DTG: 212000Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 211800Z NOV 25 – 212000Z NOV 25
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. RF continues high-leverage hybrid synchronization. Political C2 destabilization is confirmed and exploited by RF IO narratives of imminent peace/defeat, creating the optimal strategic environment for the critical Pokrovsk ground assault.
Ternopil Deep Strike (Confirmation): National Police confirmed 21 fatalities in the Ternopil residential attack. This confirms the high civilian casualty toll, maximizing the intended psychological impact of the strike. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)
Pokrovsk Axis (Kinetic/Cognitive Focus): RF kinetic activity remains focused on shaping the Pokrovsk axis. RF IO channels (Operation Z) are actively disseminating capture videos featuring claims of UAF forces near Pokrovsk being "surrounded" and suffering logistics failure, directly targeting morale in the imminent assault sector. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - JUDGEMENT)
Rear Area Security (RF Presence): Imagery shows Russian Investigative Committee personnel conducting roadside stops, likely connected to mobilization enforcement or internal security/annexation enforcement actions in occupied zones. This confirms ongoing normalization of military-administrative control. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Kharkiv/Northern Sector: Deteriorating weather is forecasted for the Kharkiv region (Oleg Syniehubov report). This may temporarily restrict tactical UAS/FPV operations but will not stop larger ground maneuver or high-altitude ISR platforms. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)
Pokrovsk/Donbas: No adverse weather inhibiting the mechanized ground assault is reported.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
UAF Air Defense: Air Force reporting of UAF UAV activity near Chernihiv suggests RF continues low-level kinetic probes or ISR missions against northern targets, maintaining C2 pressure across multiple fronts. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - FACT)
RF Ground Posture: The previous commitment of the 40th OMBR to the Pokrovsk sector (Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka) remains the most critical ground threat indicator. RF MoD is reinforcing morale among Vostok Group (Rovnopolye claim) ahead of large-scale operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - JUDGEMENT)
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Exploitative IO: RF demonstrated rapid, flexible adaptation by immediately linking the UAF political crisis (coalition talks, ministerial resignations) with amplification of the unconfirmed US/RF peace framework to create a sense of operational inevitability and despair.
Sustained Deep Strike: Confirmed high casualty strike (21 fatalities) in Ternopil reaffirms the capability and intent to strike deep rear areas to induce strategic instability and terror.
Intentions:
Maximize Political-Operational Synchronization: RF's intent is to launch the Pokrovsk ground offensive when C2 distraction (political crisis) and morale erosion (peace rumors, logistics fears) are at their peak.
Isolate UAF: RF IO is attempting to isolate UAF High Command by emphasizing exclusion from US-Russian peace talks (Reuters/TASS reports), positioning Kyiv as irrelevant to the conflict's outcome.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
Hybrid Synchronization Confirmed: The public statement by a Servant of the People (SN) deputy (Poturaev) confirming the need for a government "reformat" and new coalition validates the RF hybrid strategy's political impact. RF military blogs (Operation Z, Russian Spring) immediately amplified this development, linking it to UAF military failure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - JUDGEMENT)
Counter-IO on Materiel: Pro-Ukrainian channels (Alex Parker Returns) are successfully identifying RF MoD's use of recycled, year-old footage to claim destruction of high-value targets (ATACMS launchers). This indicates RF is straining to maintain credibility on the kinetic front while the political narrative is strong. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - FACT)
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
Polish Rail Disruption (CRITICAL IO): Ukrainian (RBC-Ukraine) and Western (Reuters) sources confirm arrests in Poland related to rail sabotage between Warsaw and Lublin. While arrests are ongoing, the RF IO effort (previous daily report) to seed narratives of external sabotage and slow cross-border GLOCs has achieved tactical success by introducing delays and internal security friction in NATO nations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - JUDGEMENT)
Pokrovsk GLOC (Status Unchanged - CRITICAL): The Kostiantynivka road remains the single most important operational node. RF activity (IO and SpN positioning) is dedicated to its interdiction.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
UAF C2: The focus on coalition formation and government reformatting (Poturaev statement) confirms that strategic C2 bandwidth is critically consumed by the political crisis, increasing the vulnerability window for tactical failures near Pokrovsk. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - JUDGEMENT)
RF C2: RF command demonstrates effective synchronization between deep kinetic strikes, tactical ground preparation (40th OMBR commitment), and strategic-level IO deployment (peace rumors, political crisis amplification).
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Posture: Tactical units in the Pokrovsk sector are on high alert, but readiness is directly threatened by the confluence of logistics uncertainty (Kostiantynivka) and cognitive warfare (Pokrovsk surrounding claims, peace rumors).
Morale Indicators: There is persistent circulation of petitions (e.g., petition to restore simplified return procedure for AWOL soldiers) and public discussion on difficult topics (e.g., internal equipment supply quality), indicating ongoing morale and personnel management challenges. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Setback (Diplomatic Exclusion): Confirmation by a high-ranking Ukrainian official (via Reuters/TASS) that Kyiv was not involved in US-RF discussions regarding a conflict conclusion plan is a major diplomatic setback that severely undermines national resilience narratives.
Success (Tactical ISR): UAF SOF/volunteer UAV footage (STERNENKO) confirms effective long-range tracking of hostile vehicles, maintaining capability to interdict RF movement in the near rear, although this capability is insufficient to counter the impending mechanized assault.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
Constraint: The internal political environment is actively constraining strategic focus. The priority must pivot entirely back to the kinetic threat.
Requirement: An immediate, high-visibility counter-propaganda effort is required to discredit the peace rumors and refocus troop morale on the immediate threat to the Pokrovsk axis.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
Peace Narrative Dominance (CRITICAL): The combined impact of the Politico leak (imminent agreement) and the Reuters confirmation (Kyiv excluded from talks) is RF's most effective current IO weapon. Ukrainian media sources (RBC-Ukraine, Tsaplienko) are actively circulating the claim that a peace agreement could be agreed "in the near future." This narrative primes the domestic and international audience for a sudden end to hostilities, potentially leading to UAF operational pause or confusion during the RF ground assault. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Political Collapse Narrative: RF sources (Operation Z) are using the statements of SN deputies regarding a new coalition to validate their "Kyiv regime collapse" narrative, portraying internal chaos under fire.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
Sentiment is dangerously low due to the simultaneous impact of high civilian losses (Ternopil), deep political instability (Ministerial vacancies/coalition talks), and external claims of a secret peace deal negotiated without Kyiv.
RF propaganda targeting the Zaporizhzhia front (Two Majors footage) aims to create a perception of RF tactical success and UAF vulnerability, specifically ahead of the Pokrovsk escalation.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
Hungary Veto/Doubt: PM Orban's public comments about future generations being burdened by war costs (DeepState report) signal continued diplomatic friction within the EU, potentially hindering aid and financial support mechanisms. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)
Poland Rail Arrests: The arrests linked to rail sabotage, while internally managed by Poland, reinforce RF efforts to introduce friction and delays into the critical NATO land logistics routes supporting Ukraine.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
The political-cognitive environment is optimally conditioned for the RF ground maneuver. The window for the GLOC interdiction and subsequent breakthrough remains imminent.
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours (212000Z NOV 25 - 220200Z NOV 25)
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - GLOC Execution)
GLOC Interdiction (0-4 hours): RF Spetsnaz or highly trained SOF elements initiate the complex ambush/strike on the Kostiantynivka GLOC, aimed at achieving rapid closure and delaying UAF QRF response.
IO Surge: RF channels launch a coordinated surge of "Peace Agreement Imminent" messaging (potentially false flag source) precisely during the interdiction, aiming to achieve maximal cognitive disruption within UAF C2.
Forward Positioning: The 40th and 155th OMBRs complete final staging in the Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector, preparing for the breakthrough attempt following the confirmed GLOC disruption.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours
Scenario Refined: RF achieves prolonged closure (>12 hours) of the Kostiantynivka GLOC and simultaneously launches a massive, synchronized IO campaign asserting the peace agreement is signed, effective immediately, citing US/RF sources. Frontline UAF commanders, unable to confirm C2 instructions through politically paralyzed higher headquarters, hesitate or withdraw. The 40th/155th OMBRs exploit this hesitation, achieving a localized operational collapse near Pokrovsk, forcing a rapid, costly UAF counter-withdrawal.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-4 Hours (CRITICAL)
SpN/IED Engagement: UAF QRF confirms active kinetic engagement with RF elements on the Kostiantynivka road corridor.
UAF SOF/QRF confirmed contact or imagery confirming major road blockage (>2 hour expected clearance time). (IMMEDIATE)
4-12 Hours
Ground Offensive Initiation: RF armor crosses the Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka line in battalion-strength force packages.
ISR confirmation of high-density mechanized penetration; increased fire support activity (HIMARS targeting of RF C2/artillery).
0-2 Hours
STRATCOM Deconfliction: Presidential Office issues mandatory, unified public statement against peace rumors and prioritizes Pokrovsk defense.
Public address by CINC or President rejecting external peace negotiation leaks and re-establishing C2 priority.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - TECHNICAL/IO FUSION
SpN/IO Coordination: Determine if Spetsnaz assets carry equipment (SIGINT/EW) to simultaneously jam/disrupt UAF tactical nets during the GLOC ambush and synchronize with the strategic IO surge.
SIGINT: Directed collection on known SpN operational frequencies within the Kostiantynivka corridor; look for simultaneous kinetic and EW activity spikes.
MEDIUM
CRITICAL - POKROVSK ASSAULT
40th OMBR Timeline: Exact estimated Hour Zero (H0) for the mechanized assault, based on last-minute staging activities or preparatory fire near the Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector.
ISR/HUMINT: Continuous UAV/thermal surveillance of RF staging areas near the front line for signs of vehicle startup, troop loading, or movement to contact (MTC).
MEDIUM
HIGH - PEACE RUMOR SOURCE
Politico/Reuters Source Credibility: Identify the specific Western source disseminating the peace framework leak to assess if it is a targeted RF influence operation or genuine US diplomatic effort.
HUMINT/Diplomatic Channels: High-level liaison request to Washington/Brussels to definitively confirm or deny existence of current US-RF framework discussions.
Action: Transition all available tactical ISR assets (M-scan, thermal) to 24/7 coverage of the Kostiantynivka GLOC. Implement a "Fire First, Ask Later" policy on identified hostile signatures (personnel, IED placement) within the critical road corridor. Failure to secure the GLOC in the next 4 hours guarantees failure on the Pokrovsk axis.
Rationale: The time is past for passive security. Preemptive destruction of SpN assets is the only way to ensure the road remains open for resupply convoys.
Action: Mandate the immediate release of a Presidential/CINC order stating that all external peace rumors are RF PSYOP and that no peace agreement has been signed or authorized. This message must be distributed simultaneously via secure military channels, civilian media, and front-line loudspeaker systems.
Rationale: Directly combat the MDCOA of cognitive collapse and ensure frontline units maintain operational resolve during political turbulence.
J4 (Logistics) / J3 (Air Defense): Reallocate Air Assets to GLOC/Forward Area Defense.
Action: Prioritize short-range air defense (SHORAD) assets and QRF rotary wing support exclusively to cover the Kostiantynivka GLOC. Simultaneously, divert all short-term resupply convoys to utilize the emergency caches established per previous recommendations, rather than relying on the vulnerable road segment until it is confirmed cleared of SpN presence.
Rationale: Dedicate all available force protection to the immediate point of failure (GLOC), recognizing that the loss of Pokrovsk logistics is a strategic defeat.
