Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 211800Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 211200Z NOV 25 – 211800Z NOV 25 (Afternoon Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH. The Pokrovsk threat remains the immediate priority. New information confirms continued high-tempo RF drone/artillery/SOF operations across multiple axes (Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia) tied to Chechen-affiliated units, validating the hybrid nature of the assault preparation. Critical gaps remain concerning the timing and scale of the air threat and railway repair BDA.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis / Kostiantynivka Corridor (CRITICAL): The window for the anticipated RF Spetsnaz (SpN) interdiction against the Kostiantynivka Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) remains active, supporting the imminent synchronized mechanized assault by the 40th and 155th Separate Marine Brigades (OMBRs). No confirmation of successful interdiction or neutralization of the SpN threat in this reporting period.
• Kharkiv/Vovchansk Sector (INCREASED ACTIVITY): RF (specifically Chechen-affiliated forces, e.g., "Zapad-Akhmat") claims continued successful ground advances, alleging full control over Soornaya Street and seizing new sections along Hurkanovskaya and Proletarskaya Streets in Southern Vovchansk (2025-11-18 20:15:00). This indicates persistent pressure designed to fix UAF units.
• Sumy/Ivanopillya Sector (ACTIVE SOF/DRONE OPERATIONS): RF "Akhmat" Special Forces (SpN "Akhmat," "Aida" Group) are confirmed to be executing precision drone strikes against military targets and infrastructure in the Sumy Oblast (2025-11-13 14:00:43, 2025-11-07 11:18:32, 2025-11-09 11:41:57). This indicates persistent reconnaissance and kinetic shaping operations along the northern border.
• Zaporizhzhia Sector (FIXING OPERATIONS): UAF South Command confirms successful targeting of RF fire positions and rear areas (2025-11-06 07:35:59). RF logistics activity is confirmed by Chechen units ("Akhmat-Kavkaz") receiving humanitarian/logistical support in this sector (2025-11-16 09:06:34).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Recent intelligence (UAF 16th AK BDA footage, 2025-11-18 20:13:17) shows nighttime/thermal operations are successful, suggesting low visibility (night/overcast) conditions favor advanced UAS/thermal warfare. UAF continues to demonstrate capability in this domain.
• Reports of winterization and preparedness activities for vehicles (2025-11-16 13:05:15) suggest the ground is transitioning to cold/wet conditions, which will further restrict off-road maneuverability, placing greater dependence on the vulnerable road GLOCs.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces (Hybrid Integration): RF continues to deploy Chechen-affiliated units (Akhmat, Sheikh Mansur Battalion) for high-intensity, localized ground assault (Vovchansk) and precision drone/SOF operations (Sumy/Ivanopillya). This hybrid force structure is highly effective at imposing attrition and fixing UAF reserves.
• UAF Forces (Readiness/Resilience): UAF units (e.g., 47th OMB, 95th DShB) are showcasing high morale, celebrating anniversaries, and highlighting foreign volunteers (Colombians in 47th OMB, 2025-11-13 07:01:03). This confirms high unit cohesion despite the ongoing operational crisis. Urgent field requests for logistics (pickups for 95th DShB, 2025-11-16 12:02:02) underscore the immediate shortage of combat logistics vehicles in the field. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Sustained Drone/SOF Attrition: RF (specifically SpN "Akhmat") has demonstrated sustained FPV and precision strike capabilities, targeting UAF equipment and positions across multiple directions (Kharkiv, Sumy). This capacity directly challenges UAF tactical C2 and logistics centers. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Multidirectional Fixing Operations: RF maintains the capability to execute high-tempo assaults on secondary fronts (Vovchansk, Siversk), drawing UAF resources away from the Pokrovsk Main Effort.
3. Expeditionary Deployment: RF maintains the capability to deploy fully equipped, brigade-sized forces (newly committed 40th OMBR) via rail/road and air (Il-76MD observed deploying volunteers, 2025-11-11 05:26:38) to reinforce high-priority axes rapidly.

Intentions:

1. Achieve Pokrovsk Breakthrough: The primary objective remains unchanged: maximize pressure on the Pokrovsk Axis, leveraging the logistics crisis created by the rail severance.
2. Systematically Degrade Logistics: Continue tactical-level drone/SOF operations to interdict key road GLOCs (Kostiantynivka) and degrade UAF rear area C2/logistics nodes.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Elevated Chechen Unit Profiling: A significant volume of enemy reporting is dedicated to Chechen-affiliated units (Kadyrov_95, Akhmat), showcasing successful tactical drone strikes (Volchansk, Sumy) and high-level logistical/morale visits (Zaporizhzhia). This suggests these units are being used as high-profile shock troops or primary kinetic assets in specific thrusts.
• Focus on Urban Seizure (Vovchansk): Claims of seizing key streets in Vovchansk (2025-11-18 20:15:00) indicate RF is committing to grinding urban warfare to fix UAF forces near Kharkiv.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics: RF demonstrates effective internal logistical resupply to forward deployed units, including the 270th Motorized Rifle Regiment ("Akhmat-Kavkaz") in Zaporizhzhia (2025-11-16 09:06:34).
• UAF Logistics (CRITICAL VULNERABILITY): The reliance on road transport is severely stressed. Urgent requests for pickup trucks for the 95th DShB (2025-11-16 12:02:02) signal an immediate and tactical shortage of utility logistics, directly impeding UAF tactical mobility and resupply in high-attrition sectors. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 is highly coordinated, effectively integrating conventional mechanized forces (40th/155th OMBRs) with specialized, high-tempo SOF/drone units (Akhmat). This multi-domain coordination allows RF to simultaneously apply pressure, conduct deep strikes, and execute information warfare. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: UAF is maintaining a resilient, active defense across the front, with key formations (47th OMB, 95th DShB) engaged in combat and maintaining unit cohesion.
• Readiness: High, supported by morale-boosting activities (anniversaries, honoring NCOs) and the visible integration of foreign volunteers (47th OMB). The demonstrated capability for precision strikes (16th AK, FPV units) shows tactical proficiency remains high.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: UAF 16th Army Corps documented successful thermal/drone BDA and strike against RF ground targets near Dvorichanske (Kupiansk direction, 2025-11-18 20:13:17), confirming continued tactical attrition capabilities.
• Setbacks: The operational vulnerability stemming from the rail severance remains the most critical setback. Urgent field requests for logistics vehicles indicate the high attrition of soft-skin vehicles, complicating resupply efforts.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Requirement: Immediate delivery of utility/logistics vehicles (pickups) to high-tempo units (95th DShB, 47th OMB) to maintain tactical maneuverability and distributed logistics.
• Constraint (Persistent Gap): Lack of definitive BDA or Engineering Time to Repair (ETR) estimate for the Kamyan’ske rail hub. This prevents the establishment of a robust, long-term operational logistics plan.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Akhmat Glorification): RF and Kadyrov-affiliated channels are intensely focused on publicizing Chechen successes, leveraging high-quality drone footage and showcasing military-political unity (2025-11-16 10:50:38, 2025-11-14 14:31:13). This seeks to project an image of unstoppable, coordinated force capability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF IO (Strategic Distraction): Continued promotion of civilian construction and non-military political events (Grozny development, MVD awards) attempts to normalize the domestic situation and project confidence in stability despite the war effort.
• UAF IO (Resilience and Unity): UAF effectively counters RF narratives by highlighting the professionalism of its forces (47th OMB NCOs), its combat history, and international support (Colombian volunteers).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF Morale: Remains high, reinforced by successful FPV/artillery strikes and unit pride (47th OMB anniversary).
• RF Morale: While unit-specific morale among Chechen forces appears high (due to resources/propaganda), the broader RF military relies heavily on financial incentives (as noted in the previous report) and a constant stream of domestic propaganda to sustain combat volume.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The core MLCOA remains the synchronized ground assault on Pokrovsk, dependent on successful SpN interdiction.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours (211800Z NOV 25 - 221800Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Initial Breach Attempt)

1. GLOC Interdiction (Phase I): RF SpN elements launch localized, simultaneous IED and FPV attacks along the Kostiantynivka–Pokrovsk road corridor during peak darkness (2200Z-0400Z). This aims to achieve a full, if temporary, road closure.
2. Mechanized Assault Preparation: The 40th and 155th OMBRs execute final preparatory artillery and drone strikes in the Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector, positioning their lead echelons (BTGs) in Initial Attack Positions (IAPs).
3. Hacking/Electronic Warfare (EW) Spike: RF EW assets intensify jamming/spoofing against UAF tactical communications and GPS to disrupt UAF C2 precisely when the logistics line is attacked.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Breakthrough Exploitation)

• RF SpN achieves a successful, sustained interdiction of the Kostiantynivka GLOC (closure >12 hours), forcing the operational reserve to divert to rear-area security, rather than the forward defense. The synchronized mechanized assault by the 40th/155th OMBRs achieves a rapid tactical breakthrough, exploiting critical ammunition shortages and compromised C2 in the forward UAF lines. This forces a localized, operational withdrawal, potentially compromising the defense of a key regional hub (e.g., Kostiantynivka).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Operations) / J2 (Intelligence): Preemptive Counter-SOF Clearance (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Sustain high-intensity, full-spectrum (thermal, FPV, ground patrols) search and clearance operations (Operation VIPER HUNT) along the Kostiantynivka GLOC and adjacent terrain (within 5km of the road). Utilize FPV drones in a "mine/IED clearance" role ahead of logistics convoys.
   • Rationale: The threat is imminent and a successful interdiction will trigger the MLCOA. Must prioritize GLOC security.

2. J4 (Logistics) / J3 (Operations): Tactical Logistics Mitigation (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Immediate authorization for the acquisition, requisition, or re-tasking of utility vehicles (pickups) to high-attrition units (95th DShB, 47th OMB). Establish small, hardened tactical logistics caches forward of the Kostiantynivka choke point but outside the immediate SpN interdiction zone, ensuring 24-hour buffer stocks.
   • Rationale: Mitigate the impact of a temporary road closure by pre-positioning critical supplies (ammo, fuel) at the tactical edge.

3. J7 (AD): Prioritize Tactical AD Assets (URGENT).

   • Action: Confirm the priority deployment of the incoming Skyranger 35 system to provide AD cover for the main logistics staging area/C2 node supporting the Pokrovsk defense sector, rather than diverting it solely for strategic asset protection (Kyiv/Lviv).
   • Rationale: RF UAS/UMPK strikes are an integral part of the synchronized breakthrough attempt; tactical AD protection is critical to preserve C2 and forward defense capability.

//END SITREP//