Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 211200Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 211000Z NOV 25 – 211200Z NOV 25 (Midday Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. Post-strike Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) confirms the severity of the Russian shaping operation. The operational center of gravity remains the Pokrovsk axis, where the imminent mechanized assault is expected.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Deep Rear (Western Ukraine): Confirmed severe damage resulting from the strategic strike wave:
  • Ternopil: Confirmed destruction of a multi-story residential building, resulting in confirmed casualties (2 fatalities, multiple injured). The strike utilized both missiles and Shahed drones (Mayor confirmation).
  • Lviv Oblast: Confirmed hit on an energy facility. Mayor Sadovyi confirms the subsequent heavy black smoke over Lviv city is due to the ignition of tires at a civilian warehouse/storage facility hit by the enemy.
  • Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast: Confirmed collateral damage, with three casualties (including two children) reported in the Ivano-Frankivsk district (likely proximity damage from targeting the Burshtyn TPP or similar critical infrastructure).
  • National Grid: Ukrenergo confirms widespread emergency power outages across multiple regions due to infrastructure damage.
• FLOT - Pokrovsk Axis: No confirmed initiation of the MLCOA mechanized ground assault (40th/155th OMBRs) within this reporting window. The current posture is the immediate post-strike pause before kinetic ground action.
• Eastern Front (Kharkiv/Donetsk): High-tempo Russian tactical aviation activity confirmed in the east. Air Force reports multiple launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) targeting Donetsk Oblast, Eastern Kharkiv Oblast, and Sumy Oblast. This represents continued fixing and softening of forward Ukrainian positions.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Clear skies facilitated the massive aerial attack and subsequent BDA efforts.
• Heavy smoke from damaged civilian storage in Lviv (tires) is causing localized air quality issues and obscuring potential military BDA around the actual energy target hit.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces (Deep Strike): RF MoD continues to weaponize the deep strike via Information Operations (IO), distributing multiple images of missile debris, claiming they successfully repelled and collected debris from four UAF ATACMS targeting Voronezh (18 NOV).
• UAF Forces (AD/Logistics):
  • UAF AD reports successful interception/suppression of 10 missiles and 17 UAVs over Cherkasy Oblast alone, highlighting the scale of the saturation attack.
  • Emergency power distribution protocols are active nationwide (Ukrenergo confirmation).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Combined Arms Synchronization: RF successfully executed the information (ATACMS retaliation narrative) and kinetic (mass strategic strike) shaping operation, effectively crippling significant portions of Ukraine's energy logistics base ahead of the ground push.
2. Psychological Targeting: The confirmed direct hit on a residential building in Ternopil (and civilian casualties in Ivano-Frankivsk) confirms RF intent to maximize psychological impact, leveraging the crisis to influence both domestic morale and international diplomatic processes.
3. Sustained Tactical Air Superiority: The rapid pivot to mass KAB deployment in the Eastern and Northeastern sectors (Donetsk, Kharkiv, Sumy) confirms RF ability to sustain high-intensity aerial support/fixing operations simultaneously with the deep strike BDA phase.

Intentions:

1. Operational Momentum: RF intent is to immediately leverage the paralysis caused by the energy crisis (especially on rail/road logistics) to initiate the Pokrovsk mechanized breakthrough within the next 4-8 hours.
2. Strategic Isolation: The targeting of energy infrastructure in Western Ukraine (Lviv, Burshtyn TPP vicinity) aims to systematically degrade the capacity for NATO resupply and internal troop movement by rail/electrified infrastructure.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Precision and Collateral Damage (Confirmed Shift): The precision achieved on Western Ukrainian energy assets, coupled with the immediate and significant civilian casualty events (Ternopil residential block), suggests either improved targeting data or a calculated acceptance of collateral damage to achieve psychological and strategic objectives.
• Increased KAB Reliance: The rapid increase in KAB launches on the Eastern axes indicates a standard doctrine application to soften defenses immediately preceding a major ground push.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• UAF Logistical Status (CRITICAL): Confirmed widespread emergency power outages severely constrain UAF's primary operational dependency: Timely movement of reserves and ammunition to the Donbas FLOT via rail and road.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2: Demonstrated successful coordination across strategic (missile, bomber) and tactical (KAB, IO) domains.
• UAF C2: UAF AD C2 remains resilient but overwhelmed (high penetration rate). J3/J4 C2 is heavily strained by the need for emergency power reallocation and damage mitigation across key logistical corridors.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: Defensive, transitioning to a high-alert posture for anticipated ground assault in Donbas.
• Readiness: High (Combat-Ready) for ground operations, but logistical readiness is severely degraded by the nationwide power crisis. UAF units in the Pokrovsk sector require confirmation of 48-hour forward ammunition caching, as the logistics chain is brittle.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: High number of reported aerial interceptions (e.g., Cherkasy). UAF 46th Separate Air Assault Brigade (46 OAB) confirms successful engagements against RF ground targets using FPV drones, maintaining local tactical success.
• Setbacks (CRITICAL):
  • Confirmed civilian fatalities (Ternopil) and injuries (Kharkiv 46 injured, Ivano-Frankivsk 3 injured).
  • Confirmed systemic national energy grid failure leading to emergency power outages.
  • Unconfirmed but heavily weaponized RF claim of successful ATACMS counter-strike, requiring immediate internal verification.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Immediate Requirement (AD): Resupply/repositioning of mobile AD assets to cover critical GLOCs (Kostiantynivka) and known high-risk staging areas (Kharkiv/Sumy) that are now under increased KAB threat.
• Requirement (J4/Energy): Priority deployment of repair crews and mobile generation units to the affected Western energy assets (Lviv, Burshtyn vicinity) to restore strategic rail capacity.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Domination): The central narrative is that the national strike was a justified counter-escalation (ATACMS retaliation) and that all hits were on military targets ("military objects in Ternopil," Lviv "military warehouse"). This directly contradicts the confirmed civilian impacts (Ternopil residential block).
• RF IO (Diplomatic Disruption): Russian channels are amplifying speculative reports of cancelled US/Ukrainian diplomatic meetings (Yermak/Whitkoff) due to corruption claims, coinciding with President Zelenskyy's confirmed arrival in Turkey for high-level meetings. This seeks to undermine Ukrainian leadership legitimacy during the crisis.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Public sentiment is currently defined by shock and localized fear due to the deep, successful strikes on Western cities combined with national power outages.
• The confirmation of fatalities and direct residential strikes (Ternopil) must be rapidly leveraged in Western diplomatic channels to maintain support, countering RF claims of military targeting.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• President Zelenskyy’s arrival in Turkey for discussions with President Erdoğan is a critical counter-IO signal, demonstrating continued diplomatic engagement despite the internal crisis. The focus will likely shift to Black Sea grain security and military/AD aid delivery.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The current phase is the Immediate Pre-Assault Window (Post-Shaping Operation).

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4-8 Hours (211200Z NOV 25 - 212000Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Ground Assault Initiation)

1. Pokrovsk Mechanized Assault: The 40th and 155th OMBRs initiate the concentrated mechanized assault in the Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector, following intense preparatory artillery and KAB strikes (which are currently underway in the region).
2. GLOC Interdiction (SpN/UAS): Russian Spetsnaz elements execute Phase I interdiction of the Kostiantynivka GLOC using FPV/IEDs to delay the expected emergency flow of UAF reserves/ammunition that should counter the Pokrovsk breach attempt.
3. Sustained KAB Pressure: RF Tactical Aviation maintains a high sortie rate over Sumy/Kharkiv/Donetsk to fix UAF defensive fire and prevent movement of UAF reinforcements toward the critical Pokrovsk sector.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Tactical Exploitation)

• RF forces (40th/155th OMBRs) achieve rapid, tactical penetration (>4km) at Pokrovsk. Concurrently, the Kostiantynivka GLOC closure succeeds in starving key UAF defense units of artillery ammunition (especially 155mm) for over 12 hours. This dual success forces UAF command to commit reserve forces prematurely without adequate logistical cover, risking a wider operational-level collapse.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Operations) / J2 (Intelligence): Execute GLOC Defensive Fire Plan (URGENT).

   • Action: Transition immediately from preemptive patrolling (VIPER HUNT) to ready-to-fire defensive artillery plans (smoke/HE) covering the Kostiantynivka GLOC choke points. Use detected SpN signatures (UAS/thermal) as clearance targets, aiming to secure 100% operational throughput for the next 72 hours.
   • Rationale: The time for preparation is over; the ground attack is imminent. The priority is to protect the lifeline.

2. J4 (Logistics) / J7 (Air Defense): Reallocate Mobile AD/C-UAS. (PRIORITY SHIFT).

   • Action: Immediately pull all non-critical, fixed AD/C-UAS from deep rear sectors (excluding critical C2 hubs) and redeploy them to protect high-density KAB target zones (Eastern Kharkiv/Sumy) and the forward ammunition caches supporting the Pokrovsk defense.
   • Rationale: The immediate kinetic threat has shifted from mass deep strike (Kh-101/Kalibr) to mass KAB/Ground Assault. AD assets must reflect this reality.

3. STRATCOM / J2 (Intelligence): Counter-Propaganda and Diplomatic Messaging.

   • Action: Rapidly disseminate confirmed, graphic BDA of the Ternopil residential strike and the casualties in Ivano-Frankivsk to all NATO/EU allies. Link the strikes directly to the imminent Pokrovsk offensive, defining the Russian campaign as a humanitarian and logistical strangulation attempt. Explicitly counter the RF ATACMS claims with factual denials or BDA regarding UAF launcher status as soon as verified.
   • Rationale: Maintain urgency and pressure for sustained/accelerated military aid delivery, particularly AD and counter-battery systems.

//END SITREP//