Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 211800Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 211200Z NOV 25 – 211800Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The RF hybrid attack strategy has achieved a significant near-term success by simultaneously inflicting terror (Ternopil) and triggering political instability (Ministerial resignations, calls for new coalition). The window for the Pokrovsk ground assault remains open and critical.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Ternopil Deep Strike: Rescue operations are ongoing. UAF DSNS confirmed no toxic chemical presence, countering immediate RF chemical threat rumors. RF sources (Kotsnews, Colonelcassad, Война с фейками) immediately shifted propaganda to retroactively justify the strike, claiming the target was the "Orion Radio Plant." (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Seversk Direction (Fixing Operation): RF reports (Дневник Десантника) claim activity in the Seversk direction. This continues the established pattern of RF using secondary axes to fix UAF reserves away from the main Pokrovsk effort. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• Novopavlovsk Direction (Kinetic Activity): RF sources (Рыбарь) claim tactical successes in the Novopavlovsk direction, aimed at maintaining pressure on the southern flank of the Donbas axis. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No critical weather changes impacting the Pokrovsk axis are reported. The focus remains on mitigating secondary effects (smoke, debris, psychological impact) from the Ternopil strike.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Institutional Normalization: RF confirmed the formal opening of a "state border crossing point" in the Mariupol seaport for sea arrivals. This is a critical legal/administrative step toward formal annexation and permanent logistical normalization in occupied territories. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• UAF Anti-Corruption Focus: UAF General Prosecutor and NABU are highly active, confirming searches and issuing new details on high-profile corruption cases (Mindich/Umerov link, Browko searches). This demonstrates continued institutional function but heavily consumes C2 resources. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Sustained Hybrid Warfare: RF successfully executed a highly synchronized hybrid attack within the last 24 hours, utilizing deep kinetic strikes (Ternopil) and targeted information operations (corruption allegations amplified by TASS/ASTRA) to induce a deep political crisis in Kyiv (two ministerial resignations, calls for a new coalition).
2. Strategic IO Amplification: RF efficiently utilizes Western news leaks (Politico report on "peace framework") to amplify narratives of Western abandonment and inevitable Ukrainian defeat, aiming to drive down military morale and Moscow Exchange Index up. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Intentions:

1. Operational Paralysis: RF intends to overload UAF C2 capacity with political and kinetic crises, forcing senior leadership (Presidential Office, Rada) to focus inward during the critical 0-8 hour GLOC vulnerability window for Pokrovsk.
2. Permanent Occupation: The formalization of a state border checkpoint in Mariupol confirms RF intent to permanently integrate occupied territories, reinforcing the strategy of "irreversible facts on the ground."

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Hybrid Success Confirmed (CRITICAL): The dismissal of two key ministers (Justice Halushchenko, Energy Hrynchuk) on the same day as the mass casualty strike in Ternopil confirms the RF's ability to successfully synchronize political destabilization with peak kinetic threat.
• IO Focus Shift: The focus has shifted from simple denial of responsibility (Ternopil) to aggressive amplification of the corruption crisis and US negotiation rumors, maximizing domestic division.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics: The administrative normalization of the Mariupol port (border crossing) provides a long-term logistics node for sea sustainment, bypassing potential terrestrial chokepoints and indicating preparations for a prolonged occupation posture. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• UAF Logistics: The critical logistics vulnerability remains the Kostiantynivka GLOC (0-8 hours). The C2 distraction risks delaying the "Hunter-Killer" response recommended in the previous report.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• UAF C2: C2 effectiveness is under extreme duress. While the anti-corruption bodies are functioning robustly (NABU/Prosecutor actions), the fact that two senior ministerial posts are vacant, alongside calls for a coalition government (TASS/РБК-Україна), indicates the government is dedicating critical operational hours to survival and political management rather than pure tactical defense of the Pokrovsk axis. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: The defensive lines near Pokrovsk are expected to be maintained, but force readiness is directly correlated with timely resupply. The political crisis creates a strategic vulnerability, not a tactical one, but this strategic failure will translate to tactical defeat if GLOC interdiction succeeds.
• F-16 Claims: UAF Air Force claims over 1300 intercepted air targets since August 2024. While this data serves a strong morale function, the confirmed use of missile decoys in the latest Ternopil strike suggests the need for immediate system/doctrine updates to maintain this level of effectiveness against advanced RF countermeasures.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Major Setback: The immediate political consequence of the RF hybrid strategy (dual ministerial resignations, coalition crisis) is a critical operational-level setback, diverting strategic attention precisely when all focus is required on the Pokrovsk ground threat.
• Success (IO Counter): DSNS rapid confirmation of no chemical agents in Ternopil successfully denied the RF a secondary escalation narrative (chemical terror).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• URGENT REQUIREMENT: C2 De-coupling: Mechanisms must be found to de-couple critical tactical decision-making (Pokrovsk GLOC defense, QRF deployment) from the ongoing political crisis, possibly through highly compartmentalized, empowered operational commands.
• CONSTRAINT: Political Unity: The calls for a new coalition government risk escalating internal friction, making strategic resource allocation decisions (e.g., reserve commitment) exponentially more difficult and slower.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• "Framework Agreement" Escalation: The initial Politico leak regarding a framework agreement has been immediately and aggressively amplified by RF state media (TASS, Операция Z, Alex Parker), presenting the outcome as a "done deal" that will be presented to Zelenskyy as a "fait accompli." This seeks to generate hopelessness within UAF forces and pressure the government toward unilateral concessions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Corruption/Collapse Narrative: The successful political targeting (Halushchenko/Hrynchuk dismissals) is linked by RF channels (ASTRA, TASS) to the broader corruption narrative, validating the RF claim of the "Kyiv regime collapse" and fueling calls for internal political rearrangement (new coalition).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Sentiment is likely polarizing between outrage over the Ternopil atrocity and profound cynicism regarding the internal political scandals. The simultaneous nature of these events risks driving critical national attention away from the imminent ground threat.
• The high-profile NABU/Prosecutor investigations, while necessary, unintentionally feed the RF narrative of deep corruption, further degrading public trust in the state during the crisis.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• EU Mobility: The EU’s move to create a European system for the accelerated transfer of troops across its territory (TASS reporting) suggests anticipation of further conflict and commitment to collective defense planning, providing a positive long-term strategic signal.
• US/Peace Rumors (CRITICAL DANGER): The sustained leak regarding a peace framework (Dempster-Shafer belief: 30.6%) is the most damaging IO factor. It creates uncertainty among Western allies and reduces motivation for immediate military aid delivery, which directly impacts UAF operational capabilities.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The conditions for the RF ground offensive are nearing perfection: political C2 is distracted, logistics are stressed, and strategic IO is peaking. The 0-8 hour window remains paramount.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (211800Z NOV 25 - 220600Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Ground/Hybrid Attack Synchronization)

1. GLOC Interdiction (0-4 hours): RF Spetsnaz executes the complex ambush/IED strike on the Kostiantynivka GLOC.
2. C2 Overload: RF deploys secondary kinetic threats (e.g., loitering munitions strikes on minor western logistics nodes or C2 backups) to ensure UAF High Command remains fixed on crisis management.
3. Breakthrough Attempt (4-12 hours): The combined 40th and 155th OMBRs launch the mechanized assault on the Pokrovsk axis (Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka), relying on the expected logistical shortfall and C2 confusion to gain rapid operational depth.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Paralysis and Penetration)

• Scenario Refined: RF achieves prolonged closure (>12 hours) of the Kostiantynivka GLOC due to effective SpN interdiction and UAF QRF failure/delay caused by C2 distraction. The 40th/155th OMBRs breach UAF forward defenses on the Pokrovsk axis, establishing a bridgehead. RF media then uses the Politico "framework agreement" rumor to broadcast calls for UAF frontline units to cease fire, asserting that the war is diplomatically concluded, achieving a cognitive warfare victory that precipitates tactical collapse.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Operations) / SOF: Intensify Operation VIPER HUNT (GLOC Defense - 0-2 Hours).

   • Action: Immediately deploy all available UAS/thermal assets for continuous, high-resolution surveillance of the Kostiantynivka–Pokrovsk road corridor. Any detected SpN element must be neutralized preemptively using indirect fire or quick-reaction air assets, bypassing bureaucratic engagement procedures. The QRF must be instructed to prioritize route clearance over capture/detainment.
   • Rationale: The C2 confusion from the political crisis is the SpN's primary operational enabler. Overwhelm the SpN threat decisively to secure the supply line.

2. J4 (Logistics): Execute Emergency Caching Protocol (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Implement immediate contingency plans to distribute 24-hour emergency stocks of artillery ammunition (155mm, 122mm) and anti-tank systems to forward-most holding areas, even if sub-optimal.
   • Rationale: Provides an indispensable buffer against the MDCOA of prolonged GLOC closure, ensuring forward units can sustain engagement until the route is cleared.

3. STRATCOM / J3: Unified Strategic Counter-IO (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: The Office of the President, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense, must issue a single, unified statement: (a) Denouncing the Politico leak as RF PSYOP designed to disrupt the Pokrovsk defense; (b) Reaffirming the commitment to the anti-corruption fight; and (c) Directly stating that the Pokrovsk front is the singular strategic priority and that all government resources are mobilized for the defense.
   • Rationale: Must stabilize the political domain and redirect national focus back to the kinetic threat timeline.

//END SITREP//