Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 221623Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 220600Z NOV 25 – 221623Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. All indicators confirm the transition to the RF mechanized assault phase on the Pokrovsk axis. The simultaneous deep-strike logistics campaign by UAF continues to challenge RF strategic sustainment.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad Axis (Critical): The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSHU) confirms UAF units are executing tasks in the area of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration. RF military correspondents ("Операция Z") explicitly claim the "🅾️тважные" (RF Central Military District units, likely reinforcing the 40th/155th OMBR) are "assaulting Pokrovsk" and advancing into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. This confirms the initiation of the mechanized thrust previously forecasted (MLCOA). (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT/JUDGMENT)
• Volchansk (Kharkiv Oblast): UAF-affiliated forces (Georgian Legion units mentioned in reporting) captured Russian military personnel near Volchansk, indicating ongoing tactical stability and successful localized defensive action in the Northern sector, fixing some RF forces there. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - FACT)
• Lviv (Deep Rear): RF sources ("ASTRA") confirm a strike destroyed an Ukrposhta (postal service) logistics warehouse in Lviv. This confirms continued RF strategy of targeting civilian logistics hubs with dual-use potential, disrupting supply chains far from the contact line. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)
• Infrastructure (Energy): National power utility reports indicate scheduled power outage graphics are being updated for Kyiv and utilized across Ukraine for tomorrow (23 NOV), confirming the operational impact of the ongoing RF energy infrastructure targeting campaign. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No new weather data beyond the previous report's confirmation of cold/snowy conditions favoring mechanized maneuver in the Donbas.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Force Posture (Pokrovsk): The assault is active. RF units are committed to penetrating the forward defenses.
• RF Deep Rear (Logistics Disruption): A second, distinct railway incident has occurred in the deep rear: tankers carrying fuel oil (mazut) are burning on a rail line in Sverdlovsk Oblast. The cause is currently unknown, but follows the previous Perm incident within the reporting period, confirming a pattern of successful attacks on RF rail fuel logistics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)
• UAF Force Posture (Defense/SOF): UAF continues to maintain political stability (political arrests/prosecutions of collaborators) and demonstrate strategic offensive capability in the deep rear (Perm/Sverdlovsk rail incidents).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Immediate Breakthrough Capability: Confirmed execution of the mechanized assault wave (40th/155th OMBR and supporting elements) immediately following heavy kinetic preparation (FAB-3000 at Myrnohrad).
2. Sustained Strategic Strike: Demonstrated ability to target high-value logistics nodes (Ukrposhta warehouse) deep within Ukraine (Lviv) to disrupt western supply lines and internal Ukrainian logistics.

Intentions:

1. Achieve Rapid Operational Success (Pokrovsk): Exploit the initial breach caused by the extreme pre-assault fire to achieve an operational breakthrough, threatening the major GLOCs (Kostiantynivka) and Pokrovsk itself.
2. Impose Political Friction: Propagate narratives regarding US involvement in new "peace plans" (Witkoff) concurrent with the assault to sow doubt regarding long-term Western support for UAF war aims.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Reinforcement of Main Effort: The RF use of "🅾️тважные" units (Central Military District) to reinforce the Pokrovsk assault indicates prioritization of this axis. This confirms the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad operation is the single most critical military effort for the RF at this time. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - JUDGMENT)
• Targeting of Civilian Logistics: The confirmed Lviv Ukrposhta strike confirms the prioritization of dual-use logistics centers over purely military targets in the deep rear, maximizing collateral damage and economic disruption. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - JUDGMENT)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Internal Logistics Vulnerability (WORSENING): The Sverdlovsk rail incident, following the Perm incident, indicates that the UAF/affiliated DRG/SOF deep-strike campaign against RF fuel distribution is highly successful and replicable. While the specific impact on front-line fuel consumption (critical for the current mechanized assault) will be delayed, sustained attacks will force RF to commit significant assets to protect thousands of kilometers of rail lines. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - JUDGMENT)
• RF Front-Line Logistics: The assault remains high-tempo, indicating sufficient immediate ammunition stockpiles for ground maneuver.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2: Excellent synchronization between the initiation of the mechanized assault and the associated propaganda push (claiming Pokrovsk assault is underway).
• UAF Internal Security: Successful continuation of counter-intelligence and anti-collaboration operations (OPZZH deputy detained; FSB claims disruption of GUR sabotage team in DNR/Mariupol area, though specific location and details are murky). This confirms high operational security posture against RF hybrid warfare efforts.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Defense: GSHU confirmation that UAF units are executing defensive tasks in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad region indicates defensive lines remain engaged and controlled, despite the massive kinetic shock of the FAB-3000.
• Offense (Asymmetric/Hybrid): The successful rail sabotage campaign (Perm, Sverdlovsk) demonstrates a highly effective, low-signature capability to impose strategic friction on RF logistics, directly influencing the long-term sustainment of RF forces.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Tactical Success: Capture of RF prisoners near Volchansk demonstrates local tactical superiority and morale.
• Strategic Success (Logistics): Confirmed replication of fuel rail sabotage (Sverdlovsk).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Energy Constraints: The continuation of scheduled blackouts across Kyiv and nationally confirms the sustained success of the RF energy infrastructure campaign, limiting UAF war-fighting potential and civilian resilience (RBC-Ukraine reporting).
• Air Defense: New RF drone groups reported moving from Sumy/Kharkiv towards Poltava suggests continuous regional air defense requirements and potential energy/logistics targeting in the central oblasts.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Operational Tempo Narratives: RF military blogs are synchronizing their reports with the assault, claiming the "🅾️тважные" are already "assaulting Pokrovsk," projecting inevitable success to demoralize UAF defenders and potentially trigger a premature, disorganized UAF withdrawal.
• "Peace Plan" Hybrid Warfare: TASS reporting on US official Witkoff developing a "new peace plan" (CNN source) during the peak of the RF assault is a classic IO tactic designed to erode Ukrainian resolve and pressure Kyiv to negotiate from a position of weakness.
• UAF Counter-Narrative: GSHU confirming units are operating in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area acts as an essential counter-narrative, confirming UAF presence and C2 despite the heavy assault.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Public sentiment is under heavy stress due to the combination of the immediate kinetic threat at the front (Pokrovsk) and the continued national stress of energy blackouts.
• The deep strike successes (Sverdlovsk/Perm) remain critical to maintaining domestic morale by showing UAF has retaliatory capability.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Zelensky's emphasis that all activity should be directed toward peace (RBC-Ukraine) is a critical communication to international partners, counteracting the RF narrative that Kyiv is intransigent while facing heavy assault.
• The new US "peace plan" rumors, even if unconfirmed, suggest friction within Western consensus regarding long-term strategy.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (221623Z NOV 25 - 222023Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Consolidation and Interdiction)

1. Exploitation of Breach: RF mechanized units (40th/155th OMBR) will attempt to consolidate a tactical foothold (1-2 km deep) within the defensive belt damaged by the FAB-3000/heavy artillery fire near Myrnohrad.
2. Kostiantynivka Interdiction (Delayed): The Spetsnaz interdiction operation against the Kostiantynivka GLOC will be launched immediately to capitalize on UAF C2 disruption caused by the ground assault. (The lack of a strike in the last 12 hours suggests tactical synchronization with the main armor push).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Maneuver)

RF forces successfully penetrate the forward defensive line and bypass Myrnohrad to the north or south, achieving a 5km+ operational penetration. Simultaneously, the Spetsnaz operation successfully closes the Kostiantynivka GLOC, forcing UAF defenders in the Pokrovsk area to fight without timely resupply. RF exploitation units will then move to encircle key UAF defense nodes in the area, forcing a general withdrawal.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CINC/J3: Direct Response to Mechanized Assault (CRITICAL).

   • Action: Immediately commit the tactical reserve unit (TOC, location in Annex A) to a Counter-Penetration Mission (rather than fire support). Specifically, use the reserve to anchor the flanks of the penetration, creating a "killing sack" rather than committing them linearly into the breach, which may expose them to follow-on fire.
   • Rationale: The assault is confirmed; the immediate priority is stopping the momentum and containing the penetration before it expands into an operational crisis.

2. J4 (Logistics): Execute Emergency Fuel Diversion (URGENT).

   • Action: Given the confirmed success of the deep-strike rail campaign (Perm and Sverdlovsk incidents), the J4 must assume RF forces will attempt to target UAF fuel reserves in the near rear (e.g., Dnipro/Kharkiv rail depots). Immediately disperse forward fuel stocks and increase camouflage/protection measures for rail-to-road transfer points.
   • Rationale: Proactive defense against replicated deep-strike tactics is essential to sustain the defense line.

3. STRATCOM/J2: Aggressive Counter-IO to Peace Rumors (URGENT).

   • Action: Disseminate immediate, high-level counter-statements (Presidential Office or Foreign Ministry) categorically rejecting any "peace plan" negotiations while RF mechanized forces are actively assaulting key cities (Pokrovsk). Use the Volchansk POW capture as BDA proving UAF military effectiveness.
   • Rationale: Combat the RF hybrid warfare effort aiming to erode international and domestic will at the most critical juncture of the battle.

//END SITREP//