Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 222100Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 221800Z NOV 25 – 222100Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The kinetic threat on the Pokrovsk axis is matched by a strategic maximum-pressure Information Warfare (IW) campaign designed to force political concessions. The GoU's counter-move in Ankara introduces a new dynamic but heightens the immediate risk of RF kinetic retaliation.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad Axis (CRITICAL): Intelligence confirms RF focus on the Pokrovsk (Красноармейск) approaches, specifically utilizing FPV drone reconnaissance and mapping (Сливочный каприз). This reinforces the MLCOA of an imminent ground assault utilizing the gap created by the FAB-3000 strike. The goal remains seizure of the logistical hub of Kostiantynivka.
• Deep Rear (Dnipropetrovshchyna/Lviv): Rolling blackouts are scheduled for Dnipropetrovshchyna (РБК-Україна), confirming the success of previous RF deep strikes in degrading power generation capacity, adding friction to military mobilization/logistics. RF milbloggers (Colonelcassad) are actively mocking the Lviv blackouts, highlighting the morale impact of energy warfare across Ukraine.
• Northeast Axis (Chernihiv): Confirmed group of UAVs (likely Shahed-type) traveling south over northern Chernihiv region (Air Force, UAF). This indicates a continuing pattern of deep-strike reconnaissance or saturation attacks targeting Kyiv or central logistics.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Muddy conditions in frontline areas (indicated by evacuation footage Шеф Hayabusa) continue to affect off-road mobility, favoring tracked vehicles and potentially slowing the RF mechanized thrust, but not preventing it.
• Night operations confirmed by RF MLRS footage (Дневник Десантника), indicating sustained artillery fire under cover of darkness.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Force Posture (IO Focus): Putin and RF media continue to project long-term stability and technological development (AI, longevity) while downplaying immediate military shortcomings (Басурин о главном, Alex Parker). This is designed for domestic resilience and international perception.
• UAF Force Posture (Diplomatic Counter-Play): President Zelenskyy’s presence in Ankara with an "alternative plan" (Оперативний ЗСУ, РБК-Україна) confirms an active, high-level attempt to break the US/RF-pushed peace narrative.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Combined Arms Attack (Pokrovsk): RF forces are demonstrating the capability to integrate massive aerial ordnance (FAB-3000), detailed FPV-based reconnaissance (Сливочный каприз), and conventional fires (MLRS, artillery, Kotsnews) for a tactical breakthrough.
2. Strategic IW Dominance: RF media is successfully framing the US/RF peace plan, amplified by Western sources, to pressure Kyiv and create diplomatic friction (Astra, РБК-Україна).

Intentions:

1. Immediate Tactical Success (Pokrovsk): Exploit the Myrnohrad crater to force a rapid breakthrough, aiming for operational freedom of maneuver toward Kostiantynivka.
2. Isolate Kyiv Diplomatically: Use the US/RF peace plan narrative to paint Ukraine's rejection (Zelenskyy's 'alternative plan' in Ankara) as a rejection of peace, thus eroding support among key allies.
3. Exploit Corruption Narrative: Amplify high-level corruption cases (Chernyshov bail) to undermine public trust in the GoU and fuel internal dissent (STERNENKO, Оперативний ЗСУ analysis).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Civilian Targeting (IO focus): RF milbloggers (Colonelcassad) are increasingly linking power outages in cities like Lviv to "de-communization," a propaganda technique designed to rationalize the destruction of civilian infrastructure as a political, rather than military, necessity.
• UAS in Deep Rear: The renewed UAV grouping heading south over Chernihiv confirms continuous effort to saturate UAF Air Defense (AD) resources and disrupt logistics/C2 in the rear.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics (Persistent Friction): New milblogger video (МОБИЛИЗАЦИЯ) confirms the continued practice of using military personnel for private projects (building a commander’s dacha), underscoring endemic corruption and misuse of military resources, which degrades overall sustainment effectiveness.
• UAF Logistics (Pressure Point): Scheduled rolling blackouts in Dnipropetrovshchyna indicate sustained vulnerability to deep strikes, directly impacting logistics and repair capabilities supporting the Pokrovsk front.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2: Highly centralized and effective at coordinating Information, Diplomatic, and Kinetic pressure. The quick reframing of Zelenskyy’s trip to Ankara as a rejection of peace (ASTRA, РБК-Україна) shows rapid IO synchronization.
• UAF C2 (Challenge): UAF C2 is effectively challenged by the domestic corruption narrative, which consumes political capital required for decisive action against external military and IO threats.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Diplomatic Resilience: The GoU has successfully launched a diplomatic counter-offensive in Ankara, presenting an alternative plan and refusing to cave to the US/RF pressure plan, demonstrating continued strategic autonomy (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Civilian Resilience: Construction of 'underground schools' in Zaporizhzhia (🇺🇦 Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація) demonstrates robust civilian adaptation to security threats, which feeds into long-term national resilience.
• Frontline Security: UAF forces in damaged zones continue civilian evacuation efforts despite FPV drone threats, maintaining operational focus (Шеф Hayabusa).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: Strategic diplomatic refusal of the US/RF plan in Ankara (AxiOS/РБК-Україна).
• Setback: Confirmed need for rolling blackouts in Dnipropetrovshchyna due to infrastructure damage, hindering regional stability.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• IO/StratCom: Critical need to rapidly and loudly disseminate the existence and nature of the 'alternative plan' from Ankara to domestic and international audiences, countering the RF narrative that Ukraine is merely rejecting peace.
• Anti-Corruption: The political capital lost due to the high bail for former officials (Chernyshov) diverts attention and saps domestic morale needed to withstand the Pokrovsk assault.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• CRITICAL IO THREAT REINFORCED: The core demands of the alleged peace plan are confirmed and amplified: territorial transfer (non-occupied Donbas), official status for the Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church (Financial Times, Оперативний ЗСУ).
• NARRATIVE SYNCHRONIZATION: RF media (Поддубный) is attempting counter-denial, claiming they have no information on the plan, while simultaneously publishing the details via other channels (Операция Z), maintaining plausible deniability while maximizing the disruptive effect of the leak.
• US Political Link: The linking of Trump's comments (РБК-Україна, Трамп is "disappointed" in Putin) and the cancellation of the Witkoff/Zelenskyy meeting (РБК-Україна, ASTRA) suggests RF/pro-RF channels are seeking to sow mistrust between Kyiv and the future US administration.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Public sentiment remains volatile, marked by outrage over corruption (Sternenko's call to suspend bail for corruption suspects) and deep anxiety over the political concessions demanded by the rumored peace plan. The juxtaposition of frontline sacrifice and rear-area malfeasance is highly dangerous for morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• CRITICAL DIPLOMATIC JUNCTURE: Zelenskyy's presentation of an alternative plan in Ankara (Оперативний ЗСУ) means Kyiv is proactively attempting to shape the diplomatic framework rather than merely reacting to the US/RF proposals. This is a high-risk/high-reward strategy.
• US Stance: Trump’s public disappointment in Putin adds complexity, as the RF-pushed peace plan is tied to his incoming administration. This suggests the proposed deal may not have monolithic support even in future US circles, giving Kyiv leverage.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours (222100Z NOV 25 - 232100Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Double Escalation)

1. Pokrovsk Breakthrough Attempt: The RF mechanized assault (40th/155th OMBR) will commence or intensify rapidly following the FPV/artillery preparation phase, likely focusing on achieving a penetration depth of 3-5 km into the defensive line to reach favorable maneuvering terrain.
2. Kinetic Retaliation for Ankara: Given the public rejection of the "peace plan" via the alternative proposal in Ankara, RF will launch a significant saturation strike (missiles and/or Shahed UAVs) against Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, or deep-rear logistical hubs within 6-12 hours. This serves as punishment and diplomatic signal.
3. Intensified C2/GLOC Interdiction: RF will increase dedicated counter-battery fire and SpN activity targeting UAF command posts and the Kostiantynivka GLOC to maximize chaos during the ground assault phase.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Collapse/Political Crisis)

1. Tactical-Operational Success: RF forces successfully seize a key choke point on the Kostiantynivka GLOC and simultaneously achieve a decisive breach at Pokrovsk. This forces the premature withdrawal of UAF mechanized reserves, leading to the rapid operational encirclement of forward defensive positions in the Donetsk sector.
2. Strategic Cohesion Failure: The combination of kinetic terror (mass missile strike) and public outrage over corruption leads to a major political destabilization in Kyiv, forcing a change in the Ministry of Defense or High Command just as the Pokrovsk breach demands immediate, centralized decision-making.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Frontline Command (Pokrovsk): Initiate Phased Withdrawal to Prepared ADPs (URGENT).

   • Action: Given the confirmed depth of preparation (FAB-3000, FPV scouting) and high confidence in imminent assault, forward units must utilize tactical reserves to anchor defensive flanks while executing a controlled, phased withdrawal to pre-established Alternate Defensive Positions (ADPs). Do not attempt to hold the Myrnohrad crater at all costs.
   • Rationale: The goal is to trade territory for time and force the RF to commit armored elements into well-prepared kill zones, conserving manpower.

2. STRATCOM/Ministry of Defense: Defuse Political Pressure (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Conduct a press conference with high-level MoD and MFA officials to explicitly denounce the US/RF 'peace plan' as a surrender document. Contrast this with the alternative, sovereignty-respecting plan presented in Ankara. Simultaneously, a Presidential decree should mandate increased scrutiny and faster processing of high-profile corruption cases to address internal political threats.
   • Rationale: Maintaining internal political cohesion is as critical as holding the line at Pokrovsk. These actions counter the hybrid threat by denying RF the political instability necessary for strategic success.

3. Air Force/Air Defense: Pre-Position for Retaliation (CRITICAL).

   • Action: Immediately increase Air Defense (AD) readiness around Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and key GRU (General Directorate of Intelligence) targets. Prioritize the readiness of mobile short-range AD systems (e.g., Gepard, Avenger) to counter the confirmed UAV traffic approaching from the north/east.
   • Rationale: The diplomatic counter-move in Ankara will provoke a kinetic response, likely aimed at terrorizing the capital or crippling the logistical spine (Dnipropetrovsk). Preemptive readiness saves critical infrastructure.

//END SITREP//