Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 211200Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 211130Z NOV 25 – 211200Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The RF continues to execute a high-tempo, multi-domain attack aimed at creating C2 collapse and logistical vulnerability prior to the Pokrovsk ground assault. Hybrid warfare synchronization remains the critical RF strategic advantage.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Western Axis (Ternopil): Confirmed civilian KIA count from the missile strike has been reconfirmed at 20 KIA (including 2 children) by DSNS. RF propaganda (Colonelcassad) is attempting to retroactively justify the strike by claiming the target was the "Orion Radio Plant," a clear attempt to mask the mass civilian atrocity as a legitimate military target strike. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Deep Strike Capability: Footage shows incoming missiles over Ternopil deploying thermal flares/decoys, complicating UAF air defense engagement and increasing the probability of successful deep penetration strikes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Rear Area Strikes (Reciprocal): UAF deep strike continues to hit RF critical infrastructure, with confirmed substantial destruction at the GRES (Power Plant) in Ryazan Oblast following drone attacks (ЦАПЛІЄНКО). This sustains reciprocal logistical/energy stress on the RF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Fire and smoke from the Ryazan GRES strike confirm active environmental and operational disruption in RF logistics hinterlands.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Force Posture (Vinnytsia): The Coordination Staff for POW Affairs continues high-visibility engagements with families of Missing/Captured personnel in Vinnytsia Oblast (Lypovets, Pohrebyshche). This reflects efforts to sustain home front morale despite rear-area kinetic strikes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Force Posture (IO Focus): RF channels (Basurin) continue to amplify the 'Day of Rocket Troops and Artillery' narrative, using historical Soviet decrees to reinforce the ideological and destructive power of their artillery, directly supporting the anticipated ground assault. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Anti-Air Defense Countermeasures: RF missiles (Kh-101/55 variants likely) demonstrate the capacity to deploy advanced countermeasures (thermal flares), significantly degrading UAF SHORAD effectiveness against deep strikes targeting cities like Ternopil. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Hybrid Synchronization (Political/Kinetic): RF is successfully sustaining the political crisis in Kyiv. The dismissal of Minister of Justice Halushchenko (Rada/TASS/STERNENKO) amidst corruption allegations creates instability and validates previous RF IO attempts (Naftogaz crisis), draining C2 resources. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. Sustained Attrition and Propaganda: RF continues to market aggressive social narratives (Peskov comments on Kyiv regime ‘toxicity’) aimed at international and domestic audiences, reinforcing the notion of Ukrainian collapse.

Intentions:

1. Overwhelm UAF C2: The primary intention remains the overwhelming of UAF High Command through kinetic terror (Ternopil) and orchestrated political crises (Halushchenko resignation, previous Naftogaz crisis) to prevent timely deployment of reserves to the Pokrovsk axis.
2. Degrade Air Defense Effectiveness: The use of missile decoys intends to drive UAF Air Defense systems toward expenditure or failure, enabling subsequent strikes to pass more easily.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Political Targeting Confirmation: The resignation/firing of a senior government minister (Halushchenko) confirms the immediate success of the RF hybrid warfare campaign aimed at exploiting real and perceived corruption within the Ukrainian political structure.
• Air Defense Decoys: Confirmed deployment of advanced missile countermeasures (thermal flares) in the deep strike domain is a significant technical adaptation that UAF Air Defense must immediately address.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• UAF Logistics: Current focus remains on managing the political crisis and the human consequences of the Ternopil strike. The strategic logistics picture (Kostiantynivka GLOC) remains at CRITICAL VULNERABILITY (0-8 hours) against SpN interdiction (as noted in the previous report).
• RF Logistics: UAF is successfully creating reciprocal pressure on RF energy logistics via drone strikes (Ryazan GRES). This forces RF to commit resources to internal security and repair.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• UAF C2: C2 remains heavily stressed. The kinetic threat (Ternopil) combined with the simultaneous political turmoil (Rada votes, Ministerial resignations) confirms the RF’s ability to successfully engage UAF across all domains simultaneously. Senior leadership is forced to dedicate time to political stabilization and crisis communication (Zelenskyy spoke with Polish PM Tusk). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: UAF maintains a posture of resilience and transparency regarding deep strikes (DSNS casualty reporting) and diplomatic engagement (Polish PM call). Efforts to modernize (UGVs) and manage home-front psychological stress (POW Coordination meetings) continue.
• Readiness: Operational readiness for immediate response to the Pokrovsk ground breakthrough is now inextricably linked to the ability of C2 to rapidly disengage from the hybrid/political crisis and focus purely on the tactical defense.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (CRITICAL): The successful RF-orchestrated political instability resulting in the Minister of Justice's removal represents a tactical victory for RF IO/Hybrid Strategy, consuming vital governmental attention during the period of maximum kinetic threat.
• Success: Sustained deep strike capability against critical RF energy infrastructure (Ryazan GRES). The conversation between President Zelenskyy and Polish PM Tusk suggests an attempt to stabilize the diplomatic front following previous RF narratives (e.g., alleged Polish sabotage claims).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Counter-Decoy Air Defense Doctrine. UAF Air Force (P-800/P-500) requires immediate analysis of the missile decoy deployment footage to update engagement procedures and maximize kill probability against future deep strikes.
• CONSTRAINT: Political Stability: Internal political friction remains a critical constraint on unifying national resources and attention on the immediate kinetic threats.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Narrative Consolidation: RF channels (Colonelcassad, Parker, TASS) immediately seized on the Minister Halushchenko resignation, linking it to broader corruption narratives previously established (Naftogaz) and framing it as the "collapse of the Kyiv regime." This is a successful, planned IO evolution.
• Deep State Amplification: The SVR report (via Poddubny) claims "Western experts" are warning of the "collapse of the Anti-Russia project in Ukraine." This narrative aims to degrade international support and feed into the domestic apathy narrative.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Sentiment is likely volatile. While the high visibility of the Ternopil atrocity fuels anger and resolve, the simultaneous public dismissal of a senior minister on corruption grounds validates RF narratives and undermines confidence in governmental integrity.
• The Coordination Staff's meetings with POW families are a necessary morale countermeasure to RF psychological operations regarding losses.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• EU Assets: Ukraine is pressing for a political decision by the EU on utilizing frozen Russian assets in December (RBC-Ukraine), indicating continued long-term financial planning resilience.
• US/Negotiation Rumors: Politico reports White House expectation of a framework agreement for ending the war "by the end of this month, possibly this week." This highly destabilizing rumor, amplified by Ukrainian operational channels (Оперативний ЗСУ), is likely feeding RF IO goals by suggesting Western fatigue. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• Polish Link: The call with PM Tusk is a necessary action to reaffirm the critical logistical/political link with Poland, countering previous sabotage narratives.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The simultaneous political and kinetic climax indicates RF is executing the final preparatory phase before the major ground effort. The 0-8 hour window for GLOC interdiction remains the singular most critical operational vulnerability.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (211200Z NOV 25 - 220000Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Ground/Hybrid Attack Synchronization)

1. GLOC Interdiction Execution (0-4 hours): RF Spetsnaz will strike the Kostiantynivka GLOC (road) to ensure closure coincidental with the planned ground assault.
2. Offensive Launch Preparation (4-8 hours): The combined 40th and 155th OMBRs will finalize pre-assault fire missions and positioning for the mechanized breakthrough attempt on the Pokrovsk axis (Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector).
3. IO Escalation: RF media will link the Halushchenko dismissal to the US envoy delay rumor to create the perception of total institutional collapse and Western abandonment.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Paralysis and Penetration)

• RF deep strike elements use decoy-equipped missiles to successfully target a key UAF logistics hub near Kostiantynivka while SpN interdicts the GLOC, achieving operational-level logistical failure. The resulting ammunition shortage paralyzes UAF forward defenses, allowing the reinforced 40th/155th OMBR to achieve a decisive, multi-kilometer penetration, forcing UAF to commit strategic reserves prematurely or face a rout.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Operations) / SOF: Initiate Operation VIPER HUNT (GLOC Security - 0-2 Hours).

   • Action: Immediately commit all available SOF, National Guard, or highly-trained QRFs near Kostiantynivka to aggressive "Hunter-Killer" patrols along the GLOC. Any detected personnel or vehicle not conforming to established UAF logistics control measures must be engaged immediately and definitively. Prioritize the removal of IED/mine threats.
   • Rationale: The threat timeline is now IMMINENT. Passive defense is insufficient. The road must remain open at all costs for the next 48 hours.

2. J3 (Air Defense) / J2 (Tech): Update Air Defense SOPs (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Disseminate an immediate flash intelligence bulletin regarding the confirmed use of thermal flares by incoming cruise missiles. Adjust operational parameters for SHORAD and intercept aircraft guidance systems to prioritize kinematic trajectory over heat signature.
   • Rationale: Rapid technical adaptation is required to maintain the credibility of deep rear-area air defense and protect C2 nodes.

3. STRATCOM / Presidential Office: Crisis Communication Posture (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: The President or Minister of Defense must issue a unified, high-visibility address that simultaneously: (a) Condemns the Ternopil atrocity, (b) Acknowledges and commits to investigating corruption allegations (Halushchenko), and (c) Reaffirms the unwavering defensive commitment against the anticipated ground assault, directly tying political stability to military effectiveness.
   • Rationale: This counter-measure is required to stabilize the information environment, reclaim narrative control from RF propaganda, and focus national attention back on the kinetic front.

//END SITREP//