Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 211200Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 210600Z NOV 25 – 211200Z NOV 25 (Mid-Day Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The RF intent to execute the Pokrovsk breakthrough remains the singular focus, reinforced by continued high-level diplomatic signaling and confirmed front-line aggression in secondary sectors (Siversk, Zaporizhzhia). New information highlights significant RF internal morale vulnerabilities despite effective external propaganda.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis / Kostiantynivka Corridor: Remains the Main Effort (ME). The threat window for the Spetsnaz interdiction on the Kostiantynivka GLOC is currently peaked (0-4 hour window elapsed, threat remains high until confirmed negative BDA).
• Siversk Sector: RF forces are actively engaging in urban assaults ("Наши штурмы в жилой застройке Северска," 2025-11-18 18:47:53), indicating localized, high-intensity attempts to fix UAF units and prevent reserve movement toward Pokrovsk.
• Zaporizhzhia Sector: Active counter-mine and FPV strike operations are confirmed by the RF MoD (2025-11-18 18:30:02), suggesting RF is actively preparing for limited advances or defensive hardening in this southern sector.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Overcast skies are reported over RF urban areas (2025-11-18 17:28:48), which may affect visual ISR but remains optimal for thermal and UAS operations, a key feature of the ongoing fighting (UAF 46th Airmobile Bde footage, RF MoD footage).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces: RF continues high-tempo UAS operations across multiple fronts (Zaporizhzhia, Krasnolymanske) using both FPV strike platforms (2025-11-18 18:30:02, 2025-11-18 17:00:21) and guided munitions (UMPK, 2025-11-18 18:39:13). This confirms a pre-offensive shaping doctrine focused on degrading UAF positions.
• UAF Forces: UAF brigades continue to demonstrate high proficiency in counter-drone FPV operations (46th Airmobile Bde footage, 2025-11-17 16:46:08). Significant logistical support is confirmed moving towards the Pokrovsk and Huliaipole directions (Come Back Alive Foundation, 2025-11-15 15:08:53), indicating an urgent effort to buffer front-line supplies.
• Western Aid: Confirmed high-value aid delivery is imminent (Skyranger 35 AD system next week, 2025-11-18 20:08:35), providing a medium-term boost to tactical AD capability.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Sustained Diplomatic Shield: High-level strategic engagement (Putin-Jaishankar, 2025-11-18 15:37:11) and Chinese support (2025-11-18 18:49:13) sustain RF geopolitical cover, allowing resources to flow and diplomatic pressure to be absorbed.
2. Effective Hybrid/IO Integration: RF is actively using advanced robotics concepts (2025-11-15 17:32:44) and internal stability messaging while simultaneously conducting aggressive kinetic operations and high-tempo FPV/drone warfare.
3. Localized Ground Penetration: Forces retain the capability for small-unit penetration in urban or wooded areas (Siversk, Krasnolymanske, 2025-11-18 18:50:11).

Intentions:

1. Pokrovsk Breakthrough: Maintain maximum pressure on the Pokrovsk axis (ME).
2. Infrastructure Degradation: Continue targeting forward UAF positions, C2 nodes, and logistics routes using precision UAS/UMPK strikes.
3. Internal Finance Coercion: Intelligence reveals that RF internal contract practices involve coercion and threats regarding high contract payments (600k–1M RUB), indicating RF relies on financial incentives coupled with threats to maintain personnel volume (2025-11-18 10:55:51).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Drone-Based Mine Clearance: Confirmed use of specialized FPV/drone assets for mine clearance in Zaporizhzhia (2025-11-18 18:30:02), indicating preparation for mechanized forward movement or tactical advance in this sector, beyond just defensive hardening.
• Focus on Localized Strike BDA: RF channels are showcasing drone and UMPK strikes with "stunning angles" (2025-11-18 18:39:13), suggesting effective BDA collection capability and a deliberate IO campaign to demoralize UAF.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics (Mixed): While deep strike successes (TETS) impose strategic friction, the immediate operational logistics flow for the 40th/155th OMBRs appears unhindered in the Pokrovsk sector.
• RF Personnel (Coerced): Dependence on large, coercive contract payments (2025-11-18 10:55:51) suggests that RF retention and recruitment quality are fundamentally unstable, but volume is sustained by monetary incentives.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains effective, coordinating multiple complex operations across diverse axes (Siversk fixed assaults, Pokrovsk massing, Zaporizhzhia shaping). The quick release and coordination of video BDA across multiple sources indicate a robust military information coordination process. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: UAF is maintaining a critical defensive posture, utilizing high-value Western equipment and hybrid warfare units (46th Airmobile Bde) to impose high attrition (UAS strikes on personnel/equipment).
• Readiness: High. Commitment to supporting front-line logistics (Pokrovsk, Huliaipole) is evident. The incoming Skyranger 35 AD system will allow for better protection of tactical C2 nodes and short-range maneuver units.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: UAF units are successfully employing FPV drones against dug-in positions and personnel (46th Airmobile Bde footage, 2025-11-17 16:46:08; 41st Mechanized Bde, 2025-11-12 18:06:03). This confirms tactical overmatch in the FPV domain over conventional RF infantry.
• Setbacks: RF continues localized tactical successes in Siversk and Krasnolymanske areas, forcing UAF to divert resources to contain these fixed assaults.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Requirement: Urgent delivery and deployment of the Skyranger 35 system to high-threat corridors to counter RF UMPK and UAS operations.
• Constraint: Personnel loss and Missing in Action (MIA) status (2025-11-18 18:48:11) indicate the sustained human cost of the conflict, necessitating continuous rotation and resupply of specialized units (e.g., sappers).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Internal Corruption/Coercion): RF internal sources detail high contract payments alongside threats of non-payment (2025-11-18 10:55:51). This is a critical intelligence finding: RF military cohesion is tied less to ideology and more to financial coercion, a major long-term vulnerability.
• RF IO (Strategic Distraction): Putin’s meeting with India and amplifying cooperation with China (2025-11-18 15:37:11, 2025-11-18 18:49:13) serves to project global relevance and stability, distracting from military losses.
• UAF IO (Diplomatic Success): President Zelenskyy’s engagement with the Spanish PM and the symbolic viewing of Picasso’s "Guernica" (2025-11-18 18:51:34) effectively links UAF resistance to historical European defense against totalitarian aggression, strengthening the narrative for continued security assistance.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF: Morale remains resilient, buoyed by successful tactical strikes (FPV BDA) and confirmed Western aid deliveries (Skyranger). Urgent private calls for MIA soldiers (2025-11-18 18:48:11) highlight sustained domestic anxiety but also transparency regarding losses.
• RF: High-value morale efforts focus on glorifying local KIA 'heroes' in Pokrovskoye (2025-11-18 18:42:28), suggesting that losses, including in the key Pokrovsk sector, are high enough to require dedicated commemorative propaganda.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The core threat remains the combined 40th/155th OMBR mechanized assault on the Pokrovsk corridor, timed to coincide with successful GLOC interdiction.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours (211200Z NOV 25 - 221200Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Synchronized GLOC Closure and Assault)

1. GLOC Ambush Execution: RF SpN elements, having successfully infiltrated the Kostiantynivka corridor, execute a coordinated attack (IEDs, direct fire, FPV drones) to close the primary supply route for a minimum of 6 hours, creating a logistics bottleneck at the front.
2. Mechanized Assault Launch: The 40th and 155th OMBRs launch the main mechanized assault in the Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector, aiming to exploit UAF defensive lines during the critical period of ammunition and fuel interdiction.
3. Kinetic Fixation: RF intensifies drone and artillery strikes in secondary sectors (Krasnolymanske, Siversk) and continues limited UAS harassment in the North (Sumy/Poltava) to prevent the timely movement of UAF operational reserves.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Strategic AD Overextension)

• RF executes a limited but highly visible strategic strike (using renewed Pskov/Monchegorsk assets) against a major industrial or political target (e.g., Kyiv, strategic Western GLOC hub). This forces UAF C2 to divert AD and strategic reserves westward. Simultaneously, the Pokrovsk GLOC closure is successful, and the combined OMBR force achieves a deep, uncontained breakthrough (>10km), leading to the requirement for UAF to execute a costly local retreat and stabilization operation.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Operations) / SOF: Maintain Active Hunter-Killer Operations (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Given the critical window, SOF must be granted permissive rules of engagement (ROE) to prosecute high-probability SpN targets in the GLOC rear area without C2 delays. No relaxation of GLOC security posture is authorized until 220600Z NOV 25.
   • Rationale: The threat remains high probability, and successful preemption is the only way to safeguard the main defensive line.

2. J7 (AD) / J4 (Logistics): Fast-Track Skyranger 35 Deployment (URGENT - Next Week).

   • Action: J7/J4 must finalize the reception, training, and deployment plan for the incoming Skyranger 35 systems. Priority deployment should be to the Pokrovsk high-value tactical area (e.g., brigade C2/Logistics Nodes), and not diverted to static strategic defense unless MDCOA is executed.
   • Rationale: The system provides crucial defense against the ubiquitous RF FPV and UMPK threat, which is degrading UAF C2.

3. J2 (Intelligence) / STRATCOM: Exploit RF Morale Vulnerabilities (HIGH).

   • Action: Utilize the confirmed RF internal intelligence (coercive contract payments, high KIA rates in Pokrovskoye) in targeted Information Operations campaigns aimed at demoralizing RF forward units and undermining domestic support for forced recruitment.
   • Rationale: Leverage RF internal friction to reduce the combat effectiveness of the advancing OMBRs.

//END SITREP//