DTG: 211028Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 210958Z NOV 25 – 211028Z NOV 25
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The strategic missile campaign has achieved peak kinetic impact, confirmed by rising casualty counts and BDA of major logistics/energy nodes. The operational focus remains shifted to the Pokrovsk ground breakthrough synchronized with internal political destabilization efforts.
Western Axis (Ternopil/Lviv): The effects of the deep strike campaign are escalating significantly.
Ternopil: Confirmed casualty count has surged to 16 KIA and 64 WIA (including 14 children) following the Kh-101/missile strike on the residential area. RF sources (Colonelcassad) claim the target was the "Orion Plant" in Ternopil, attempting to re-justify the collateral damage.
Lviv Logistics Hub: Damage confirmed to be a new Ukrposhta (Postal Service) logistics facility, in addition to the previously reported "Pizza Hot" warehouse. The massive industrial fire and smoke plumes confirm a high level of operational disruption to civilian and potentially dual-use logistics chains.
Energy Infrastructure (Deep Strike): Multiple attacks confirmed against DTEK Thermal Power Plants (TESS), confirming the continuation of the RF strategy to degrade Ukraine's energy resilience ahead of winter/intensified ground operations.
Eastern Axis (Pokrovsk Area): UAF General Staff reports confirmed clashes yesterday near Scherbynivka, Rusyn Yar, and towards Kostyantynivka, Stepanivka, and Sofiyivka on the Kostiantynivka axis, and heavy fighting in the Pokrovsk direction (Shakhove, Myrnohrad, Udachne). This confirms the MLCOA has already entered its preliminary kinetic phase.
Cross-Border (RF Territory): UAF strikes confirmed against the Ilsky Oil Refinery (NPZ) and a HRES (Power Station) in Ryazan Oblast, and a partial power outage reported in Rylsk, Kursk Oblast after an attack on a substation. This confirms Ukraine's sustained effort to impose reciprocal costs on Russian logistics and energy.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
The ongoing industrial fire in Lviv is generating dense, hazardous black smoke, requiring local advisories for window closure and mask use. This secondary effect exacerbates the humanitarian impact and complicates local emergency response.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Force Posture (IO Focus): RF media is focusing its artillery/missile forces on two key narrative points: a) Celebrating 'Rocket and Artillery Forces Day' (Старше Эдды, 1000Z), emphasizing artillery dominance; b) Claiming successful destruction of a UAF transport truck by the 56th OBSPN (1002Z), suggesting localized SpN/FPV superiority in rear/front-adjacent areas.
UAF Force Posture (Active Defense/Counter-Attack): UAF 63rd Brigade successfully destroyed an RF ground robotic complex carrying ammunition (0757Z/1013Z), demonstrating effective counter-RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) targeting. UAF artillery (Grad MLRS) remains active and focused (1023Z).
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Sustained Deep Strike (Energy and Logistics): Demonstrated capability to hit multiple, critical nodes simultaneously (Residential, Postal Logistics, TPPs) across Western and Central Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Ground Maneuver Preparation: Successful deployment and integration of the 40th and 155th OMBRs, evidenced by the reported clashes near Sofiyivka and Stepanivka (1006Z), confirming massing for the anticipated breakthrough. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Low-Intensity Attrition: Continued effective use of FPV drones/SpN (56th OBSPN) to target logistics and light armored vehicles. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Intentions:
Operational Paralysis (Pokrovsk): Create a 'perfect storm' by forcing the UAF to simultaneously manage a catastrophic civilian crisis (Ternopil), political gridlock (Rada), and the imminent ground attack (Pokrovsk).
Degradation of Reserves/Support: Targeting of the TPPs is a clear strategic intent to undermine war sustainability and strain civilian infrastructure support requirements.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
RF Target Selection Adaptation: RF has broadened its deep strike target set from just energy to key civilian postal/logistics hubs (Ukrposhta), recognizing that these facilities are critical for the civilian economy and dual-use supply chains.
UAF Counter-RMA Success: Confirmed destruction of the RF Ground Robotic Complex indicates that UAF FPV/UAS teams are actively and successfully targeting high-value, novel enemy assets.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
UAF Logistics (CRITICAL): The confirmed destruction of the Ukrposhta facility in Lviv, combined with the earlier rail severance at Kamyan’ske, places maximum pressure on the long-haul delivery mechanism, exacerbating the tactical resupply crisis at Kostiantynivka.
RF Logistics (Countered): The confirmed UAF strikes on the Ilsky NPZ and Ryazan HRES impose significant counter-logistics stress on Russia's ability to fuel and power its forward combat operations.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2: C2 remains highly synchronized between strategic fires (missiles), theater ground forces, and the IO apparatus (Colonelcassad justifying Ternopil strike).
UAF C2 (Stress Test): The rapid rise in the Ternopil casualty count and the ongoing political instability (Rada blockage, high-level personnel review) represent a significant, ongoing C2 stress test that demands immediate prioritization: Ground defense must be shielded from rear-area political volatility.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Posture: UAF units are engaging in active defense and tactical counter-attacks (63rd Brigade RPV kill) despite the logistics crunch.
Readiness: UAF StratCom (Zelenskyy, GSU) is actively using the crisis and recent diplomatic successes (PPO missiles, 515M Euro support, gas supply agreements with Greece/France/Spain) to project international support and counter the RF narrative of isolation.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Successes: Confirmed destruction of an RF ammunition-carrying ground RPV. Confirmed kinetic hits on multiple RF critical infrastructure nodes (NPZ, HRES, Substation).
Setbacks (CRITICAL): Civilian casualty count is now 16 KIA, 64 WIA (14 children). This is the most severe kinetic and psychological setback in the reporting period.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: The strategic missile strike on energy and logistics nodes is designed to preempt or delay the flow of recent diplomatic commitments (PPO missiles, 515M EUR). Immediate, protected transport of these new resources is paramount.
REQUIREMENT: Personnel and equipment (heavy lifting, medical) need to be rapidly allocated to the Ternopil SAR effort, even though operational priority must remain on Pokrovsk GLOC defense.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF Justification (Deep Strike): RF milbloggers (Colonelcassad) are attempting to mitigate the political impact of the Ternopil residential strike by falsely claiming the target was a military factory ("Orion Plant").
RF Diplomatic Messaging: Peskov emphasizes non-existent 'peace talks' in Alaska (1009Z), attempting to portray Russia as open to diplomacy while military action escalates, diverting international focus from atrocities.
UAF Counter-IO (Reciprocity): UAF sources are maximizing coverage of the successful deep strikes into Russia (Ilsky NPZ, Ryazan HRES) and emphasizing international diplomatic gains (Zelenskyy’s foreign visits) to maintain morale.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
Public sentiment is likely entering a phase of acute anger and distress due to the sharply rising casualty figures in Ternopil, particularly the death of a child. This can be leveraged to reinforce national unity against RF brutality but also risks generating panic regarding rear-area safety.
The high-profile US General delegation visit (Army Secretary, Chief of Staff, Gen. Donahue) publicized by RF sources confirms continued, high-level US military engagement, which is positive for UAF morale despite RF attempts to spin it as "Western meddling."
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
Positive Developments: Confirmed PPO missile agreement, 515M Euro support, and guaranteed gas supply from Greece (1011Z). Confirmation of high-level US Army C2 presence in Kyiv (1020Z). Poland's closure of the last Russian consulate (1008Z) demonstrates strong diplomatic solidarity.
Ongoing Uncertainty: Zelenskyy’s continued high-level diplomatic activity (Turkey visit, 1027Z) aims to secure long-term military and economic support to offset the internal political turbulence and RF military pressure.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
The simultaneous escalation in civilian targeting, energy strikes, and confirmed kinetic activity on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis confirms the current period is the peak kinetic window for the MLCOA.
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours (211028Z NOV 25 - 211628Z NOV 25)
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Synchronized Ground and Hybrid Attack)
Main Effort Launch (Pokrovsk): RF 40th and 155th OMBRs will transition from preparatory fire to the full mechanized assault near the Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector. Artillery density will peak to suppress UAF forward defenses coinciding with a concentrated IED/Ambush effort on the Kostiantynivka GLOC.
Strategic Strike Follow-up: RF will attempt to hit critical energy infrastructure (TESS/substations) in the Dnipro or Zaporizhzhia regions to capitalize on the success of the current strikes and further restrict UAF industrial capacity.
IO Amplification: RF state media will flood the information space with images of the Ternopil strike aftermath, blaming Ukraine for locating "military objects" near residential areas, while simultaneously amplifying narratives of UAF corruption and political chaos to maximize demoralization.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours
The mechanized assault (40th/155th OMBR) successfully overruns the forward defenses near Sofiyivka, AND SpN activity effectively closes the Kostiantynivka GLOC for >12 hours, severing the forward combat forces from ammunition resupply, forcing the hasty and vulnerable retreat of UAF tactical formations towards Pokrovsk.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-2 Hours (CRITICAL)
Artillery Saturation Peak: UAF forward observers report a shift from localized preparatory fire to sustained saturation fire (e.g., TOS-1A use) on the Pokrovsk axis.
Real-time fire mission data and RF G-band COMINT showing high volume fire requests.
1-4 Hours (IMMINENT)
Main Mechanized Breach: Confirmation of MBT/IFV penetration past the forward-most anti-tank ditch lines, or engagement beyond the pre-set 4km tactical depth.
ISR/JFO reports confirming enemy forces are operating in depth, potentially isolating forward UAF strongpoints.
4-8 Hours
Resource Commit Decision (J3): Decision to deploy theater-level reserves (armor/mechanized) to reinforce the Pokrovsk axis, or accept tactical retreat to a designated second line (D-Line 2).
Ammunition expenditure rates exceed projected 4-hour resupply window, coupled with 20% casualty rate in forward units.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - GROUND ASSAULT EXECUTION
GLOC SpN Interdiction Status: Has the RF SpN element on the Kostiantynivka GLOC commenced operations, and what is the current traffic flow/closure status?
ISR/HUMINT: High-frequency, armed UAS patrols on the Kostiantynivka road network.
MEDIUM
CRITICAL - ENEMY CAPABILITIES
RF Missile Stock/Production: What is the assessed production rate and current reserve of Kh-101 and Kinzhal missiles, given the sustained, high-tempo strikes?
HUMINT/GEOINT: Focused collection on known RF missile production/storage facilities (e.g., Ulyanovsk, Dubna).
LOW
HIGH - POLITICAL STABILITY
Rada Confidence in Leadership: Will the Rada blockage and corruption IO (Umerov/Mindich) lead to any immediate, critical personnel changes in the MOD/GSU leadership?
POLINT/HUMINT: Continuous monitoring of internal political discussions and high-level communications.
Action: Immediately implement the "Hunter-Killer" ROE (Operation VIPER HUNT) and conduct a full sweep-and-clear operation on the Kostiantynivka GLOC to preempt the SpN MLCOA. Concurrently, initiate movement of the 36-hour emergency caches to forward hardened positions.
Rationale: The time for preparation is over; immediate kinetic action is required to maintain the sole logistics lifeline during the main RF ground thrust.
J4 (Logistics) / J1 (Personnel): High-Value Asset Protection and SAR Coordination (URGENT).
Action: Allocate dedicated military security elements to protect all remaining critical logistics and energy hubs (e.g., remaining DTEK TPPs, rail hubs, and major regional postal/commercial depots) from the highly likely follow-on deep strikes. Simultaneously, divert all available medical and SAR assets to Ternopil, coordinating with S&R command to minimize SAR impact on frontline reserve readiness.
Rationale: Protect remaining strategic capacity while mitigating the immediate political and humanitarian crisis.
STRATCOM / J2 (Intelligence): Counter-IO on Civilian Atrocities (CRITICAL).
Action: Launch a highly aggressive international media campaign focused exclusively on the confirmed rising civilian death toll (16 KIA, 1 child) in Ternopil, demanding increased AD/PPO systems in response. Directly counter the "Orion Plant" justification by presenting objective BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) of the residential buildings.
Rationale: Maximize international pressure and sympathy to secure immediate military aid deliveries and prevent RF normalization of civilian targeting.