Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 222330Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 222300Z NOV 25 – 222330Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. RF is maintaining maximum pressure across the deep-strike (drone saturation) and cognitive domains while solidifying the narrative that only Russian military success dictates the terms of a future peace.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): RF is executing final air preparation. Air Force Command confirms new launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB/FAB series) targeting Donetsk Oblast (19:34:09), likely directed against UAF defenses near the Mirnohrad/Pokrovsk breach zone following the FAB-3000 precedent. The ground assault initiation (MLCOA 5.1) remains highly imminent.
• Zaporizhzhia Front (Secondary): RF sources ("Два майора") are showing FPV drone operation footage (19:25:13) and launching high-profile public solicitation drives for advanced Electronic Warfare (EW) equipment (19:50:19). This indicates that the Zaporizhzhia sector is highly contested in the EW domain and remains a secondary offensive focus for local RF units, requiring technological superiority to advance.
• Deep Rear Targets (Sustained Pressure): Continued power outage schedules in Kyiv (19:34:49) confirm the sustained strategic impact of RF energy strikes.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No change. Conditions remain suitable for drone operations, enabling the ongoing saturation attacks.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Force Posture (Drone Saturation): Multiple groups of RF UAVs (Shahed/Geran type) are tracked across Central and Northern Ukraine, stressing UAF AD:
  • East Dnipropetrovsk (Westbound, 19:27:50)
  • Central Sumy (Westbound toward Chernihiv, 19:30:06)
  • North Kherson (Northbound toward Dnipropetrovsk, 19:36:35)
• UAF Posture (Response Synchronization): UAF 4th National Guard Brigade ('Rubizh') Artillery confirms counter-battery fire specifically dedicated to avenging the Ternopil civilian casualties (19:32:19). This signals a strong, morale-driven response to RF terror tactics.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Guided Artillery Proficiency: RF sources highlight the effective use of Krasnopol guided munitions by 2S35 artillery systems (19:35:10) to destroy high-value UAF targets, specifically UAV control points in Dnipropetrovsk. This capability severely degrades UAF tactical ISR and C2.
2. MLRS Effectiveness: Confirmed operational readiness of Tornado-S MLRS systems by the 79th Guards Brigade (19:35:09), targeting UAF deployment points, airfields, and counter-battery assets (claiming three M-777s). This confirms RF has a deep-strike precision capability beyond strategic cruise missiles.
3. Advanced Hybrid Warfare: RF is testing new ground systems, specifically the "Kuryer" Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) equipped with the RPO "Shmel" thermobaric rocket launcher (19:45:04). This confirms investment in next-generation, high-lethality autonomous ground systems to reduce personnel risk in close combat.

Intentions:

1. Kinetic Domination: Achieve an immediate, localized breakthrough at Pokrovsk supported by KAB strikes, coupled with wide-area drone saturation to exhaust UAF AD reserves and distract from the main effort.
2. Psychological Warfare and Coercion: Fully reject any diplomatic outcome not dictated by military success (19:25:52) while simultaneously leaking maximum-demand "peace terms" (force reduction by 2.5x, no foreign troops, long-range weapon bans - 19:48:39) to erode Ukrainian public support and cohesion.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Drone Defense Targeting: RF artillery is now prioritizing the destruction of UAF UAV control points using precision munitions (Krasnopol), reflecting the importance of drone warfare and counter-ISR in this phase of the conflict.
• IW Pivot: The RF official narrative has shifted from "open to talks" (Peskov, 19:28:01) to "negotiations will be dictated by the soldier's boot" (milblogger, 19:25:52), reinforcing that military victory is the sole pathway to a settlement.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics (Artillery Focus): The extensive propaganda focusing on Artillery/Rocket Forces Day (19:35:08-19:35:10), showcasing multiple MLRS and howitzer systems in action, suggests artillery remains the backbone of RF kinetic operations, supported by robust ammunition supply (as hinted by the GRAU arsenal surge in the previous report).
• RF Logistics (Local Gaps): The public appeal by "Два майора" for EW equipment funding (19:50:19) suggests that while strategic support is available, specific high-tech battlefield requirements (like EW/C-UAS systems) may still rely heavily on domestic volunteer support, indicating logistical inflexibility for niche high-value assets.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2: Highly effective C2 synchronization between frontline maneuver (KAB strikes on Pokrovsk), deep fires (drone waves), and strategic messaging (hardline rejection of external peace terms).
• UAF C2: The Ukrainian government has formally rejected the leaked US/RF "peace plan" (19:24:04), asserting control over the diplomatic narrative despite immense pressure. This demonstrates unified strategic refusal of unacceptable terms.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Defensive Rejection: The official refusal of the US/RF plan confirms a resolute strategic posture that will not yield to diplomatic coercion, bolstering military resolve (19:24:04).
• Localized Counter-Fire: UAF 4th Brigade's specific designation of fire missions "For Ternopil, for the children" (19:32:19) suggests strong unit cohesion and high morale despite civilian losses, turning RF terror strikes into motivation for counter-attack.
• Adaptive Security: The Cabinet of Ministers decision to allow private companies to form their own air defense groups (19:44:54) is a necessary, albeit late, adaptation to the persistent RF deep-strike campaign, freeing up high-value military AD assets for priority frontline and strategic point defense.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: Formal diplomatic rejection of coercive peace terms. Tactical success in galvanizing local unit morale in response to civilian tragedy.
• Setback: Continued RF aerial bomb (KAB) strikes on the Donbas (19:34:09) and the coordinated saturation drone attacks across Central/Northern Ukraine continue to strain UAF AD resources.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Air Defense (Decentralization): The new policy for private AD groups highlights the systemic strain on state-provided AD. Requires immediate standardization and integration procedures for these new civilian/private assets to ensure effectiveness and deconfliction.
• Electronic Warfare: The successful RF targeting of UAF UAV control points and the RF public request for more EW gear indicate that the EW fight on the Zaporizhzhia and likely Pokrovsk axes is reaching a critical inflection point. UAF requires increased access to mobile, resilient EW/C-UAS solutions.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Maximum Demands Escalation: RF and aligned channels are doubling down on the leaked "peace plan" details, increasing the demanded force reduction from 2x to 2.5x (19:48:39). This is designed to maximize public shock and internal political pressure on Kyiv.
• "Soldier’s Boot" Narrative: RF official and unofficial channels are aggressively pushing the narrative that negotiations are meaningless until Russia achieves military success (19:25:52, 19:32:49), attempting to delegitimize any current diplomatic efforts by Kyiv.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Sentiment is likely polarized: Anxiety over the severe leaked diplomatic terms is being countered by nationalistic resolve following the GoU's outright rejection. The visible, morale-driven counter-fire response by UAF units (19:32:19) is critical for public confidence.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Ukraine's formal rejection (19:24:04) shifts the diplomatic burden back onto the US/RF actors to adjust the terms. It confirms that the GoU will not accept a peace dictated by the status quo or by maximalist Russian demands.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (222330Z NOV 25 - 231130Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Synchronized Attack)

1. Pokrovsk Main Assault Initiation (T-Minus < 4 hours): Following the recent KAB strikes, the 40th/155th OMBR mechanized assault will launch in the Pokrovsk sector. The effort will likely be supported by heavy MRLS fire (Tornado-S) targeting UAF forward C2 and staging areas.
2. Saturation Drone Strike (Midnight Wave): The three detected UAV groups (Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy/Chernihiv, Kherson/Dnipropetrovsk) will converge on high-value industrial and energy targets in Central Ukraine (Kyiv, Dnipro, Chernihiv) around midnight, forcing UAF AD assets to disperse and engage non-frontline threats.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Defensive Breach)

1. Operational Depth Penetration: RF successfully breaches UAF lines at Pokrovsk, utilizing UGVs (like the "Kuryer") and dismounted infantry to rapidly clear a path through the FAB-3000 rubble zone. This penetration exceeds 5 km depth and places RF units in a position to interdict the secondary GLOCs feeding the sector, achieving the desired semi-encirclement before UAF reserves can counter-attack effectively.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J2 (Pokrovsk): High-Value Counter-Battery (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Prioritize the suppression and destruction of all observed RF MRLS (especially Tornado-S) and Krasnopol-capable artillery (2S35/2S19) immediately behind the Pokrovsk/Mirnohrad sector.
   • Rationale: These precision and area-fire systems are enabling the mechanized assault and degrading UAF C2/ISR (Krasnopol targeting UAV CPs). Neutralizing them degrades the quality of the RF offensive.

2. J7/J2 (Air Force Command): Dedicated AD for C2 Nodes (URGENT).

   • Action: Reallocate high-mobility, short-range AD systems (e.g., Gepard, Avenger) to provide localized point defense for critical UAF C2 centers supporting the Pokrovsk defense and known UAV control points in Dnipropetrovsk/Kharkiv.
   • Rationale: RF is actively targeting UAV CPs with precision munitions. Securing these C2 nodes is paramount to maintaining tactical agility during the main assault.

3. J4/MIA: Formalize Private AD Integration (URGENT).

   • Action: Immediately publish clear, simplified procedures for the integration, authorization, and deconfliction of fire from newly formed private/civil AD groups into the national AD picture, focusing on the defense of regional logistics hubs (Dnipro, Odesa, Kyiv).
   • Rationale: Maximizing AD coverage against the ongoing saturation strikes requires rapid, coordinated deployment of all available assets.

//END SITREP//