Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 222300Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 222100Z NOV 25 – 222300Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The RF remains committed to simultaneous kinetic (Pokrovsk axis, deep strikes) and cognitive (peace plan leaks, leadership threats) pressure to force a favorable diplomatic outcome.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): Precursor activities for the RF mechanized assault remain active. New Russian milblogger footage from the 'Group Vostok' (19:03:01) focuses on destroying UAF tactical utility vehicles (ATVs), indicating that close-in ISR and elimination of mobility assets are ongoing immediate preparations for the assault.
• Volchansk (Secondary Pressure): RF sources claim minor advancement in Volchansk (19:23:01). This front continues to serve as an economy of force effort to fix UAF reserves in Kharkiv Oblast, preventing their transfer to the critical Pokrovsk sector.
• Deep Rear Strikes (Sustained): The previous analysis of deep strikes is confirmed by reports of continued combat losses and damage assessment:
  • Ternopil: Confirmed casualty count rising (26 KIA, 93 WIA as of 18:57:43), indicating a high-casualty strike (likely missile) on non-military infrastructure.
  • Dnipro: UAV attack resulted in a fire at a food storage facility (19:18:00). RF continues targeting civilian logistics and supply chains to create internal friction.
  • Odesa: Power outage schedules released (19:15:03) confirm regional energy grid instability following the recent saturation strikes, reinforcing the criticality of AD protection for central and western Ukraine.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No new significant data. UAV activity reported in Kherson and Kharkiv Oblasts (19:03:45, 19:12:38) confirms clear enough conditions for persistent drone ISR and attack operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Force Posture: RF is maintaining the Information-Kinetic synchronization plan. While forward units execute final preparations (drone operations at Pokrovsk), strategic communication emphasizes diplomatic "openness" (18:55:01, 19:11:01) to maximize the psychological impact of the Pokrovsk escalation.
• UAF Air Defense: New groups of UAVs detected over Kherson (heading NW) and Southern Kharkiv (heading N) (19:03:45, 19:12:38). UAF AD is actively tracking multiple low-altitude threats across the operational area, stressing both frontline and deep rear AD assets.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Effective Hybrid Integration: RF is effectively combining kinetic action (FAB-3000 precedent, Ternopil casualties, Dnipro logistics strikes) with advanced Information Warfare (IW) concerning a "peace plan" (19:14:57, 19:15:02).
2. High-Risk Target Acquisition: RF milblogger narratives are escalating threats to the highest level of UAF leadership (19:20:08 - calls for the assassination of President Zelenskyy via aircraft sabotage). While this is purely IO, it reveals the MDCOA and is designed to create anxiety within the UAF High Command.
3. Sustained Drone Warfare: Confirmed use of specialized UAVs by the 14th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Group Vostok) (19:03:01) to eliminate UAF tactical mobility assets, indicating tight integration of Special Forces, ISR, and FPV technology at the FEBA.

Intentions:

1. Tactical-Operational Penetration: Force a rapid and decisive breakthrough at Pokrovsk, exploiting the physical disruption caused by heavy ordnance and synchronized deep strikes.
2. Diplomatic Coercion: Leverage high civilian casualties (Ternopil) and the continuous public revelation of the alleged US/RF peace plan terms (e.g., UAF force reduction, no foreign troops, Russian as official language - 19:14:57, 19:15:02) to demoralize the populace and compel GoU concessions.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Targeting Priority: RF targeting has shifted to include non-military logistics infrastructure (food storage in Dnipro, 19:18:00) alongside energy infrastructure, broadening the scope of targets intended to degrade quality of life and create internal supply issues.
• IO Escalation: RF and proxy channels are directly confirming the central, highly polarizing elements of the leaked peace plan, including the demand to reduce UAF forces by 2.5 times and forbidding foreign troops (19:15:02).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics (External Friction): ASTRA reporting hints at domestic logistical stress in key staging areas ("selling gasoline by passport in Rostov Oblast," 19:10:23). This, combined with the earlier Perm rail sabotage, suggests UAF deep strikes are achieving friction on RF domestic distribution, which may eventually impact frontline sustainment.
• UAF Logistics (Acute Stress): The continued success of RF deep strikes against logistics (Lviv, Dnipro, Odesa power issues) places UAF combat sustainment under acute pressure.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2: Highly disciplined in maintaining the diplomatic/IO narrative of "openness to negotiations" (Peskov, 18:55:01) while simultaneously executing maximum kinetic efforts.
• UAF C2: President Zelenskyy’s statement from Turkey (19:02:36, 19:20:43) is critical: While rejecting the US/RF plan, he acknowledges that only US leadership has the power to end the war and accepts Turkey's offer of a negotiation platform. This signals a difficult but active attempt to regain control of the diplomatic narrative amidst intense pressure.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Diplomatic Flexibility: The GoU maintains a firm strategic objective (territorial integrity) but has shown operational-level flexibility by engaging with Turkey's proposed formats (19:02:36).
• High Alert: UAF AD remains on high alert, tracking new UAV groups in the critical Kherson and Kharkiv sectors, prioritizing interception of these ongoing threat vectors.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback: The rising civilian casualty count in Ternopil (18:57:43) and the destruction of civilian logistics storage in Dnipro (19:18:00) represent humanitarian and logistical setbacks due to effective RF deep strike campaigns.
• Success: The continued focus on deep-rear RF logistics (Rostov gasoline rationing hint, Perm sabotage) indicates UAF strategic interdiction operations are achieving measurable, though non-critical, friction on RF internal supply lines.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Air Defense: The sheer volume and geographic spread of current UAV activity (Kharkiv, Kherson, Dnipro) necessitate immediate reallocation and replenishment of AD munitions, particularly short-range systems for point defense of logistics hubs.
• Information Counter-Offensive: Requires resources to rapidly deploy a counter-IO narrative (Section 4.1) against the highly damaging, politically charged leaks of the alleged peace plan details.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Maximum Pressure Leaks: RF-aligned sources are exploiting the FT leak, claiming key elements of the US/RF plan involve a massive UAF force reduction and making Russian an official state language (19:14:57, 19:15:02). This is a classic "wedge" tactic designed to split UAF leadership, the military, and the public.
• RF Stability Narrative: Putin's continued public focus on AI and domestic longevity goals (18:55:39, 19:08:35) is an effort to project confidence, stability, and long-term viability, contrasting sharply with the immediate chaos RF is inflicting in Ukraine.
• Direct Threat IO (Extremist): The open call for the assassination of President Zelenskyy (19:20:08) crosses a critical IO threshold, normalizing the concept of extreme measures to end the conflict on RF terms.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Public morale is severely tested by high-casualty strikes in the deep rear (Ternopil) coinciding with leaked diplomatic terms suggesting national surrender. The military is required to show tangible progress (like the Perm sabotage success) to offset the fear and anxiety created by the coordinated kinetic/IO assault.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Turkish Mediation: President Zelenskyy's acceptance of Turkey as a platform for negotiations (19:02:36) indicates a diplomatic necessity to engage the process while maintaining control over the terms.
• US Leverage Acknowledged: Zelenskyy’s explicit statement that "only President Trump and the United States have sufficient power to end the war" (19:02:36) highlights the perceived dependence on the US for a sustainable resolution, which RF is exploiting.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (222300Z NOV 25 - 231100Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Breach Attempt)

1. Pokrovsk Breakthrough Initiation: RF mechanized forces (40th/155th OMBR) will launch the primary ground assault against the UAF defense line in the Pokrovsk sector, likely preceding the main effort with heavy indirect fire, potentially coordinated with the Northern-bound UAV group previously reported.
2. Saturation Drone Attack: RF will use the detected UAV groups (Kherson, Kharkiv) to execute a coordinated saturation strike on either Central Ukraine logistics (e.g., Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia energy hubs) or frontline UAF C2 centers supporting the Pokrovsk defense.
3. Diplomatic Maneuvering: Peskov will continue to leverage the "Russia is open to talks" line, increasing diplomatic pressure on the US and EU to push Kyiv toward the leaked peace terms.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Collapse)

1. Kostiantynivka Road Closure (Synchronized): The RF mechanized penetration at Pokrovsk forces a partial UAF retreat, simultaneously creating a target-rich environment for the pre-positioned SpN teams to successfully interdict the Kostiantynivka GLOC for a sustained period (>12 hours). This severs resupply to forward Pokrovsk units, potentially causing localized operational collapse.
2. Targeted Political Disruption: An attempt is made against high-value GoU leadership (as hinted by IO, 19:20:08). Success in this would immediately destabilize command, control, and political unity, forcing a crisis response that distracts from the ongoing Pokrovsk assault.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J2 (Pokrovsk): Initiate Counter-Mobility Kill Zone (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Execute pre-planned fire missions on identified RF staging and assembly areas in the Mirnohrad salient immediately. Do not wait for the breakthrough. Focus counter-battery efforts to suppress RF artillery supporting the initial push.
   • Rationale: The time is critical; proactive degradation of RF formation density before the main thrust crosses the line is essential to breaking the momentum of the mechanized assault.

2. J4/Air Force Command: Harden and Disperse Logistics (URGENT).

   • Action: Fully implement anti-UAV/AD coverage for the rail lines and major road transfer points in Dnipro, Kharkiv, and Odesa. Disperse and conceal all food and non-military logistics depots in Central Ukraine, shifting to smaller, lower-profile storage locations to deny RF high-value targets like the one hit in Dnipro.
   • Rationale: RF is escalating targeting of civilian supply chains. Dispersion and point defense are necessary to maintain internal stability and combat resilience.

3. STRATCOM/Security Services: Secure and Rebut (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: UAF Security Services must conduct an immediate review of security protocols for all critical diplomatic and military personnel, particularly air travel and staging areas (Poland/Turkey), in light of the extremist IO threats (19:20:08). STRATCOM must launch an aggressive public campaign emphasizing that Turkey is a neutral platform for Ukraine's plan, not the US/RF plan.
   • Rationale: The IO threat is designed to create distrust and fear in the highest echelons; security hardening and proactive narrative control are mandatory.

//END SITREP//