Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 210600Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 211800Z NOV 25 – 210600Z NOV 25 (Night Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH. The enemy shifted kinetic focus overnight from the critical Pokrovsk ground threat (SpN interdiction) to a large-scale, combined-arms aerial attack on Kharkiv and southern/central Ukraine. This strike was likely intended to stretch AD resources and degrade strategic C2/Logistics/Morale ahead of the anticipated mechanized breakthrough.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis / Kostiantynivka Corridor (CRITICAL): The immediate threat of RF Spetsnaz (SpN) interdiction against the Kostiantynivka Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) appears to have been delayed or was unsuccessful in achieving a full closure within the critical 0-8 hour window predicted. No overt RF ground assault by the 40th/155th OMBRs was reported during this period, but preparatory/fixing fires continue (see 1.3). (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• Kharkiv/Northeast Sector (HIGH KINETIC ACTIVITY): RF executed a massive nighttime combined-arms attack, utilizing up to 19 Shahed-type UAVs against urban targets, resulting in at least 32 civilian casualties across the Slobidskyi, Osnovianskyi, and Nemyshlianskyi districts. Confirmed targets include residential high-rises, medical facilities, and a school courtyard. This attack aimed to fix UAF AD and inflict maximum psychological/logistical damage. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Southern/Central Ukraine (Widespread Drone Threat): Multiple waves of RF Shahed-type UAVs were launched from the Black Sea, targeting Odesa, Mykolaiv, and central regions (Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Rivne). This operation was synchronized with the Kharkiv strike, overwhelming distributed UAF mobile AD assets. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Siversk Axis (Localized Pressure): RF sources claim critical advances, alleging they have reached the high-rise buildings and are attempting to bypass defenses along the railway line, indicating persistent fixing operations designed to exhaust UAF reserves. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• The nighttime conditions favored RF's massed UAV attack, as visual and auditory detection is significantly degraded.
• Reports of bodies in a snowy/cold environment (2025-11-18 23:50:44) confirm the onset of winter conditions in some forward sectors, favoring tracked vehicle movement but requiring greater logistical support for personnel.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces (Strategic Air/Drone Integration): RF demonstrated the capability to mass and synchronize large-scale, multi-vector UAS attacks (19 Shaheds on Kharkiv, plus other axes). This UAS campaign is likely a strategic, non-Pokrovsk Main Effort designed to degrade UAF resolve and logistics nationally.
• RF Forces (Ground Pressure): Claims of advances in Siversk, and reports of FPV drone strikes against UAF light vehicles (pickup trucks in Veseloe, Kharkiv Oblast, 2025-11-18 22:11:02) highlight the continued pressure on critical local road logistics, reinforcing the general strategy of attrition and fixing UAF units.
• UAF Forces (Technological Adaptation): Unit 54th Separate Mechanized Brigade is confirmed to be operating an intensive, organized 3D-printing capability for drone components and improvised munitions, demonstrating a high degree of tactical innovation and localized sustainment capability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• UAF Forces (International Support): Confirmed US approval for $105 million in maintenance and spare parts for Patriot AD systems is a critical sustainment measure against the rising threat of strategic air attack. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Massed UAS Strike: Demonstrated capability to execute large, synchronized UAS/loitering munition attacks against major urban centers far from the FLOT (Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa) intended to inflict maximum civilian casualties and political pressure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Strategic Strike Readiness: Confirmed takeoff of at least one Tu-95MS strategic bomber from Olenya airfield (2025-11-18 20:29:59, 21:07:41) and the monitoring of Kalibr missile carriers in the Black Sea (2025-11-19 00:01:06) indicate a sustained capability for high-end kinetic strikes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. Advanced Counter-UAS/EW: RF forces (specifically Vostok grouping) are implementing a new automated EW control system to suppress UAF FPV drones, threatening UAF's primary tactical reconnaissance and strike capability. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

Intentions:

1. Degrade National Resilience: The immediate intention of the nighttime strike was to punish UAF for recent deep strikes (e.g., Novorossiysk, 2025-11-18 20:38:40) and degrade civilian morale/infrastructure ahead of the major Pokrovsk push.
2. Exploit Logistical Crisis: Continue local FPV/SOF strikes targeting UAF light logistics vehicles (e.g., pickups) to compound the operational crisis resulting from the rail severance.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Shift to Strategic Terror/Infrastructure Targeting: While the tactical ground threat at Pokrovsk persists, RF prioritized strategic terror (massed Shaheds against Kharkiv civilian targets) over tactical interdiction during the 0000Z-0600Z window. This may signal an attempt to draw AD systems away from the critical eastern axis.
• Information Manipulation (Hybrid): RF sources are utilizing civilian infrastructure strikes (Kharkiv) to claim military success (18 "Geraniums" hit targets, 2025-11-18 23:15:57) while simultaneously promoting highly inflammatory, potentially false narratives regarding UAF actions (radiation danger in Zhytomyr, 2025-11-18 23:25:06).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics: The observed massed Shahed attack confirms adequate munitions stockpiles for strategic, non-precision strikes.
• UAF Logistics (CRITICAL): The successful RF strike on a UAF pickup truck (2025-11-18 22:11:02) and the prior urgent requests highlight the ongoing, critical shortage and vulnerability of light tactical logistics vehicles, directly impacting forward unit resupply. The UAF 54th OMB's reliance on grassroots 3D printing (2025-11-12 15:05:51) underscores the need for localized production capability to offset attrition losses.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 demonstrated effective synchronization of the multi-vector UAS/Air threat.
• UAF C2 remains effective in early warning and regional coordination (Air Force updates, OVAS), successfully tracking and targeting multiple drone threats simultaneously. However, the high casualty rate in Kharkiv (32 civilian victims) suggests localized AD saturation or insufficient coverage in urban centers. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: UAF is in a high-alert defensive posture nationally due to the ballistic missile/strategic bomber launch confirmations and the persistent multi-axis drone threat.
• Readiness: High, supported by successful drone/HIMARS strikes by specialized units (Shadow, Wormbuster) against RF positions (Toretsk, 2025-11-13 16:23:32; 2025-11-18 21:45:20). Operational readiness is maintained despite casualty spikes.
• Technological Self-Reliance: The 54th OMB’s in-house 3D printing capability provides critical tactical readiness by quickly supplying essential drone/munition components.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Confirmed kinetic strikes by UAF units (Shadow) against RF armor (tank and artillery, 2025-11-09 05:22:38) and fortified positions (industrial building, 2025-11-13 16:23:32). Successful engagement of an FPV drone over Mykolaiv (2025-11-18 21:43:10).
• Setbacks: The high civilian casualty count in Kharkiv (32 wounded) from the massed drone attack is a significant strategic setback and resource strain (medical, rescue, morale). Confirmed loss of a UAF pickup truck near Veseloe to FPV strike (2025-11-18 22:11:02).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Requirement: Immediate need for increased localized, short-range AD/C-UAS capability (e.g., Skyranger 35) to protect vulnerable urban civilian/logistical centers (Kharkiv, Poltava) from persistent Shahed attacks.
• Constraint: The logistical strain caused by the massive urban attacks distracts resources (medical, security, reserves) from the critical Pokrovsk front.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Damage Glorification): RF channels (e.g., War correspondents) immediately magnified the impact of the Kharkiv attack, inflating success claims ("18 Geraniums hit," 2025-11-18 23:15:57) and framing civilian strikes as military hits.
• RF IO (Political Destabilization): A synchronized disinformation campaign aimed at fracturing UAF leadership and Western support emerged, focusing on alleged high-level corruption (Yermak/Witkoff cancellation, 2025-11-18 21:30:07) and internal Ukrainian political strife (Yermak resignation calls, 2025-11-18 20:58:38). This targets UAF strategic decision-making. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF IO (Strategic Distraction/Fear Mongering): False reports of "Radiation Danger" in Zhytomyr (2025-11-18 23:25:06) attempt to incite panic and disrupt deep rear areas.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF Public Sentiment: The Kharkiv attack will temporarily increase fear and demand for enhanced AD protection. However, successful UAF counter-UAS operations and confirmed international support (Patriot maintenance approval) should help stabilize morale.
• RF Internal Morale Issues: New evidence (POW interrogation, 2025-11-18 23:08:02; reports of violence to avoid deployment, 2025-11-18 23:50:44) suggests underlying systemic morale and corruption issues among RF personnel regarding deployment and discipline. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Positive Development: US State Department approval for $105 million in Patriot maintenance/spares (2025-11-18 20:36:01) ensures the long-term sustainment of critical high-value AD systems.
• Negative Development: The political maneuvering surrounding Ukrainian officials (Yermak's canceled Turkey meeting) suggests potential internal or external pressure impacting strategic diplomatic engagements critical for future aid coordination.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The observed massed aerial strike suggests RF is conducting strategic shaping operations to precede the inevitable main ground push on Pokrovsk.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours (210600Z NOV 25 - 220600Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Ground/Logistics Hybrid Attack)

1. Pokrovsk Assault Initiation: RF 40th and 155th OMBRs initiate the synchronized mechanized ground assault on the Pokrovsk axis (Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector), leveraging the tactical surprise achieved by the preceding massed UAS attack which diverted C2/Logistics focus.
2. Targeted GLOC Disruption: While the SpN ambush may have been delayed, RF conventional/SOF units use intensified FPV drone swarms and precision artillery against the Kostiantynivka GLOC to create temporary closure points (3-8 hours) designed to isolate forward units mid-assault.
3. EW / Recon Spike: RF increases C-UAS and SIGINT/ELINT activity across the entire Donbas front to degrade UAF C2 and locate UAF counter-battery fire sources.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Collapse Trigger)

• A combination of the persistent UAS attrition (further degrading C2/Logistics nodes) and a successful, sustained closure (12+ hours) of the Kostiantynivka GLOC allows the reinforced 40th/155th OMBR grouping to achieve a tactical breakthrough exceeding 5 km. This penetration forces UAF to commit its remaining operational reserves under compromised logistical conditions, risking a localized operational collapse and loss of key defensive hubs (e.g., Kostiantynivka/Pokrovsk).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J7 (Air Defense) / J3 (Operations): Reposition C-UAS Assets (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Immediately transition the mobile, tactical counter-UAS (C-UAS) teams and systems (e.g., electronic rifles, mobile AD guns) from the peripheral, deep-rear cities (Kharkiv/Poltava) to the critical GLOC nodes supporting the Pokrovsk defense. Prioritize the expected deployment of the Skyranger 35 system to the Pokrovsk axis main logistical/C2 hub.
   • Rationale: The main effort is the ground defense at Pokrovsk. Aerial assets must now protect the ground GLOC and C2 from the synchronized ground push, not be fixed by strategic terror attacks in the rear.

2. J4 (Logistics) / J3 (Operations): Tactical Mobility Priority and 3D Print Integration (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Prioritize procurement and deployment of light, armored logistics vehicles to replace the soft-skin pickup truck losses. Integrate the proven 3D printing capacity (e.g., from 54th OMB) into the wider logistical framework to rapidly supply units with drone/munition components at the tactical edge.
   • Rationale: Mitigate FPV-induced attrition on logistics vehicles and utilize UAF's technical advantage for distributed, resilient supply.

3. J2 (Intelligence) / J3 (Operations): Preemptive Fire Missions (URGENT).

   • Action: Utilize long-range artillery and HIMARS against confirmed RF assembly areas in the 40th/155th OMBR sectors. Fire preparation missions should target known enemy electronic warfare (EW) positions to degrade the effectiveness of their new C-UAS systems prior to the breakthrough attempt.
   • Rationale: Disrupt the final staging and EW integration before the MLCOA ground assault launches, maximizing disruption and minimizing EW effectiveness against UAF FPV/UAS reconnaissance.

//END SITREP//