Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 221653Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 221623Z NOV 25 – 221653Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. RF mechanized assault on Pokrovsk axis is confirmed facing sustained UAF counter-fire. Strategic friction via deep-strike operations continues to degrade RF sustainment capability.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): UAF drone footage (BUTUSOV PLUS) documents successful targeting and destruction of RF personnel and light equipment, including targets within dugouts and ruined buildings, specifically captioned as "in Pokrovsk." This confirms that RF ground forces are currently engaged in close-quarters combat (CQC) within the outer defensive belt of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration. This reinforces the previous judgment of a mechanized assault execution (MLCOA). (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT/JUDGMENT)
  • Note: The Russian OSINT channel 'Slyvochny Kapriz' maps an advance toward Hryshyne (Гришино), south of Pokrovsk, which aligns with the expected RF exploitation vector.
• Seversk Axis (Localized Action): RF sources (Kotsnews) claim successful strikes against UAF positions and dugouts near Seversk. Indicates continued low-intensity kinetic engagement in the northern Donbas to fix UAF reserves. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - FACT)
• Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia: Reports confirm RF use of FPV drones and artillery against Nikopolshchyna (Pokrovska, Marhanetska, Myrivska, Chervonohryhorivska Hromadas) and general Zaporizhzhia direction (MoD Russia). This maintains pressure on UAF forces south of the main effort and prevents the redeployment of tactical reserves. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Air Force reports (Poltavshchyna) confirm ongoing UAV/drone activity despite operational challenges (previous reports noted strong winds affecting FPVs near the line of contact). Current weather does not appear to significantly restrict continued kinetic or ISR operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Force Posture (Pokrovsk): Committed to the ground assault. Losses are mounting due to concentrated UAF drone/artillery counter-fire, as evidenced by BDA videos. RF appears to be attempting to bypass Myrnohrad and seize control of critical junctions towards Hryshyne.
• UAF Deep Strike (STRATEGIC SUCCESS): Confirmed replication of fuel rail sabotage: Perm Krai railway incident involves two wagons with gas/fuel ignited, following the previous Sverdlovsk and Perm fuel oil incidents. This confirms a highly successful, sustained UAF deep-operations strategy targeting RF strategic fuel supply across multiple military districts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT/JUDGMENT)
• NATO ISR: Continued presence of NATO ISR assets near RF borders (Voenkor Kotenok reports) indicates sustained Western awareness and support for UAF operational awareness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Sustained Ground Attack: RF maintains the ability to launch synchronized, multi-echelon attacks, integrating heavy ordnance (FAB-3000) with mechanized exploitation (Pokrovsk).
2. Information Dominance: RF continues to seamlessly integrate military assaults with simultaneous high-level political distraction (Putin's emphasis on AI/Robotics) and IO/disinformation campaigns.

Intentions:

1. Achieve Tactical Encirclement (Pokrovsk): The current push appears aimed at bypassing major urban strongpoints (Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk) by seizing adjacent villages and critical roads (Hryshyne axis) to force a UAF operational withdrawal rather than a costly direct city assault.
2. Mitigate Sanctions Impact: Putin's focus on national AI strategy (TASS reports) indicates an intention to mitigate dependence on Western technology, which directly supports long-term military modernization and independence from sanctions.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF: High commitment of personnel into heavily contested areas (Pokrovsk urban fringes) despite high-density UAF drone fire (BDAs showing significant losses). This suggests C2 is prioritizing seizure of ground over minimizing immediate casualty rates.
• UAF (Defense): Demonstrated high effectiveness of decentralized FPV drone teams ("pilots") in rapidly prosecuting exposed RF personnel and light vehicles in the penetration zone, acting as rapid-response light artillery. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - JUDGMENT)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Internal Logistics (CRITICAL DEGRADATION): The third confirmed major rail fuel/gas disruption (Perm, Sverdlovsk, now Perm gas cars) confirms the vulnerability of RF bulk fuel supply. This is not tactical friction; it is strategic degradation. The cumulative impact will affect the operational tempo of the mechanized assault units on the front line within 7-10 days, primarily through reduced fuel for maneuver and vehicle maintenance downtime. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - JUDGMENT)
• RF Front-Line Logistics: Current assault momentum indicates sufficient immediate supply, but the supply chain resilience is severely compromised.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains capable of launching large-scale, synchronized assaults (Pokrovsk).
• Internal RF Friction: Reports of mass brawl involving "Donetsk military cadets" in Volgograd Oblast (ASTRA) are symptomatic of underlying social and C2 issues within the wider RF military/paramilitary structure, especially among mobilized or non-standard formations. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - JUDGMENT)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Tactical Defense (Pokrovsk): UAF units are successfully engaging the RF mechanized penetration with high-precision, low-cost assets (FPV drones), stabilizing the initial breakthrough. The immediate crisis is contained but sustained pressure remains.
• Strategic Outlook (Intelligence Head): MG Budanov (GUR Chief) openly states that a "window of opportunity" for war termination could open in early-to-mid February, but only with US intervention (Trump). This signals UAF reliance on external diplomatic shifts coinciding with potential tactical exhaustion on the RF side. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: Confirmed RF losses in the Pokrovsk sector (UAF BDA) and the strategic replication of the rail sabotage campaign (Perm gas cars).
• Setback: Continued high civilian casualty rates (92 wounded in Ternopil) and persistent attacks on frontline civilian infrastructure (Nikopolshchyna FPV/artillery) stress civil defense and medical resources.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Civil Defense: Ongoing need for trauma resources and fortified educational facilities, evidenced by the Deputy Minister of Education's visit to inspect shelters in Zaporizhzhia.
• Political/Diplomatic: Sustained high-level diplomatic activity (Zelensky-Erdogan meeting in Turkey) is necessary to ensure consistent political and material support, especially given the public statements regarding future negotiations/US involvement.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Counter-IO: Putin's emphasis on AI and sovereignty acts to project technological competence and self-sufficiency, countering the Western narrative of RF decline.
• Polish/Ukrainian Friction: RF sources (Operatsiya Z) amplify a false or misleading claim that the Polish PM Tusk demanded data on Ukrainians suspected of railway sabotage. This is a classic hybrid warfare tactic designed to exploit real diplomatic friction (e.g., grain disputes) to degrade military cooperation on the Western border. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - JUDGMENT)
• UAF Narrative: Budanov's calculated public statements regarding the "window of opportunity" (Feb 2026) are aimed at framing the current heavy fighting as a necessary phase leading to a favorable future negotiation environment, maintaining morale and Western commitment through the winter.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Morale is being tested by severe kinetic impacts (Ternopil casualties) contrasted with the positive strategic friction imposed on RF logistics (Perm rail fires). The high tempo of events requires consistent, strong governmental counter-messaging.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Zelensky’s meeting with Erdogan stabilizes a critical relationship regarding trade, Black Sea security, and potential prisoner exchanges/mediation, particularly timely given the US-centric discussion initiated by Budanov. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours (221653Z NOV 25 - 231653Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Sustained Pressure)

1. Deepening Penetration: RF forces will continue to press the current penetration on the Pokrovsk axis, attempting to seize Hryshyne to establish a strongpoint for logistical resupply and exploitation towards Pokrovsk or Kostiantynivka.
2. Interdiction Synchronization (IMMINENT): The Spetsnaz operation against the Kostiantynivka GLOC will be launched within the next 12 hours, synchronized with the heaviest RF armor push, aiming to maximize the isolation of UAF defenders. (This is the expected culmination of the current RF operational plan.)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Operational Collapse)

RF achieves a decisive, successful breach of the second defensive line near Hryshyne. The closure of the Kostiantynivka GLOC (or a major alternative route) for >18 hours, combined with heavy RF air support, forces UAF forward units to rapidly expend ammunition and begin a forced, disorganized withdrawal. This would open the way for RF forces to directly threaten the strategic defense of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CINC/J3: Prioritize Counter-FPV Defensive Measures (URGENT).

   • Action: Given the clear success of UAF FPV teams against the RF ground assault, RF will immediately prioritize Electronic Warfare (EW) and Counter-UAS (C-UAS) deployment in the penetration zone. Task specialized UAF EW teams to deploy mobile counter-EW platforms adjacent to the most effective FPV teams (Pokrovsk sector) to protect the C2 links from RF jamming, thereby sustaining current BDA rates.
   • Rationale: The FPV defense is currently stabilizing the line. Protecting this capability from expected RF C-UAS retaliation is vital.

2. J4 (Logistics): Exploit RF Fuel Vulnerability (HIGH).

   • Action: The deep-strike team responsible for the Perm/Sverdlovsk incidents should be authorized and resourced to replicate the rail sabotage tactic against specific, non-fuel, high-tonnage military cargo (e.g., ammunition trains) in the 500-1000 km depth.
   • Rationale: Capitalizing on current RF logistical disarray and demonstrating the ability to strike beyond fuel will force RF to stretch internal security assets further, drawing forces away from the front.

3. STRATCOM/J2: Address Negotiation Rumors Proactively (URGENT).

   • Action: Immediately issue clarification, based on Budanov's statement, emphasizing that the "window of opportunity" is a projection of potential factors and not a commitment to negotiate now. Stress that any diplomatic shift must be preceded by RF military failure and adherence to Ukrainian sovereignty.
   • Rationale: Counteract potential confusion and demoralization caused by mixing high-stakes combat (Pokrovsk) with talk of future negotiations.

//END SITREP//