DTG: 210958Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 210930Z NOV 25 – 210958Z NOV 25 (Immediate Update)
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The RF operational pattern remains consistent: Deep, strategic strikes on logistics/morale nodes (Kh-101/Kinzhal) are synchronized with preparatory ground maneuver and intensive hybrid warfare efforts (IO/Political disruption). The window for the ground MLCOA on the Pokrovsk axis is rapidly closing.
Western Axis (Ternopil/Lviv): Confirmed use of the Kh-101 cruise missile against a multi-story residential building in Ternopil. Casualty count is rising, with the Mayor reporting 12 confirmed victims as of 0958Z. This confirms the RF intent to maximize civilian terror and infrastructure damage post-Kinzhal deployment.
Lviv Logistics Node: Further confirmation of the strategic targeting, with reports explicitly naming the destruction of the Pizza Hot production/warehouse facility in Lviv as a result of the attack (0927Z). This contributes to the broader strategic goal of disrupting civilian logistics and stability.
Eastern Axis (Pokrovsk Area): RF sources are amplifying IO claims regarding the Gulyaypole-Malynivka road as a "road of death," visually demonstrating attacks on UAF infantry withdrawing near Zatyshshia (0930Z). This narrative aims to demoralize UAF forces ahead of the main assault and suggests limited UAF movement/withdrawal efforts are underway in anticipation of the RF thrust.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
No new significant weather impact. The immediate, localized effect of the Kh-101 strike on Ternopil creates an intense demand for immediate search and rescue (SAR) resources, diverting resources from other rear area security and readiness tasks.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Force Posture (Deep Strike Validation): RF MoD (via Colonelcassad) publicly and explicitly confirmed the massive strike wave utilizing Kinzhal and Kh-101 missiles targeted VPC, energy, and long-range UAV storage in Western regions, explicitly labeling the strikes as a retaliatory effort against Ukrainian cross-border attacks (0933Z). This messaging aims to legitimize the targeting of civilian-adjacent infrastructure.
UAF Posture (Readiness/Resupply): UAF units, specifically the 72nd Brigade (Black Zaporozhians), are actively requesting critical tactical resources (Thermal imagers, FPV drones) via open source channels (0952Z), confirming immediate tactical equipment gaps ahead of the expected RF ground assault.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Mass Precision Strike (Sustained): Demonstrated capability to synchronize Kinzhal and Kh-101 strikes (with thermal decoy flares observed, 0939Z) for maximum physical and psychological damage against the deep rear. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Hybrid Warfare Synchronization (Political Disruption): RF Information Operations (IO) are successfully synchronized with military action, exploiting internal Ukrainian political instability (Rada blockage, 0929Z) and corruption narratives (e.g., alleged procurement scandal involving Umerov and Mindich, 0957Z).
Intentions:
Strategic Degeneration: The continued targeting of Western civilian logistics (Lviv) and residential areas (Ternopil) is intended to degrade strategic resupply routes and break civilian morale/resolve.
Deception/Psychological Preparation: The focus on the "road of death" IO (Gulyaypole-Malynivka) is intended to condition RF forces and domestic audiences for immediate success and demoralize UAF personnel on the Pokrovsk axis.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
Kh-101 Decoy Use (Confirmed): Imagery suggests Kh-101 missiles are deploying thermal countermeasures during terminal flight (0939Z). This is an adaptation designed to counter advanced Western air defense systems and confirms that Western AD effectiveness is driving RF cruise missile operational refinement. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
IO Escalation (Diplomatic): Russian MFA (Zakharova) confirmed that the closure of the Polish Consulate in Gdansk will result in reciprocal scaling back of Polish diplomatic presence in Russia (0953Z), signaling diplomatic hardening that could further complicate future logistics or intelligence exchange efforts through neutral channels.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF Logistics (IO): RF media continues to push generalized claims of UAF logistics failure (e.g., "road of death"), masking its own tactical logistics vulnerabilities (IFAK appeals noted in previous report).
UAF Logistics (Acute Stress): The physical destruction of the Lviv facility and the psychological effect of the Ternopil strike place immediate pressure on humanitarian and commercial supply chains, which are secondary yet crucial components of UAF sustainment.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2: Exhibiting highly effective synchronization between strategic missile command (Gryphons), ground force preparation (40th/155th OMBRs), and IO/political warfare apparatus (targeting Rada gridlock).
UAF C2: The simultaneous management of a high-casualty rear-area crisis (Ternopil BDA/SAR), political instability (Rada blockage), and the critical threat of the impending ground assault on Pokrovsk is creating maximum cognitive load. C2 clarity must prioritize the Pokrovsk GLOC defense (Kostiantynivka) over the rear-area humanitarian response, while allocating sufficient resources for SAR.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Posture: The 72nd Brigade's open appeal for critical thermal equipment (0952Z) confirms that specific frontline units are resource-constrained and anticipate immediate, intense nighttime engagement, confirming a high threat level on their sector.
Readiness: General Staff (GSU) is actively documenting and disseminating evidence of RF strikes on civilian infrastructure (0948Z) to support international legal efforts and sustain domestic morale by focusing anger on RF atrocities.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Setbacks (CRITICAL): Civilian casualty toll in Ternopil has reached 12 and is climbing (0958Z). This represents a severe morale and resources setback in the deep rear.
Successes (Information): Ukraine continues to proactively advertise the utilization and combat effectiveness of Western systems, such as the F-16 (0947Z), as a crucial component of strategic communication.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
CRITICAL REQUIREMENT:Thermal Imaging and FPV Drone supply to frontline units (e.g., 72nd Brigade) must be addressed immediately via emergency requisition and transport, or the effectiveness of forward defense against the synchronized RF assault (MLCOA) will be compromised.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF IO (Internal Corruption): RF media is focusing heavily on alleged high-level corruption within the UAF establishment (Umerov/Mindich procurement scandal, 0957Z), explicitly attempting to sow distrust between the military and political leadership during a crisis.
RF IO (Political Paralysis): The continued, visible blocking of the Rada podium by opposition factions (0929Z) is a major RF IO success, providing evidence for the narrative of a chaotic, dysfunctional government unable to manage the war effort.
RF IO (Targeted Escalation): RF actively defends the use of Kinzhal/Kh-101 strikes on Western infrastructure as legitimate retaliation for cross-border attacks, normalizing the targeting of Western supply chains.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
Public anger in the West will be intensely focused on the escalating civilian casualties (Ternopil). The UAF StratCom must ensure this anger is effectively channeled toward continued resistance and international pressure, rather than internal blame.
The open political friction in the Rada directly undermines public confidence in the national government's ability to unify and lead the war effort during the most kinetic phase.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
Poland/Russia Diplomatic Break: The confirmed Polish closure of the Gdansk Consulate and subsequent RF retaliation solidifies the diplomatic front against Moscow, which is favorable for UAF strategic logistics and security near the border.
US Political Uncertainty: Reports of a Trump Special Envoy refusing to meet with Zelenskyy (0952Z) are being amplified by RF media to signal declining long-term US support, directly supporting the RF operational goal of isolating Ukraine.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
The observed RF IO and tactical maneuvering (Kh-101 decoy use, ground narratives) confirm the immediate transition to the final phase of the ground MLCOA.
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours (210958Z NOV 25 - 211558Z NOV 25)
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Ground Breakthrough Attempt)
GLOC Interdiction (IMMEDIATE): RF SpN elements will execute a complex attack (IED/ambush) against a high-value UAF logistics convoy on the Kostiantynivka corridor to ensure maximum tactical disruption concurrent with the ground offensive launch.
Main Ground Offensive (Pokrovsk): The combined 40th and 155th OMBRs will initiate the mechanized assault, focusing on penetrating the front lines near the Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector under cover of heavy artillery and air support, timing the attack to coincide with the expected UAF ammunition exhaustion window.
Kinetic Diversion (North): Continued low-level assaults and kinetic pressure in the Kursk/Slobozhansky directions will aim to fix UAF reserves and prevent their immediate allocation to the Pokrovsk crisis.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Collapse)
RF forces successfully penetrate the initial defensive line on the Pokrovsk axis by >5km, AND the UAF C2 apparatus suffers a critical failure (either due to physical strike on a critical node or political paralysis preventing timely reserve deployment), resulting in the abandonment of the Pokrovsk Defense Sector.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-1 Hours (CRITICAL)
SpN Engagement/GLOC Closure: Confirmation that SpN Hunter-Killer teams have engaged or preempted the threat, or that the Kostiantynivka GLOC is compromised.
ISR/Ground unit contact reports of high-value convoy attacks or road infrastructure damage.
1-4 Hours (IMMINENT)
Launch Confirmation: Confirmation of the main mechanized assault (40th/155th OMBRs) is underway.
UAV/ISR reports showing mass movement of MBT/IFV columns entering the 8km engagement envelope.
4-8 Hours
Frontline Stability Decision: GSU must determine if the forward defense (D-Line 1) is holding and if the emergency 36-hour caches are required and accessible.
Confirmed RF foothold or penetration of key strongpoints on D-Line 1.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - GROUND ASSAULT EXECUTION
Assault Synchronization: What is the specific H-Hour for the combined 40th/155th OMBR mechanized assault? Has the SpN operation been timed precisely to the ground force launch?
SIGINT: Focused collection on tactical RF networks for final pre-assault countdowns or specific attack vectors.
MEDIUM
CRITICAL - REAR AREA DAMAGE
Lviv Depot BDA (Operational Impact): What was the exact content of the destroyed Lviv Pizza Hot warehouse/depot? (Was it purely food, or a dual-use logistics site containing medical/military supply components?)
HUMINT/J4 BDA Team: On-site inventory assessment of destroyed Lviv facility.
LOW
HIGH - POLITICAL STABILITY
Rada Resolution Timeline: What is the political forecast for the resolution of the Rada blockage, and does the ongoing corruption IO (Umerov/Mindich) indicate an immediate threat to the Minister of Defence's tenure?
HUMINT/POLINT: High-level political analysis of internal UAF negotiations and confidence votes.
Action: All available ISR assets (UAV/SATINT) must be layered and prioritized solely over the Kostiantynivka GLOC and the Pokrovsk engagement zone. Utilize the confirmed thermal equipment shortage (72nd Brigade report) to anticipate RF night/low-light operations and vector FPV/UAS strikes accordingly.
Rationale: Maximize reconnaissance/strike capability against the critical MLCOA elements (SpN and 40th/155th OMBRs) before they gain momentum.
Action: Immediately divert any available theater-level stocks of thermal imagers and FPV drones to the 72nd Brigade sector and adjacent threatened units on the Pokrovsk axis via emergency, armed transport.
Rationale: Mitigate the confirmed tactical equipment deficiency that directly impacts the unit's survivability during the expected night/low-light mechanized push.
Action: Launch a highly synchronized counter-IO campaign: a) Use the rising Ternopil casualty count to demand a UN investigation into the Kh-101 strike on residential areas. b) Immediately and publicly refute the RF corruption narrative (Umerov/Mindich) with verified facts, minimizing political paralysis caused by the Rada blockage.
Rationale: Stabilize the cognitive domain by reframing the narrative from internal chaos/corruption to external RF brutality, while simultaneously isolating the RF MO's attempt to justify civilian targeting.
