TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS
DTG: 210800Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 210600Z NOV 25 – 210800Z NOV 25 (Early Morning Update)
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The predicted shift to strategic aerial shaping has fully materialized, diverting significant UAF Air Defense (AD) resources nationally. The ground threat at Pokrovsk remains imminent but is currently masked by the massive air campaign.
National Airspace (CRITICAL HIGH KINETIC ACTIVITY): RF has launched a massive, synchronized combined-arms strike utilizing Tu-95MS (confirmed 6 airborne), Tu-160 (confirmed 4 airborne), Tu-22M3 (confirmed 2 airborne, threat of Kh-22), Kalibr cruise missiles (multiple groups detected from Black Sea/Novorossiysk), Kh-101/55SM cruise missiles (multiple groups detected from strategic bombers), Kinzhal (aero-ballistic missile, confirmed launch), and Shahed-type UAVs (multiple axes: Kherson, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk). This is the largest, most complex air assault in the current reporting period. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Pokrovsk Axis / Kostiantynivka Corridor: No direct ground assault by the 40th/155th OMBRs has been confirmed within this 0-2 hour period, consistent with the MLCOA prediction that the aerial strike precedes the ground push. The critical logistical corridor remains highly vulnerable to the anticipated Spetsnaz/FPV strikes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Western Ukraine (NEW PRIORITY TARGET): Cruise missile trajectories (Kalibr, Kh-101) are being channeled toward Lviv, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi (Starokonstantyniv), and the Burshtyn thermal power plant (TЭС). Confirmed explosions in Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, and Burshtyn indicate successful RF targeting of deep-rear strategic/energy infrastructure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Nighttime conditions continue to favor RF strategic air/UAS operations, complicating UAF mobile AD response and visual tracking.
Cold/snowy environment (noted in previous report) remains relevant for forward logistics and tracked vehicle operations at the FLOT.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Forces (Strategic Air Posture): RF has committed the majority of its strategic bomber fleet (Tu-95/160/22) for the current coordinated strike, indicating a high-priority, national-level objective. This operation is designed to degrade UAF ability to maneuver and defend itself in the critical Pokrovsk sector.
RF Forces (Tactical Adaptation): Continued FPV drone utilization is reported against UAF light vehicles near the FLOT (confirmed strike by 6th Guards Army Spetsnaz), reinforcing the attrition strategy against UAF logistical tail.
UAF Forces (Air Defense): UAF AD resources are heavily saturated and deployed nationwide, leading to confirmed impacts on high-value civilian infrastructure (Kharkiv: 36 injured) and strategic energy targets (Burshtyn TPP suspected).
UAF Control Measures: Polish Air Force (PLAF) has scrambled aircraft due to the proximity of the RF long-range missiles to NATO airspace, confirming the extreme nature of the current strike wave. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Full-Spectrum Combined Strike: Demonstrated capability to synchronize up to 12 strategic bombers, multiple missile types (Kalibr, Kh-101, Kinzhal, Kh-22), and UAS into one operational wave aimed at national critical infrastructure and AD saturation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Strategic Targeting (Energy Focus): RF is prioritizing energy generation and transmission infrastructure (confirmed/suspected targeting of Burshtyn TPP) and high-value military airfields (Starokonstantyniv).
UGV Deployment (Future Threat): Confirmed Russian testing and deployment reporting of the tracked 'Kurier' Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) for fire suppression and logistics (near Pokrovsk, previously reported) indicates RF investment in future autonomy capabilities that will challenge UAF tactics. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Intentions:
Operational Shaping: The primary intent of this combined air strike is to exhaust UAF AD ammunition reserves, divert air cover from the critical eastern axis, and degrade C2/energy infrastructure in the deep rear, setting conditions for the imminent Pokrovsk mechanized assault.
Political Signaling: The high casualty count in Kharkiv (now 36 injured) and the targeting of Western-aligned diplomatic centers (via the alleged "secret US/RF plan") are synchronized to degrade morale and political stability in Kyiv.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
High-Value Missile Commitment: RF deployment of Kinzhal aero-ballistic missiles suggests they are attempting to engage critical, time-sensitive targets (likely AD systems or major C2/logistical hubs) that are impervious to cruise missiles.
Dual-Threat Deployment: RF is simultaneously deploying high-speed (Kinzhal) and long-loiter (Shahed) munitions to maximize AD confusion and exhaustion.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF Logistics: The magnitude of the strike confirms high strategic missile stockpile readiness (Kh-101/Kalibr) despite previous inventory reports suggesting limitations. This indicates either a successful mass production cycle or a deliberate commitment of remaining reserves for this specific operational window. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
RF Logistics (Ground): Reporting confirms RF is utilizing ATVs and Enduro motorcycles for rapid forward logistics near Pokrovsk (14th Artillery Brigade), indicating a localized tactical adaptation to offset UAF interdiction of heavier supply lines.
UAF C2 (Air Force/Regional Administrations) provided timely public alerts, but the confirmed successful impacts in Western Ukraine and Kharkiv suggest AD C2 is currently overwhelmed or severely restricted by resource constraints. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Posture: UAF is currently focused on survival and defensive fire against the strategic air threat. Resources (Mobile Fire Teams, AD assets) are fixed on national defense rather than proactive operations in the East.
Readiness: High-tempo AD engagement across 7+ oblasts suggests high operational readiness, but the lack of ground activity on the Pokrovsk axis (due to RF's shaping ops) prevents the deployment of critical artillery counter-battery fire.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Successes: UAF C-UAS forces successfully eliminated FPV drones in multiple regions, though specific kill counts are unavailable. UAF General Staff claims a daily elimination of 850 RF personnel and 10+ artillery systems, indicating continued ground attrition in contact zones (likely Donbas).
Setbacks: Confirmed loss/damage to strategic energy infrastructure (Burshtyn TPP suspected) and critical civilian infrastructure (Kharkiv: 36 casualties). The Kinzhal launch represents the most dangerous current threat vector.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
Immediate Requirement (AD): Urgent need to secure immediate re-supply of high-capacity AD systems (Patriot, NASAMS) interceptors to manage the sustained cruise missile threat.
Logistical Constraint (Pokrovsk): The need to withhold mobile AD assets to protect cities against strategic strikes directly compromises the ability to deploy short-range AD/C-UAS teams to the Kostiantynivka GLOC ahead of the imminent ground assault.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF IO (Damage Glorification): RF sources (WarGonzo, NGP Razvedka) are immediately claiming successful hits on infrastructure and military objects across Ukraine, specifically celebrating the targeting of Western Ukraine energy assets ("Electric power in Western Ukraine is not needed," 210421Z NOV 25).
RF IO (Strategic Distrust): The Axios report (amplified by Russian and Ukrainian sources) alleging secret US/RF negotiations for a "28-point plan" to end the war, spearheaded by a military delegation from the Trump administration, is a major, high-impact Information Operation.
Judgement: This narrative is designed to sow deep distrust between Kyiv and its key Western partners (US/NATO), specifically undermining President Trump's military/diplomatic engagement in Kyiv and painting UAF resistance as futile against pre-determined diplomatic outcomes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
UAF Public Sentiment: The sustained national air alert, coupled with the new political IO regarding secret negotiations, is likely creating a peak stress environment. Successful AD engagements and clear, quick communication are necessary to prevent morale collapse.
RF Internal Narrative: RF military channels are leveraging the simultaneous strategic air attacks and the propaganda narratives to project an image of overwhelming force and diplomatic inevitability ("denazification and demilitarization," 210358Z NOV 25).
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
Support Indicator: PLAF scrambling fighters confirms NATO's continued concern regarding spillover and maintains a strong deterrence posture on the Western border.
Threat Indicator (IO): The confirmed visit of a senior US military delegation (Minister of the Army Dan Driscoll, per WSJ/Politico) is being actively weaponized by RF Information Operations via the Axios/28-point plan narrative.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
The massive aerial strike is the final operational preparation for the ground assault.
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (210800Z NOV 25 - 212000Z NOV 25)
Pokrovsk Breakthrough Initiation: Leveraging the distraction and logistical isolation created by the air campaign, the combined 40th/155th OMBRs initiate the synchronized mechanized assault along the Pokrovsk axis.
Kinzhal/Ballistic Strike Focus: The currently airborne Kinzhal (and potentially other high-speed weapons) will target UAF strategic command nodes, high-capacity AD batteries, or key mobilization/reserve assembly areas (e.g., Dnipro, Starokonstantyniv).
Ground Interdiction: Simultaneous to the ground assault, RF SOF/Spetsnaz execute coordinated interdiction (FPV swarms and IEDs) on the Kostiantynivka GLOC to prevent immediate UAF resupply during the breakthrough attempt.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours
RF executes a successful strike on the last functioning, heavy AD node (likely Patriot/NASAMS assets) protecting Kyiv or a critical eastern C2 facility. Simultaneously, the 40th/155th OMBRs achieve a high-speed penetration (>7 km) on the Pokrovsk axis, capitalizing on ammunition depletion in forward UAF units (due to GLOC closure), forcing a tactical retreat that exposes secondary defensive lines and operational reserves.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-4 Hours
Ground Assault Confirmation: J3 must confirm the start of the MLCOA ground assault at Pokrovsk.
Confirmed large-scale armored thrust (OOB > 2 BDE-sized elements) or heavy preparatory fire (TOS-1/Heavy Artillery) in the Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector.
4 Hours
AD Prioritization/Re-deployment: J7 must rapidly shift any available mobile C-UAS/Short-Range AD assets that survived the initial strike wave from the deep rear (Vinnytsia/Poltava) directly to the Pokrovsk logistical corridor (Kostiantynivka).
Confirmed Kinzhal/Ballistic impacts and subsequent cessation of massed strategic bomber activity.
8 Hours
IO Counter-Response: J2/STRATCOM must release a coordinated, high-level denial or counter-narrative addressing the "28-point plan" to stabilize Western diplomatic relations and domestic morale.
Sustained amplification of the Axios/negotiation narrative by RF and Western media.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - STRIKE TARGETING
Kinzhal/Kh-101 Target BDA: Definitive BDA on targets hit by Kinzhal/Kh-101 strikes (Hmelnytskyi, Lviv, Burshtyn TPP, Starokonstantyniv). Assess damage to high-value AD or C2 sites.
GEOINT (SAR/Imagery) / SIGINT: Immediate tasking for BDA imagery on suspected impact sites. Priority for thermal/EO BDA of Burshtyn TPP.
LOW
CRITICAL - GROUND THREAT (MLCOA LAUNCH)
40th/155th OMBR Launch Time/Axis: Precise launch time and current momentum of the ground assault.
ISR/HUMINT: Continuous UAV coverage over the Pokrovsk axis and forward observer updates on FLOT contact intensity.
MEDIUM
HIGH - STRATEGIC RESERVE/CAPACITY
Strategic Missile Inventory: Estimate of remaining Kh-101 and Kalibr inventory given the current massive expenditure.
ELINT/HUMINT: Monitor RF weapons depots and production facilities for capacity estimates.
LOW
HIGH - ENEMY UGVS
Kurier UGV Deployment Status: Confirmation of tactical deployment of Kurier UGV in the SVO zone and its mission profile (logistics vs. direct combat).
ISR/BDA: Task FPV/Recon units operating near Pokrovsk to locate and engage Kurier platforms for technical exploitation.
LOW
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
J3 (Operations) / J7 (Air Defense): Re-prioritize AD Assets (URGENT).
Action: Immediately pull back surviving mobile C-UAS/light AD from saturated deep-rear cities (Poltava, Cherkasy) and redeploy them to establish a high-density "logistical air shield" over the Kostiantynivka GLOC and its critical intersections.
Rationale: The threat to the GLOC from FPV and Spetsnaz is now the most critical enabler for the imminent ground MLCOA. Protecting supply lines overrides city defense after the main strategic wave has passed.
Action: Deploy high-level military and diplomatic spokespersons to forcefully reject the "28-point peace plan" narrative, confirming the US military delegation's visit is only to coordinate continued military support, not negotiations. Provide explicit public confirmation of continued full US backing.
Rationale: Neutralize the RF IO campaign aimed at fracturing Kyiv-Washington confidence during the critical ground assault window.
Action: Initiate massed, pre-planned artillery and HIMARS fire missions on all identified assembly areas, movement corridors, and suspected EW/C2 nodes of the 40th and 155th OMBR along the Pokrovsk axis, even without confirmation of the full MLCOA launch.
Rationale: Disrupt RF mechanized formation coherence and timing, increasing friction and potentially delaying the assault, buying critical time for the GLOC defense to consolidate.