DTG: 220645Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 220600Z NOV 25 – 220645Z NOV 25
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The kinetic breakthrough phase at Pokrovsk remains imminent. The immediate spike in RF information operations confirms a coordinated effort to apply diplomatic/psychological pressure precisely as the main offensive push commences.
Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): The previous FAB-3000 strike on Mirnohrad has not yet been followed by the confirmed, large-scale mechanized assault (40th/155th OMBR), suggesting RF is waiting for optimal synchronization or final reconnaissance (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
Kyiv/Deep Rear: Air defense (AD) activity is confirmed in Kyiv Oblast, specifically engaging enemy UAVs (20:37:48). This confirms the continuation of RF saturation drone pressure aimed at forcing UAF AD dispersal and potentially striking C2/GLOC targets in the rear, as previously predicted.
Lviv (Deep Rear): Firefighting efforts are confirmed to be ongoing at warehouses near Lviv (20:35:30) following a recent RF attack. This highlights RF capability to maintain pressure on strategic western logistics and storage hubs.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Night conditions remain favorable for RF UAV operations and infiltration (e.g., Spetsnaz activity near Kostiantynivka GLOC). Low visibility favors both the RF assault and UAF defensive/counter-infiltration measures.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Force Posture: RF is coordinating kinetic and cognitive domains. The simultaneous push on the Pokrovsk front and the massive escalation in "peace plan" messaging (20:26:59, 20:28:01) indicates RF intent to shatter UAF resolve immediately upon breakthrough.
UAF Force Posture: High-level diplomatic activity continues in Kyiv (20:41:57), with Syrskyi meeting the US Secretary of the Army. This is a critical indicator that Kyiv is proactively managing international support and countering the RF IO narrative of isolation.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities (Confirmed):
Urban Clearing: Demonstrated capability to utilize FAB-3000 class ordnance to eliminate hardened urban defensive positions prior to maneuver.
Psychological Coercion: Highly effective synchronization of political leaks (US pressure for 2.5x army reduction - 20:28:01) with battlefield movements to achieve operational objectives via psychological demoralization.
Domestic Sustainment: RF MoD is actively showcasing and streamlining veteran support programs (20:33:02), designed to maintain domestic support for the "SVO" despite casualties and long war timelines.
Intentions (Reiterated):
Achieve Breakthrough (Tactical): Initiate mechanized assault on Pokrovsk axis within the immediate timeframe (T-Minus < 4 hours).
Force Strategic Negotiation (Operational/Strategic): Leverage battlefield success and diplomatic pressure to force Kyiv into accepting a maximalist peace plan by the end of winter (Budanov timeline cited: 20:34:02).
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
Renewed Focus on Urban Assault: The confirmed FAB-3000 use and the video evidence of heavy, sustained fighting in urban/suburban environments on the Zaporizhzhia front (20:30:34) confirm RF intent to avoid protracted sieges by utilizing massed destruction (glide bombs, heavy artillery) to clear paths for maneuver forces.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF Strategic Logistics: The success of the UAF deep strike (Perm rail sabotage) is acknowledged by the RF military commentariat (20:49:12) as a significant impediment to sustained operations, despite the focus on strategic airframes like the Su-57 (20:47:02) for propaganda purposes.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2: Excellent, visible synchronization between IO and kinetic operations. The messaging on the US peace plan is timed to maximize impact on UAF field commanders and political leadership as the Pokrovsk attack looms.
UAF C2: UAF military leadership (Syrskyi meeting US officials) is actively engaging the political domain to secure counter-leverage, demonstrating C2 stability under intense hybrid pressure (20:41:57).
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Resilience under Pressure: UAF AD remains active and effective in the deep rear (Kyiv, 20:37:48).
Strategic Resolve (Confirmed): Budanov’s statement, amplified by Russian channels (20:34:02), sets a clear, realistic endpoint ("window of negotiations will be in the middle of February")—a necessary C2 step to anchor UAF planning and morale against immediate RF maximalist demands.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Success: UAF deep-strike/sabotage operations continue to impose high friction on RF strategic logistics (Perm, Lviv targeting confirmed).
Setback: Confirmed UAF loss of prisoners/equipment (20:33:12, capture video context), indicating RF counter-infiltration or localized tactical success in small unit engagements.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
AD/C-UAS Systems (CRITICAL): The confirmed, sustained drone threat over Kyiv (20:37:48) and the overall pattern of RF deep strikes (Lviv, Mirnohrad) confirms the urgent need to replenish and harden forward AD assets, particularly against low-altitude UAV/drone swarms.
Reinforcement for Pokrovsk: The immediate priority remains the deployment of the tactical reserve to key blocking positions to counter the inevitable mechanized thrust.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
Main Effort: Strategic Coercion: RF IO is attempting to create a pre-emptive strategic defeat narrative by widely publicizing the (unconfirmed) US proposal for Ukraine to cut its army by 2.5 times (20:28:01) and claiming US pressure is "tangible" (20:26:59). This targets the core of UAF strategic resilience: Western support.
Counter-Narrative Gap: RF military channels are using the current diplomatic confusion to frame any future peace deal as inevitable and worse than an immediate surrender (20:49:12, referencing the failure of Minsk agreements).
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
The sustained deep strikes (Lviv, Kharkiv supermarket - 20:47:24) are intended to erode public morale and create a humanitarian crisis (20:42:03). However, the focus on US political pressure risks generating anti-American sentiment within Ukraine if not carefully managed.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
The key international counter to RF pressure is the visible presence and support from senior US military officials (Syrskyi/US SecArmy meeting, 20:41:57). This provides an optical and diplomatic reassurance against the narrative of abandonment.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (220645Z NOV 25 - 221845Z NOV 25)
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Breakthrough Initiation and IO Apex)
Pokrovsk Mechanized Thrust: RF 40th/155th OMBR initiates the main mechanized assault into the breach zone cleared by the FAB-3000. RF will leverage massed artillery and EW to support the spearhead and suppress UAF counter-mobility/anti-tank teams.
Psychological Warfare Peak: RF will flood international and domestic media with further details or endorsements of the maximalist peace plan, attempting to trigger operational C2 indecision in Kyiv during the kinetic crisis.
Kostiantynivka Ambush: Spetsnaz elements will launch kinetic interdiction operations on the Kostiantynivka GLOC, attempting to stop the movement of UAF reserve forces toward the Pokrovsk axis.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Encirclement via GLOC Closure)
GLOC Closure and Reserve Interdiction: Successful RF Spetsnaz interdiction of the Kostiantynivka GLOC combined with coordinated long-range precision strikes (Artillery/MLRS) on secondary supply routes forces UAF to commit reserves along compromised axes.
Operational Deep Maneuver: RF mechanized forces exploit the resulting supply and reinforcement delay, bypassing the main UAF fortified positions and threatening to cut off the main UAF grouping defending Pokrovsk.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-4 Hours (TACTICAL)
Mechanized Assault Confirmation: Visual confirmation (UAS/RECON) of combined arms maneuver by 40th/155th OMBR pushing west from the breach zone.
Confirmation of RF tank/IFV columns entering the Mirnohrad-Pokrovsk axis. (DECISION POINT: J3 must initiate the pre-approved counter-attack/delay plan using tactical reserves and fire support.)
0-6 Hours (TACTICAL)
Kostiantynivka GLOC Closure Confirmation: Multiple kinetic events (IED/ATGM/Artillery) causing confirmed sustained traffic stoppage (>1 hour) on the Kostiantynivka main road.
HUMINT/Traffic control confirms secondary route activation is required. (DECISION POINT: J3 must assign dedicated air/recon assets to hunt Spetsnaz teams and prioritize GLOC clearance over non-essential combat support missions.)
12-24 Hours (OPERATIONAL)
RF Strategic Missile Launch: Launch of long-range cruise/ballistic missiles derived from GRAU Arsenal activity targeting energy, C2, or logistics hubs.
SIGINT/ELINT confirms launch sequence or trajectory data. (DECISION POINT: J7 must execute the established AD prioritization plan for critical infrastructure protection, especially near Kyiv/Lviv.)
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - KINETIC EXECUTION
GLOC Spetsnaz Composition/Location: Verify the number, equipment, and precise positioning of RF Spetsnaz teams for the Kostiantynivka GLOC ambush.
ISR (UAS/Thermal): Sustained low-altitude surveillance focusing on choke points (bridges, culverts) and known enemy observation points along the Kostiantynivka road (5 km radius).
LOW
HIGH - STRATEGIC WEAPONS
GRAU Arsenal Cargo Type: Determine the specific missile class (e.g., Iskander vs. Kh-101/555) being prepared for transfer at the GRAU Arsenal (Score 47.07).
IMINT/VHR Re-Task: Obtain updated high-resolution satellite imagery (VHR) to analyze transport vehicle types and crate dimensions.
MEDIUM
HIGH - OPERATIONAL INTENT
40th/155th OMBR Objective: Confirm the immediate operational depth target following the breach (e.g., are they aiming to bypass Kostiantynivka entirely?).
HUMINT/SIGINT/OSINT: Intercepts or analysis of captured documents/RF communications concerning named objectives or Phase 2 movement vectors.
Action: Do not wait for confirmed engagement on Kostiantynivka. Initiate the pre-planned counter-Spetsnaz hunter-killer teams and maintain constant mobile reconnaissance on the route.
Rationale: The time synchronization between the Pokrovsk breach and the GLOC closure is the critical point for RF operational success. Proactive defense must prevent the logistical break.
Action: Use the confirmed meeting between Syrskyi and US officials (20:41:57) as the central message. Highlight renewed US support and commitment, directly refuting the RF narrative of abandonment and the maximalist peace plan.
Rationale: Countering the IO/IW component is as vital as the kinetic defense at Pokrovsk. Strategic communications must stabilize domestic and international perception.
J4 (Logistics): Mobile Air Defense for Reserve Movement (URGENT).
Action: Assign dedicated, mobile AD/C-UAS escorts to all reserve troop movements and critical resupply convoys moving toward the Pokrovsk axis.
Rationale: The absence of a large-scale air attack is often compensated by persistent drone/loitering munition surveillance and attack (like on the Zaporizhzhia front, 20:30:34). Reserves must be protected in transit.
