be prioritized over general area defense.
