Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 210800Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 210600Z NOV 25 – 210800Z NOV 25 (Morning Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The operational focus has shifted from strategic infrastructure strikes to immediate ground force preparation, confirming the prior prediction of a synchronized attack initiation. Logistical vulnerability remains critical.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Deep Rear (Ternopil): Confirmed high casualty figures (9 KIA, 22 WIA) following the strategic strike wave. CRITICALLY, the OCHA/Regional Administration reports a dangerous level of residual contamination (Chlorine exceeding safe limits by six times) in the air post-impact.
• Deep Rear (Chernihiv): Air Force reports multiple groups of UAVs detected moving toward the Chernihiv axis (0743Z), confirming ongoing RF intent to stress AD assets and potentially target infrastructure or fixing positions.
• Donetsk Oblast (FLOT): Air Force reports launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) by RF tactical aviation targeting Donetsk Oblast (0755Z). This confirms RF is executing the necessary fire preparation immediately preceding the anticipated ground assault (MLCOA).
• Zaporizhzhia Axis: 72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade reports high enemy pressure and requests specific equipment (thermal imagers), indicating localized offensive action or reconnaissance probes intended to fix UAF forces.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Chemical Contamination (Ternopil): The presence of chlorine contamination post-strike (6x safe limit) introduces a significant CBRN hazard that affects civilian emergency response, internal displacement, and potentially limits military C2/mobility in the affected rear area. (ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT: Strike may have hit a chemical storage facility adjacent to civilian infrastructure).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces: Execution of planned pre-assault fire (KAB launches, continued drone saturation). Tactical C2 is synchronized to maximize the effect of logistical and morale crises.
• UAF Forces (AD): Air Force continues to track and report UAV activity, confirming AD assets are still engaged and strained by the ongoing saturation strategy.
• UAF Forces (Logistics): Resources are being diverted to the humanitarian crisis in Ternopil/other strike zones. Logistical pressure on the Pokrovsk axis remains critical, exacerbated by the need to manage potential chemical contamination in the rear.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Chemical/Secondary Effects: Demonstrated capability to strike targets that release secondary chemical hazards (Chlorine contamination in Ternopil). This may be incidental or intentional to amplify humanitarian pressure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Hybrid Warfare (UAS): Confirmation of continued domestic Russian efforts to develop and field VTOL-capable reconnaissance/loitering munitions (UAV "Duga" prototype). This indicates future pressure will rely increasingly on specialized, domestically produced UAS technology.

Intentions:

1. Kinetic Exploitation (Pokrovsk): RF intent to immediately launch the mechanized assault is confirmed by the synchronized KAB launches on the Donetsk FLOT. RF is completing the final step of the pre-assault fire plan.
2. Information Exploitation (Political: RF state media (TASS) and affiliated channels (Operation Z) are heavily pushing a narrative that President Zelenskyy is implicated in corruption (Mindich case) and amplifying rumors of US pressure for peace talks. The intent is to erode the legitimacy of the UAF high command at the exact moment of tactical crisis.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Fire Preparation: The transition to mass KAB deployment on the Donetsk axis is the final tactical signal for the ground assault.
• Force Generation: Russian military blogs continue to push aggressive contract recruitment drives, signaling continued demand for new personnel despite high morale messaging.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics: Sustaining high-volume fire (KAB/UAV/Artillery) on critical axes. Morale appears stable, supported by domestic benefits (Deputy MOD Belousov focusing on veteran digital support).
• UAF Logistics: STATUS REMAINS CRITICAL. Road dependence (Kostiantynivka GLOC) is now under maximum threat, compounded by the humanitarian need to manage potential CBRN hazards in the rear (Ternopil).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2: Strategic C2 has successfully synchronized the deep strike and the final pre-assault fire phase. Tactical C2 for the ground force must initiate the mechanized attack imminently (within 4 hours).
• UAF C2: Stressed by concurrent multi-domain crises: imminent ground assault (Pokrovsk), renewed AD pressure (Chernihiv), and a major humanitarian/CBRN incident (Ternopil). Tactical units (72nd Mech BDE) are directly appealing for critical shortages (thermal optics), indicating gaps in institutional resupply.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: Defensive lines holding, but under significant fire preparation.
• Readiness: Max readiness on the Donetsk FLOT. Logistic/AD readiness is heavily constrained by rear area crises. Immediate reserve commitment planning is mandatory.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: UAF-affiliated units (STERNENKO) confirm successful use of FPV/loitering munitions, maintaining tactical pressure.
• Setbacks (CRITICAL):
  • Confirmed massive civilian casualties (9 KIA, 22 WIA) and CBRN hazard (Chlorine) in Ternopil.
  • UAF tactical aviation (KAB) and drone launches (Chernihiv) confirm RF maintains air superiority and the ability to continue deep strikes/fire preparation.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL SHORTFALL: Personnel CBRN Protection/Detection Gear required for rear-area security, emergency responders, and logistical units operating near industrial/residential strike zones in the deep rear.
• Logistical Priority: Thermal Imaging Optics for forward units (e.g., 72nd Mech BDE) must be immediately sourced to maintain nighttime defensive capability against likely RF SpN/recon probes preceding the mechanized push.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO - Leadership Degradation (NEW): TASS and hardline channels are actively propagating the claim that Zelenskyy is implicated in a corruption case (Mindich). This is a focused effort to demoralize UAF forces and undermine political unity just prior to a major ground assault. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF IO - Diplomatic Coercion: Continued amplification of US Pentagon officials' visit being primarily for "peace negotiations," aimed at weakening Ukrainian public support for continued resistance.
• UAF Counter-IO: Strong emphasis on the human cost of the strikes (Ternopil casualties, child suffering) to solidify international support and domestic resolve.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Sentiment is severely impacted by the graphic civilian casualties and the CBRN threat in Ternopil. The internal political IO attack on Zelenskyy adds a layer of uncertainty regarding strategic leadership.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The presence of high-level US DoD leaders provides a strong counter-narrative to the peace talk rumors, indicating immediate military aid coordination is ongoing.
• The confirmation of war crimes (Ternopil strikes/casualties) provides leverage for immediate appeals for increased AD and logistical assistance.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The timeline for the major ground assault on the Pokrovsk axis has tightened dramatically, triggered by the synchronized KAB launches. The threat window for SpN interdiction on the GLOC is immediate.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (210800Z NOV 25 - 211200Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Ground Assault Initiation)

1. Pokrovsk Mechanized Assault (Launch): RF forces (40th and 155th OMBRs) initiate the full-scale mechanized assault on the Pokrovsk axis (Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector) under the cover of mass KAB fire and escalating artillery support.
2. GLOC Interdiction (Execution): RF SpN elements initiate the complex ambush/IED attack against the Kostiantynivka road corridor, utilizing small UAVs and thermal/NVG superiority to target high-value logistics convoys.
3. AD Stressing: Drone activity continues toward Chernihiv and other northern/central axes to fix UAF AD batteries away from the critical Donbas sector.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - GLOC Compromise)

• The Kostiantynivka GLOC is successfully interdicted (closed for >6 hours) by SpN operations simultaneously with the launch of the 40th/155th OMBR assault, achieving a breach of the forward defensive line due to ammunition shortage and confusion.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Operations) / J3 (SOF): Execute Counter-SpN GLOC Interdiction (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Immediate deployment of air assets (UAV, FPV, or fixed-wing close air support if feasible) to sanitize the 5km radius around critical choke points on the Kostiantynivka GLOC. Priority is destruction of any detected SpN teams, forward spotters, or C-UAS arrays.
   • Rationale: The time for passive patrol has passed. Active interdiction is necessary to prevent the predicted simultaneous operational collapse.

2. J4 (Logistics) / J7 (CBRN): Mobilize CBRN Response Teams (URGENT).

   • Action: Immediately commit specialized CBRN detection and decontamination equipment and personnel to the Ternopil area. Logistical convoys passing through the contamination zone must be equipped with basic filtration/PPE.
   • Rationale: Mitigating the chemical hazard is essential for civilian and military logistical personnel safety and prevents a compounding humanitarian crisis.

3. J2 (Intelligence) / STRATCOM: Direct Response to RF IO Attack (CRITICAL).

   • Action: Leverage the US DoD presence in Kyiv to deliver a joint statement dismissing the RF-propagated corruption and "peace talk" narratives. The message must assert full UAF political and military unity, explicitly linking the corruption allegations to RF information aggression designed to precede kinetic attacks.
   • Rationale: The simultaneous IO/Kinetic attack pattern must be neutralized to maintain troop morale and international support.

//END SITREP//