Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 220600Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 222330Z NOV 25 – 220600Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. RF is executing the main effort at Pokrovsk while strategically leveraging IO/IW to destabilize Kyiv's diplomatic position and degrade UAF cohesion.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL – EXECUTION PHASE): The shift from preparatory strikes to the execution phase is confirmed by the previous report's FAB-3000 strike on Mirnohrad. RF mechanized assault (40th/155th OMBR) is assessed as either underway or imminent (T-Minus < 4 hours as per previous reporting). This is the main effort aimed at operational depth penetration.
• Northern/Central Ukraine (Deep Rear): RF continues sustained saturation drone pressure. New sightings confirm UAV movements on the East Kyiv axis, heading west (20:20:22), continuing the pattern of forcing UAF AD dispersal and potentially striking GLOCs or C2 targets.
• Zaporizhzhia Front: UAF Regional Military Administration issued an alert (19:59:03), indicating continued RF kinetic activity (likely missile or drone strikes, as per Dempster-Shafer analysis), confirming this axis remains kinetically active despite being a secondary RF effort.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Nighttime conditions favor RF drone and MLRS operations (20:04:02) and Spetsnaz infiltration, particularly near the Kostiantynivka GLOC as predicted. Conditions remain viable for the mechanized assault.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Force Posture (Main Effort): RF is committed to the Pokrovsk breach. VDV-aligned channels are broadcasting MLRS launch footage (20:04:02) to reinforce the perception of massed fire support for the ground forces.
• UAF Force Posture (High Readiness): UAF General Staff (20:01:06) published an operational update, maintaining high alert. UAF Ministry of Defense (MoD) is proactively addressing internal welfare by simplifying the process for obtaining veteran IDs (UDB) for those released from captivity or those who lost documentation (19:55:18). This action is designed to maintain high force morale ahead of the critical engagement.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Heavy Ordnance Clearing: Confirmed use of FAB-3000 to "clear" urban terrain for mechanized forces (Previous Report).
2. Precision and Volume Fire Support: High readiness of Tornado-S MLRS systems (Previous Report) confirmed by propaganda videos (20:04:02), indicating robust fire support for the main assault.
3. IO/IW Amplification: RF is highly effective at immediately amplifying maximalist peace terms (19:59:01, 20:01:39, 20:12:03), attempting to immediately capitalize on diplomatic confusion to pressure Kyiv.

Intentions:

1. Immediate Tactical Breakthrough: Achieve operational penetration at Pokrovsk/Mirnohrad within the next 4 hours to bypass fortified positions.
2. Strategic Coercion: Use military pressure and simultaneous diplomatic leaks to force Ukraine into signing a maximalist, unfavorable peace deal before spring 2026 (19:57:54).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF Focus on IO/IW Synchronization: RF milbloggers (19:59:01) are aggressively linking battlefield success to diplomatic outcomes, claiming that continued Ukrainian resistance only results in worse peace terms later. This is a direct psychological warfare effort aimed at eroding UAF national resolve.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Deep Logistics Strain: The successful UAF deep-strike sabotage of fuel rails in Perm (Previous Report) signals a genuine, high-friction pressure point on RF strategic logistics, limiting fuel supplies for forward maneuver elements.
• RF Missile Reconstitution: The confirmed spike in activity at the GRAU Missile Arsenal (Score 47.07, Previous Report) is the single most significant logistical indicator of a high-volume, follow-on strategic strike wave being prepared.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2: Highly effective in synchronizing the kinetic main effort (Pokrovsk) with the psychological campaign (maximalist peace terms).
• UAF C2: UAF leadership maintains strategic intent despite internal and external pressure. Budanov’s assessment (19:57:54) that the RF objective to occupy Donetsk Oblast by spring 2026 is "unrealistic" is an important strategic C2 message aimed at countering RF maximalist IO.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• High Morale Focus: MoD efforts to streamline UDB documentation (19:55:18) demonstrate awareness of the critical link between soldier welfare and sustained readiness, particularly for those returning from captivity.
• Strategic Resolve: The Head of DIU’s public statement (19:57:54) setting a realistic timeline for the end of RF operational opportunities ("until the end of February" - 20:12:56) is a key strategic counter-narrative, establishing a time horizon for UAF endurance.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: Strategic deep-strike action (Perm fuel sabotage) placing real pressure on RF logistics.
• Setback: Continuation of massed drone strikes (20:20:22) and the confirmed strategic loss of territory to RF through maximalist diplomatic leaks (20:06:45), even if rejected by Kyiv, creates internal pressure.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• EW Countermeasures: RF’s demonstrated effectiveness in drone warfare (20:00:00) highlights the need for immediate, targeted C-UAS and EW solutions to protect C2 nodes and forward maneuver units from FPV saturation attacks.
• Strategic Reserves: Immediate deployment of the tactical reserve (as recommended in the previous report) to blocking positions near Kostiantynivka is now critical to mitigate the MDCOA of GLOC interdiction and resulting operational encirclement.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Escalation of Peace Terms: RF channels (19:59:01, 20:12:03) are consistently pushing the most demanding terms—including the absence of foreign troops and territorial concessions in Zaporizhzhia/Kherson (20:06:45)—to demoralize the UAF and domestic population.
• Targeting US Support: The reporting on the resignation of US Special Envoy Kit Kellogg (20:01:43, 20:04:57) is likely being amplified by RF IO to signal instability in US commitment and policy direction toward Ukraine.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• The terror strike on Ternopil (20:03:08) will solidify public hatred of the aggressor and reinforce resolve, but the simultaneous leak of territorial concession terms (20:06:45) risks internal division and political instability if not proactively managed by Kyiv.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The diplomatic landscape is dominated by the US/RF maximalist peace proposal (20:06:45). The perceived departure of key US personnel (Kellogg) creates an opportunity for RF to amplify the narrative of diminishing international resolve. Ukraine must push for strong public reassurance from international partners to counter this.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (220600Z NOV 25 - 221800Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Breakthrough Initiation and GLOC Interdiction)

1. Pokrovsk Breakthrough Attempt: RF 40th/155th OMBR mechanized assault initiates, driving into the Mirnohrad breach zone cleared by the FAB-3000. RF will attempt to advance 2-3 km into the operational depth within the first 6 hours, prioritizing speed over security.
2. GLOC Ambush Execution: Synchronized with the Pokrovsk breach, RF Spetsnaz elements (previously inserted) will execute the ambush/interdiction of the Kostiantynivka road, utilizing IEDs, ATGMs, and fire assets to close the main logistical artery for Pokrovsk.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Paralysis)

1. Combined Arms Encirclement: RF mechanized forces sustain the momentum of the initial breakthrough and, combined with the successful interdiction of the Kostiantynivka GLOC, begin tactical maneuver to the flanks of the main UAF grouping defending Pokrovsk. This forces UAF to commit reserves piecemeal or conduct a mass, daylight withdrawal, exposing them to devastating RF artillery and air assets.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J2 (Pokrovsk): Initiate Counter-SpN and Secondary GLOC Activation (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Treat the Kostiantynivka GLOC as compromised now (MDCOA mitigation). Activate secondary supply routes immediately and dedicate mobile, high-readiness light infantry and C-UAS teams to clear and secure the Kostiantynivka main road, preventing total logistical paralysis.
   • Rationale: Preventing the closure of the Kostiantynivka route is critical to sustaining the Pokrovsk defense. RF will time the ambush with the mechanized assault to maximize operational chaos.

2. J4 (Logistics): Disperse Forward Ammunition Points (URGENT).

   • Action: Immediately disperse any large, identifiable forward ammunition storage points near Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka into smaller, hardened, and mobile caches.
   • Rationale: RF precision fires (Krasnopol/Tornado-S) are designed to hit high-value logistics targets. Dispersion reduces the effect of single strikes and increases survivability.

3. STRATCOM/MoD: Counter-Narrative Campaign (URGENT).

   • Action: Proactively disseminate the Head of DIU’s assessment that the RF objective is "unrealistic" (19:57:54). Highlight the success of the Perm sabotage operation to demonstrate UAF capacity to impose strategic friction, countering the maximalist peace narrative.
   • Rationale: Direct and visible refutation of RF IO is necessary to maintain public and military morale during the main RF offensive push.

//END SITREP//