DTG: 222100Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 191800Z NOV 25 – 192100Z NOV 25 (Focus on new inputs)
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The RF strategic intent is a synchronized pressure campaign: a kinetic maximum effort at Pokrovsk coinciding with a diplomatic/IO surge designed to force Ukraine's acceptance of the US/RF-backed peace proposal.
Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): The previous analysis of an imminent mechanized assault remains valid. Kinetic indicators (FAB-3000 strike) combined with the persistent FPV/UAV scouting presence in Donetsk Oblast moving North towards potential logistical hubs (18:39:17) confirms RF is in the execution phase of the breakthrough attempt.
Deep Rear/Infrastructure (Lviv/Sambir): Confirmation of a "Geran" (Shahed-type) strike on an object in Sambir, Lviv Oblast (18:35:10), leading to a massive fire and subsequent blackout in Lviv (18:49:01). This confirms the RF strategy of targeting critical infrastructure deep in the rear to disrupt logistics and fragment civilian morale, directly contradicting the previous report's focus on Dnipropetrovsk only.
Air Operations: RF tactical aviation launches Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB/FAB variant) onto Donetsk and Sumy Oblasts (18:40:30). This is routine but sustains the high-tempo application of massive ordnance to degrade UAF defensive integrity ahead of ground assaults.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
No new significant weather data. Conditions likely remain muddy in frontline areas, favoring the defense if adequate reserves are positioned, but the RF reliance on FAB-3000 shows they are attempting to negate the terrain advantage entirely by destroying prepared defensive positions.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Force Posture (Kinetic and IO): The RF is exhibiting classic escalation dominance, simultaneously launching deep infrastructure strikes (Lviv) while projecting long-term domestic stability (Putin discussing AI and longevity, 18:29:21).
UAF Air Defense (AD) Posture: The UAF Air Force issued two 'Attention' warnings (18:24:03, 18:28:23) followed by the detection of a UAV group in Donetsk moving north (18:39:17). This indicates UAF AD is tracking kinetic threats in both the deep rear (Lviv strike) and the operational deep area (Donetsk UAVs).
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Sustained Deep Strike Capability: Confirmed ability to strike deep rear logistical targets (Lviv/Sambir) using Shahed UAVs to cause sustained energy blackouts and large-scale material destruction.
Integrated Drone Technology: RF MoD footage (18:33:02) highlights the use of specialized Air Repeater/Relay Drones (ВОЗДУШНЫЙ РЕТРАНСЛЯТОР) in combat zones, increasing the operational range and reliability of FPV/recon assets. This significantly enhances RF C2 and targeting efficiency at the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
Diplomatic Leverage: Kremlin spokesmen (Peskov) are exploiting the diplomatic ambiguity, claiming Russia is "open to negotiations," while simultaneously blaming Kyiv for the "pause in dialogue" (18:35:40, 18:48:40).
Intentions:
Tactical Breach (Pokrovsk): Force a rapid collapse of the UAF defensive line, exploiting the saturation bombing and the critical threat posed by the Northern-bound UAV group (18:39:17), which may be targeting C2 or logistical nodes supporting the Pokrovsk sector.
Force Peace Acceptance: Use kinetic terror (Lviv blackout, FAB-3000 strikes) combined with the official leak of the "surrender plan" details (18:26:11, 18:39:58) to compel Kyiv into negotiations based on Russian/US terms.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
Technology Insertion: The confirmed use of the Air Repeater Drone (18:33:02) is a significant development, demonstrating rapid technological adaptation to overcome electronic warfare (EW) interference and terrain masking in C2/ISR for forward tactical units.
IO Synchronization: The quick transition from the Lviv strike (18:35:10) to the immediate TASS leak detailing the US/RF territorial concession demands (18:39:58) shows high-level synchronization between kinetic and information warfare efforts.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF Logistics (Strategic IO): RF state media (TASS) and milbloggers are preoccupied with domestic IO (Putin on AI, targeting of 'foreign agents' like Khodorkovsky, 18:45:08), suggesting the Perm rail sabotage impact, while significant, has not yet triggered a visible panic in strategic communications.
UAF Logistics (Under Pressure): Confirmed blackout in Lviv (18:49:01), a major Western logistics hub. This disrupts the flow of Western materiel arriving from Poland and increases the friction on internal distribution networks, particularly concerning fuel and ammunition transit.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2: Highly effective in coordinating strategic kinetic action (Lviv strike) with diplomatic pressure (Kremlin statements) and information propagation (TASS/milblogger leaks).
UAF C2 (Vulnerable): While the diplomatic response in Ankara was strong, the C2 system is constantly being tested by simultaneous kinetic threats (Donetsk FABs, Lviv Shaheds) and the demoralizing effects of the US-backed peace plan leaks, which directly challenge the authority and justification of continued resistance.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Counter-IO: Public figures (STERNENKO, 18:39:46) are actively attempting to gauge and rally public sentiment against the "capitulation demands." This confirms the severity of the IO threat and the effort to maintain cognitive cohesion.
Tactical Resilience: UAF units are continuing critical fundraising efforts (Оперативний ЗСУ, 18:47:59; STERNENKO, 18:48:38) demonstrating decentralized but effective resupply mechanisms, focusing on key assets like drones.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Setback: The Lviv blackout and Sambir strike represent a significant setback in securing the deep logistical rear, potentially slowing the inflow of Western aid.
Success: The continued refusal of the peace plan and the engagement with US officials in Kyiv (Schmyhal meeting, 18:36:26) indicates UAF political C2 is holding and actively managing the diplomatic crisis.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
Air Defense Munitions: Critical need to replenish and redistribute AD stocks to protect Lviv/Western hubs and Dnipropetrovsk, which are now confirmed high-priority targets.
Counter-UAS/EW: Need to develop counter-measures specifically targeting the new RF Air Repeater Drone systems to degrade the improved range and efficiency of RF FPV attacks on the Pokrovsk front.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
AXIOS Peace Plan Confirmation (CRITICAL): TASS (18:39:58) and Alex Parker (18:26:11) are amplifying the details of the US-backed plan: Ukraine cedes Donbas, US recognizes RF sovereignty over Crimea and Donbas in exchange for a security guarantee. This information constitutes a maximum-pressure negotiation tactic.
Kremlin Narrative Control: RF media is simultaneously projecting domestic strength (AI focus, 18:33:57) and diplomatic moderation (Peskov: "Russia is open to negotiations," 18:48:40), aiming to shift international blame for continued conflict onto Kyiv.
Internal Critique: Commentary from inside Ukraine (Butusov, 18:43:35) discussing the demographic catastrophe in "liberated" zones acts as a double-edged sword: supporting the argument against RF occupation but also depressing morale by highlighting the grim reality of territorial cost.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
Public sentiment is characterized by acute anxiety over the leaked "capitulation demands" (STERNENKO, 18:39:46). The synchronized strikes on Lviv and the diplomatic pressure campaign are designed to maximize this anxiety, suggesting to the population that continuation of the war is pointless.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
US/RF Synchronization: The leak of the US-backed plan suggests a high degree of US/RF communication on the terms of a ceasefire, regardless of the political posturing (Trump "disappointed" in Putin, 18:31:18).
Turkish Dynamics: The cancellation of the Witkoff/Zelenskyy meeting (18:29:32) indicates that Kyiv’s diplomatic counter-move in Ankara (presenting an alternative plan) has created friction with the US proponents of the current peace proposal. This confirms Kyiv is isolated but still actively shaping the narrative.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours (222100Z NOV 25 - 232100Z NOV 25)
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Dual-Axis Pressure)
Mechanized Assault at Pokrovsk (IMMINENT): The RF 40th/155th OMBR will initiate the synchronized ground assault within the next 4-8 hours, targeting the FAB-3000 impact zone to achieve a decisive breakthrough. The Northern-bound UAV group (18:39:17) is a likely precursor for C2 or artillery targeting for this assault.
Continuation of Deep Infrastructure Strikes (Lviv/West): RF will follow up the successful Sambir/Lviv strike with continued use of Shaheds and potentially limited missile strikes to target key rail junctions, large storage depots, or major power transmission infrastructure in Western Ukraine to degrade logistical resilience.
Diplomatic Amplification: Peskov and state media will intensify the "Russia is ready for peace, Kyiv is blocking it" narrative, aiming to sway undecided international partners.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Paralysis)
Pokrovsk Operational Breach: RF mechanized forces successfully bypass UAF strongpoints and reach the Kostiantynivka-Pokrovsk road, severing the main GLOC and forcing UAF units forward of the breach into an operational pocket.
Political Concession: The combined pressure from the kinetic strikes (Lviv) and diplomatic/corruption narratives forces the GoU to publicly soften its stance on the US/RF peace plan, creating a fracture in the national consensus necessary for resistance.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-4 Hours (TACTICAL)
RF Main Thrust Engagement: UAF forward units must successfully attrit the first wave of the RF mechanized breakthrough at the Pokrovsk axis.
Confirmation (BDA/UAS) of organized, battalion-sized RF mechanized movement past the FAB-3000 impact zone. (DECISION POINT: J3 must commit pre-positioned ATGM teams and reserved artillery packages to destroy the initial penetration force.)
4-12 Hours (DEEP DEFENSE)
AD Reallocation/Readiness: AD units must achieve maximum readiness in Western and Central Ukraine.
Confirmation of mass missile launch from GRAU arsenals (per previous report CRs) or detection of mass UAV launch towards Western logistics hubs. (DECISION POINT: UAF Air Force Command must prioritize protection of Western logistics nodes, not just Kyiv/Dnipropetrovsk C2.)
12-24 Hours (C2/IO)
Counter-IO Campaign Launch: GoU must officially publish key points of the 'alternative plan' from Ankara and issue statements explicitly refuting the TASS/Parker territorial surrender demands.
Continued Western media amplification of the US/RF plan with no corresponding UAF/EU counter-narrative. (DECISION POINT: STRATCOM must launch the official counter-narrative to prevent public opinion decay.)
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - TACTICAL ADAPTATION
RF Air Repeater Drone Deployment: Determine the frequency, operational altitude, and specific EW countermeasures used by the RF Air Repeater Drone (ВОЗДУШНЫЙ РЕТРАНСЛЯТОР).
IMINT/ELINT: Task forward EW teams and UAS operators to specifically monitor and characterize RF relay drone signals near the Pokrovsk FEBA.
MEDIUM
HIGH - KINETIC INTENT
Donetsk UAV Group Intent: Confirm the specific target (C2, logistics, or diversionary) of the UAV group heading north over Donetsk Oblast (18:39:17).
SIGINT/ELINT: Continuous tracking of drone flight paths and cross-referencing with known UAF assets in the sector.
HIGH
HIGH - LOGISTICS IMPACT
Lviv/Sambir Strike Damage Assessment: Determine the precise nature and extent of the damage (fuel storage, transformer station, rail junction) caused by the "Geran" strike in Lviv Oblast.
HUMINT/IMINT: Elicit reports from local authorities and use post-strike satellite/UAS BDA imagery of the Sambir facility.
LOW
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
J3/J2 (Pokrovsk): Prioritize Counter-C2 and ISR assets (CRITICAL).
Action: Immediately dedicate EW assets and electronic intelligence teams to identifying and disrupting the RF Air Repeater Drone C2 link. The efficiency of the expected mechanized assault is directly linked to the success of this relay system.
Rationale: Neutralizing the RF aerial relay network will disrupt FPV guidance, increase response time friction, and degrade the precision of advancing mechanized units.
Air Force/Air Defense Command: Defend Western Logistical Spine (URGENT).
Action: Immediately reallocate mobile AD systems (Gepard, short-range MANPADS) to key rail transshipment points and power substations between Lviv and the central Oblasts. Establish high alert status for intercepting future Geran/Shahed waves targeting the Western border logistics.
Rationale: The proven ability and intent of RF to strike deep infrastructure in the West necessitate a defensive shift to secure the lifeline of NATO materiel flow.
Action: Capitalize on the explicit leaks (TASS/Parker) detailing territorial surrender. Frame the US/RF plan as a non-starter "capitulation document," emphasizing that Ukraine's rejection of this plan upholds the principle of territorial integrity. Use President Zelenskyy’s alternative plan in Ankara as the positive counter-narrative.
Rationale: The political/IO threat is designed to create internal division; direct, aggressive refutation is required to restore public cohesion and preempt international pressure.