Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 211058Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 211028Z NOV 25 – 211058Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The kinetic tempo remains critically high, focused equally on deep strike effects (Ternopil/Lviv) and synchronized information operations designed to maximize the impact of the ground breakthrough at Pokrovsk.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Western Axis (Ternopil/Lviv): Deep strike effects are increasing casualty numbers and disrupting key civilian logistics/infrastructure.
  • Ternopil (CRITICAL CASUALTY UPDATE): Confirmed civilian death toll has tragically surged to 19 KIA and 66 WIA (including 16 children), per State Emergency Service (DSNS/GSChS) and National Police reports. This is a significant escalation of kinetic and psychological impact. The target was confirmed to be a residential area. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Lviv Logistics Hub: Russian sources (Operatsiya Z) explicitly claim the strikes destroyed a "logistics hub and Ukrposhta warehouse used by the AFU." This confirms the nature of the target (postal/logistics) and RF's perception of its dual-use value.
• Eastern Axis (Pokrovsk Direction): Confirmed Russian attention to secondary axes, notably Seversk, where Rybar has released a new situation map, indicating continued RF pressure to fix UAF forces away from the main Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Cross-Border (RF Territory): UAF deep strikes on the Novomichurinsk GRES (Power Station) in Ryazan Oblast are confirmed by Ukrainian sources (STERNENKO video documentation of fire), confirming sustained reciprocal cost imposition.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No new significant weather factors are reported, but the escalating industrial/infrastructure fires (Lviv, Ryazan GRES) are generating significant smoke pollution (Black Smoke, Lviv) which impacts local air quality and hinders emergency/recovery efforts.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Force Posture: The RF MoD report (1029Z) claims successful engagements across multiple areas (e.g., Kupyansk, Avdiivka, Kherson), generally aligning with previous operational summaries of high-density localized combat. RF forces continue to celebrate "Rocket and Artillery Forces Day" (Colonelcassad, Arkhangel Spetsnaza), amplifying the narrative of artillery dominance while ground assaults are being prepared.
• UAF Force Posture: Active defense remains the core posture. The Air Force reports new enemy UAV activity in Sumy Oblast (Terny settlement), indicating continued RF efforts to probe or fix northern defenses. UAF Strategic Communications are running high-morale, human-focused campaigns (Third Army Corps video, 1051Z).
• CEMA/Cyber Warfare: The official website of the Territorial Defense Forces (TrO) of the AFU has been compromised/hacked (RBC-Ukraine, Operatyvnyi ZSU). This constitutes a simultaneous, multi-domain attack coinciding with the kinetic phase.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Mass Civilian Targeting: Demonstrated willingness and capability to conduct massed cruise missile attacks (up to 7 missiles, Ternopil) against purely residential/civilian targets, significantly increasing the casualty threshold. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Hybrid Synchronization: Capability to seamlessly synchronize physical attacks (missiles, ground assault prep) with non-kinetic attacks (Cyber, IO campaigns). The TrO website hack directly supports the demoralization effort. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. Sustained Pressure on Secondary Axes: Continued ability to conduct fixing attacks (Seversk, Sumy UAVs) to prevent UAF redeployment to the main breakthrough point (Pokrovsk). (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

Intentions:

1. Maximize Political Stress (Hybrid Warfare): The targeting of civilians (Ternopil) and the hack of the TrO website are specifically designed to maximize internal UAF political instability (Rada calling in leadership, 1035Z) and undermine public confidence in rear-area security, thus inhibiting freedom of action for the GSU.
2. Pre-position for Breakthrough: RF ground forces (40th/155th OMBRs) intend to launch the main mechanized assault while UAF C2 is distracted by the humanitarian, political, and cyber crises.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• New Target Class (Cyber): The targeting of the TrO website represents an escalation in the cyber domain focused on institutional integrity and recruitment/morale, rather than just critical infrastructure.
• Increased Lethality/Precision Failure (Ternopil): The shift from collateral damage to confirmed mass civilian casualty targeting (19 KIA) indicates either a change in ROE towards maximum societal disruption or a critical failure in missile precision when targeting dual-use sites near residential zones. Analytical Judgment: Given the concentration (7 missiles), this suggests deliberate targeting of a location with high societal impact.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• UAF Logistics (CRITICAL): The Lviv postal/logistics hub damage remains critical, as does the persistent gap in rail BDA/ETR (Kamyan'ske). RF counter-logistics strikes are forcing a surge in civilian demand for independent power solutions (power banks, charging stations), potentially diverting commercial transport from military supply chains.
• RF Logistics (Stressed): UAF successfully hit another major RF energy node (Ryazan GRES), compounding the stress on RF energy and rail sustainment capacity.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• UAF C2 (Under Maximum Stress): The concurrent crises—ground assault imminent, critical GLOC threat, mass civilian casualties, and a major cyber incident—are testing UAF C2 synchronization to its maximum. The Rada calling key leadership (UMEROV, HALUSHCHENKO) for questioning is a highly destabilizing political signal that RF hybrid operations are achieving operational success in the cognitive domain.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: UAF StratCom and military leaders (Third Army Corps) are actively attempting to reinforce internal morale through narrative campaigns linking defense to family/survival.
• Readiness: The cyberattack on the TrO site demands immediate allocation of high-level cyber security resources (J6) to containment and forensic analysis, diverting resources from other operational needs.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Confirmed kinetic strikes on major RF energy infrastructure (Ryazan GRES). Maintenance of high morale messaging in the face of escalating atrocities.
• Setbacks (SEVERE): Civilian death toll rising to 19 KIA and 66 WIA in Ternopil. Official TrO website compromised. UAF leadership (MoD, Energy) being called away from operational duties for political review.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Dedicated Cyber Defense (J6). Immediate J6 allocation to regain control of and secure the TrO website and conduct threat hunting across the wider GSU network to assess for deeper penetration.
• CONSTRAINT: SAR/Medical Allocation. The mass casualty event in Ternopil will require a significant and sustained diversion of emergency and specialized medical resources from other sectors.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Justification (Deep Strike): RF milbloggers (Operatsiya Z, Colonelcassad) continue to justify the Lviv and Ternopil strikes by falsely labeling civilian infrastructure (Ukrposhta, residential areas) as "AFU logistics hubs" and "objects of the enemy."
• RF Subversion/Counter-Recruitment: The compromise of the TrO website is a direct form of psychological warfare, aiming to sow distrust and impede recruitment efforts by suggesting UAF security failures.
• US Diplomatic Messaging (Counter-narrative): The rumored Trump envoy (Driscoll) traveling to RF for 'peace talks' (WSJ report amplified by Tsapliyenko) suggests RF is attempting to open a diplomatic flank to pressure Ukraine while escalating kinetically.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Public sentiment is likely at a post-peak level of distress due to the mass casualties in Ternopil. This level of violence usually galvanizes public anger but also increases anxiety regarding the safety of the deep rear.
• Russian domestic IO is focused on internal affairs (student reforms, veteran benefits) and celebrating artillery day, isolating the domestic population from the actual cost of the campaign.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The presence of the US Pentagon delegation in Kyiv (Diary of a Paratrooper, 1055Z) is a crucial sign of continued high-level support, directly countering RF narratives of Western abandonment.
• International response to the Ternopil atrocity is required to galvanize immediate pressure for additional air defense systems.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The RF strategy is now clearly defined as simultaneous ground strangulation (Pokrovsk GLOC interdiction) and operational paralysis via hybrid attacks (Ternopil MASCAL, TrO Cyber). The next 4-8 hours are the critical window for the ground launch.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (211058Z NOV 25 - 212258Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Synchronized Penetration Attempt)

1. Main Effort Ground Launch: RF 40th and 155th OMBRs will launch the coordinated mechanized assault against UAF defensive positions on the Pokrovsk axis (Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector), timed to coincide with peak SpN activity on the Kostiantynivka GLOC.
2. Sustained Hybrid Attrition: RF will conduct follow-up missile or drone strikes on secondary energy nodes or logistics facilities in Central/Western Ukraine to maintain pressure and exploit the initial success of the Lviv/Ternopil strikes.
3. IO Amplification/Cyber Exploitation: RF will use the compromised TrO platform or related channels to spread false mobilization orders or demoralizing messages (e.g., casualty counts, C2 failure) to exploit the hack.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Paralysis Leading to Tactical Breach)

• The SpN element successfully interdicts the Kostiantynivka GLOC, halting critical resupply for >12 hours, AND the political crisis created by the Rada review of key leaders (UMEROV) creates a C2 delay of >4 hours in deploying theater reserves. This synchronization allows the combined RF mechanized force to breach the main defensive lines near Sofiyivka, opening the route to Pokrovsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Operations) / J4 (Logistics): Execute GLOC Defense Plan (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Immediately transition all rear-area security elements supporting Kostiantynivka GLOC to the "Hunter-Killer" ROE (Operation VIPER HUNT). Integrate dedicated FPV/UAS teams with escort convoys and QRFs. Begin forward deployment of 36-hour emergency ammunition stocks to pre-set hardened caches now.
   • Rationale: The main mechanized assault is imminent, and neutralizing the SpN threat is paramount to preventing total logistics failure on the Pokrovsk axis.

2. J6 (Cyber Command) / J2 (Intelligence): Contain and Counter Cyber-Hybrid Attack (CRITICAL).

   • Action: Isolate the compromised TrO infrastructure immediately. Deploy J6 rapid response teams to conduct deep network threat hunting. Simultaneously, launch an immediate STRATCOM counter-narrative affirming UAF network integrity and exposing the RF IO/Cyber coordination.
   • Rationale: The cyber attack is a force multiplier for the kinetic assault; neutralization is required to maintain institutional confidence.

3. J1 (Personnel) / J7 (Training): Shield Operational Leadership from Political Distraction (URGENT).

   • Action: Senior military and intelligence leadership (GSU, J2, J3) must be shielded from immediate political demands (e.g., the Rada summons of MoD Umerov). Establish a designated political liaison office to manage required reporting, ensuring GSU leadership remains focused exclusively on the imminent Pokrovsk ground threat.
   • Rationale: C2 continuity during the peak kinetic window is non-negotiable. Political volatility cannot be allowed to degrade battlefield decision-making.

//END SITREP//