Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 211000Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 210800Z NOV 25 – 211000Z NOV 25 (Morning Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The strategic aerial strike wave has reached its peak, confirming targeting priority on deep-rear Western Ukrainian energy and logistics infrastructure. The ground threat remains the critical kinetic vulnerability.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Western Ukraine (CRITICAL IMPACTS CONFIRMED): The massive, synchronized RF missile strike has concluded its primary wave, resulting in confirmed kinetic impacts and damage in Lviv, Ternopil, and repeated targeting of energy infrastructure, specifically the Burshtyn TPP and Ladyzhyn TPP (implied via IO).
  • Ternopil: Confirmed direct impact on a multi-story residential building, resulting in significant damage and civilian casualties (implied via public reports).
  • Lviv: Confirmed explosions and reports of power interruptions/emergency transport changes indicate successful targeting of infrastructure.
  • Ivano-Frankivsk: Targeted (Burshtyn TPP) but local reports suggest the city center avoided impact.
• FLOT - Pokrovsk Axis: No overt, large-scale mechanized assault by the reinforced 40th/155th OMBRs has been reported within this 0-2 hour window. The ground threat remains masked by the conclusion of the strategic strike.
• Airspace: The nationwide missile threat has been declared clear as of 210955Z NOV 25. Active RF reconnaissance UAVs remain a threat over Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, suggesting post-strike BDA or continued fixing operations.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Clear early morning conditions facilitated RF long-range missile guidance and BDA collection via UAVs (confirmed in Kharkiv/Sumy).
• Winter conditions continue to complicate damage assessment and recovery operations (e.g., Ternopil residential damage/firefighting).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces (Air/Missile Posture): The strategic bomber fleet has likely returned to staging bases. Remaining missile activity focuses on mopping up (Shaheds near Lviv) and reconnaissance (UAVs in the northeast).
  • Claimed High-Value Strike: RF MoD/IO channels are aggressively pushing the claim that they successfully destroyed two UAF MLRS/ATACMS launch systems in the Kharkiv region using Iskander-M missiles, in retaliation for an alleged UAF ATACMS strike on Voronezh, Russia (18 NOV).
• UAF Forces (Air Defense/Response): UAF AD successfully contained the threat (final 'rocket danger clear' 210955Z NOV 25). However, significant successful penetration, especially against civilian/energy targets in Western Ukraine (Ternopil, Burshtyn TPP), confirms persistent resource saturation.
  • Control Measures: Widespread emergency power outages have been implemented across several oblasts due to the systemic damage to energy transmission/generation assets.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Sustained Deep Strike: RF retains the capacity to execute highly damaging, synchronized strategic strikes (Kh-101/Kalibr/Kinzhal) aimed at collapsing UAF deep rear logistics and energy grids.
2. Information Synchronization: RF IO is tightly synchronized with kinetic action, immediately deploying narratives regarding successful strikes on military targets (Lviv warehouse, claimed ATACMS launchers) and promoting psychological impact (civilian residential strikes in Ternopil).
3. Counter-Battery/Deep Strike: RF demonstrated a claimed capability (via IO) to successfully detect and target UAF long-range strike assets (ATACMS launchers) in the tactical rear using Iskander-M. (UNCONFIRMED BDA, HIGH THREAT SIGNAL)

Intentions:

1. Ground Assault Enabling: The achieved degradation of Western energy (power outages) and disruption of logistics/morale sets the optimal kinetic and cognitive conditions for the imminent Pokrovsk ground operation.
2. ATACMS Deterrence: The aggressive reporting regarding the destruction of UAF ATACMS launchers near the border is likely intended to deter future UAF deep strikes into Russian territory, thereby forcing UAF to pull back these high-value assets.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Target Selection: Repeated and confirmed successful targeting of the Burshtyn TPP suggests its designation as a critical node whose destruction provides maximum regional energy degradation.
• Targeting of Residential Areas: The confirmed hit on a Ternopil apartment block demonstrates either careless targeting methodology or a deliberate shift to high-impact psychological targeting to degrade civilian morale and pressure Kyiv's leadership during the current crisis phase.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• UAF Logistical Status: Critical. Widespread power interruptions will severely impede UAF rail and road logistical throughput, potentially slowing the crucial resupply efforts needed to counter the imminent Pokrovsk mechanized push. This confirms the operational success of the RF shaping operation.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2: Demonstrated successful high-complexity coordination of the national strike wave.
• UAF C2: The transition to emergency power protocols (confirmed nationwide outages) indicates C2 is stressed but operational. Public alerts (Air Force/Regional ODA) were timely, but the confirmed successful penetrations suggest the C2 decision cycle for allocating interceptors remains complex under saturation conditions.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: UAF is transitioning from national AD defense back to forward defensive posture. Reserves must be secured against the immediate ground MLCOA threat.
• Readiness: High (AD interceptor expenditure). Localized damage to civilian infrastructure (Ternopil) and the energy grid creates secondary challenges for mobilization, troop rotation, and logistical readiness.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Final clearance of the massive rocket threat. Mayoral reports (Ivano-Frankivsk) indicate some cities avoided damage despite being on missile trajectories.
• Setbacks: Confirmed damage to civilian infrastructure (Ternopil apartment block). Confirmed systemic damage to the energy grid resulting in emergency power outages across multiple oblasts. Unconfirmed but concerning Russian claim of neutralizing two UAF MLRS/ATACMS launch systems.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Immediate Requirement (J4/Energy): Rapid Damage Assessment (BDA) on Burshtyn TPP and Ladyzhyn TPP to determine restoration timeframes and priority for mobile generation assets.
• AD Constraint: Interceptor stocks depleted rapidly during the saturation strike, requiring immediate re-prioritization for the forward sector/logistics GLOC (Kostiantynivka).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Weaponized Counter-Strike): The major narrative push is the ATACMS strike on Voronezh (allegedly 18 NOV) and the subsequent "retaliation" strike using Iskander-M to destroy the UAF launchers. This serves to justify the RF national strike wave as a proportionate response to UAF escalation and aims to neutralize the narrative of RF targeting civilians. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF IO (Victory Signalling): RF channels are amplifying the confirmed power outages and explosions in Western Ukraine (Lviv, Burshtyn, Ternopil) to project control and military superiority, degrading Western morale and support.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF Public Sentiment: The combination of mass civilian casualties (Kharkiv 36 injured), deep strikes on Western cities (Ternopil residential damage), and widespread power outages creates peak civilian stress and fear. Effective and rapid dissemination of accurate BDA and recovery progress is essential.
• Russian Internal Narrative: Focus remains on domestic security (FSB operations against "treason" in Krasnodar/DPR) and military retaliation claims (ATACMS counter-strike), reinforcing the "defensive war" narrative.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The RF claim of targeting ATACMS launchers may complicate future US weapons provision decisions, as it raises the stakes regarding escalation and perceived vulnerability of US-supplied long-range systems.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The strategic shaping operation is complete. The operational window for the ground attack is now open.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 8 Hours (211000Z NOV 25 - 211800Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Ground Assault Synchronization)

1. Pokrovsk Breakthrough Initiation: The 40th and 155th OMBRs initiate the major mechanized assault on the Pokrovsk axis, capitalizing on the systemic shock and logistical disruption caused by the nationwide energy strikes.
2. GLOC Interdiction (SpN/FPV): Concurrent Spetsnaz/FPV interdiction operations target the Kostiantynivka GLOC, leveraging the logistical and C2 friction caused by the power outages to prevent resupply of forward defensive lines.
3. Tactical BDA/Recon: Continued high-tempo RF reconnaissance UAV activity over Kharkiv and Sumy to assess damage from the strategic strike and fix UAF AD attention away from the Donbas axis.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Tactical Exploitation)

• RF mechanized forces achieve a rapid breach (3-5 km depth) through UAF forward lines in the Pokrovsk sector (Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka). This breakthrough is facilitated by a successful, coordinated Spetsnaz operation that closes the Kostiantynivka GLOC for a prolonged period (12+ hours), resulting in ammunition exhaustion for key UAF fire support and leading to a forced operational-level retreat by UAF reserves, exposing C2 hubs.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Operations) / J2 (Intelligence): Preemptive Counter-Interdiction (URGENT).

   • Action: Execute Operation VIPER HUNT (Hunter-Killer SOF patrols and thermal UAS surveillance) immediately along the Kostiantynivka GLOC based on the 0-8 hour SpN threat window. Do not wait for kinetic confirmation; preemptively engage suspected assembly or staging areas identified by SIGINT/ISR.
   • Rationale: Preventing GLOC closure is the singular decisive factor in defeating the imminent Pokrovsk MLCOA.

2. J7 (Air Defense) / J3 (Operations): Reposition High-Value Assets and Enhance Defense.

   • Action A (AD): Prioritize deployment of mobile short-range AD/C-UAS to the Pokrovsk axis, accepting increased risk in non-critical domestic areas. The air strike phase is over; the ground threat is primary.
   • Action B (ATACMS): Immediately relocate or establish hardened C2/launch control for all remaining long-range strike assets (HIMARS/ATACMS) away from current operating areas in Kharkiv/Sumi regions to mitigate the confirmed RF counter-strike capability (Iskander-M).

3. J2 (Intelligence) / STRATCOM: Damage Control and Information Counter-Offensive.

   • Action: Immediately release BDA/imagery evidence of the Ternopil residential strike to international partners (NATO/EU), explicitly highlighting the RF targeting of civilian infrastructure during the simultaneous peace talk IO campaign. Counter the RF ATACMS claims with factual BDA if possible.
   • Rationale: Leverage the humanitarian crisis to solidify Western political support ahead of the expected RF ground offensive.

//END SITREP//