Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 210600Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 210300Z NOV 25 – 210600Z NOV 25 (Pre-Dawn/Morning Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The intelligence picture remains stable regarding the ground force commitment (40th OMBR), but new tactical indicators reinforce the high probability of the MLCOA. Confirmed operational successes by UAF in the deep rear (TETS strikes) and active enemy drone deployment in the north require immediate C2 adjustments.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis / Kostiantynivka Corridor: Remains the Main Effort (ME). The massing of the 40th Separate Marine Brigade (OMBR) and 155th OMBR persists in the Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector, confirming preparation for a major breakthrough. The Kostiantynivka road GLOC remains the critical, highly vulnerable bottleneck.
• Deep Rear Area (Donbas): The strike by UAF forces against the Zuyivska and Starobeshivska Thermal Power Plants (TES) has forced the RF occupation authority in Donetsk to declare a state of emergency. This is a critical operational success, imposing immediate strain on RF energy logistics and demonstrating UAF’s deep strike capability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Northern Operational Zone (Sumy/Poltava): Confirmed deployment of UAS (Shahed/Geran-type) moving southwest into Sumy and Poltava Oblasts (Reference: UAF Air Force Report 200505Z NOV 25). This suggests a limited but targeted deep strike effort concurrent with the Donbas offensive.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No significant change. Conditions remain suitable for ISTAR and UAS operations, as confirmed by RF tactical drone usage (Messages 2025-11-10 through 2025-11-16) and current UAF Air Force warnings (Message 2025-11-18 20:05:05).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces: Aggressive use of auxiliary forces (Spetsnaz Akhmat) remains a consistent feature, focusing heavily on FPV/C-UAS warfare, counter-UAV measures, and the destruction of fixed targets and dug-in positions (Messages 2025-11-06/10/14/15/16/17). This indicates a highly drone-centric tactical doctrine.
• UAF Forces (Air Defense): AD assets are currently engaged in tracking and neutralizing UAS threats in Sumy and Poltava. Reserves in the Pokrovsk sector are on high alert, anticipating the MLCOA.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Sustained Mechanized Offensive: The combined force of two OMBRs (40th and 155th) retains the necessary combat power for a high-risk, high-reward breakthrough.
2. Advanced Tactical Drone Doctrine: RF units (specifically SpN Akhmat) are highly proficient in FPV strike, FPV resupply, and counter-UAS operations, indicating superior adaptation in the tactical electromagnetic and cognitive domains (Messages 2025-11-12/15).
3. IO Integration: RF media is actively attempting to control the narrative of internal stability (Chechen leadership, sports, music) while projecting operational lethality (strike videos).

Intentions:

1. Pokrovsk Breakthrough: Primary kinetic intent remains achieving operational success on the Pokrovsk axis by synchronizing logistics interdiction (SpN) with the mechanized assault (OMBRs).
2. Strategic Fixation: Utilize limited long-range UAS strikes (Sumy/Poltava) and the threat of strategic bomber staging (Pskov/Monchegorsk) to draw UAF AD assets and strategic reserves away from the Donbas ME.
3. Damage Control: The declaration of a state of emergency following the UAF TETS strikes (Message 2025-11-18) confirms RF intent to rapidly stabilize energy infrastructure in occupied areas to support forward operations.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Confirmed Focus on C2/ISR Nodes: RF strikes explicitly target UAF UAV launch sites and antennas (Message 2025-11-10 14:51:54) and other fixed infrastructure (utility enclosures, transformers, Message 2025-11-14 11:11:02). This highlights an effort to degrade UAF sensor-to-shooter capability prior to the ground offensive.
• FPV Resupply: RF SpN units are utilizing FPV drones for logistical support (resupply packages) within active combat zones (Message 2025-11-12 15:56:27), demonstrating further innovation in tactical logistics.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics (Stressed): UAF strikes on Zuyivska and Starobeshivska TETS will immediately degrade local power supply, affecting RF civilian and military infrastructure (e.g., local C2 nodes, maintenance facilities). This success mitigates some of the stress caused by the Kamyan’ske rail gap. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• UAF Logistics (CRITICAL VULNERABILITY): The Kostiantynivka road remains the single point of failure. The success of the TETS strike must not overshadow the immediate GLOC threat.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains effective, demonstrated by the synchronization of SpN operations, FPV deployment, and conventional force massing. The swift declaration of an emergency status in Donetsk (Message 2025-11-18) suggests centralized damage control capacity.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: Defensive posture on the Pokrovsk axis is critical. The successful TETS strikes demonstrate UAF capability to impose costs in the RF rear, but this must be leveraged to mitigate the immediate front-line threat.
• Readiness: High alert status for AD assets in the North and East. Operation IRON CLAW must demonstrate kinetic results against SpN in the Kostiantynivka corridor within the next 4 hours.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Confirmed kinetic strike success against RF TETS (Zuyivska/Starobeshivska), which will disrupt RF energy projection and C2 in the occupied Donbas.
• Setbacks: RF continues to successfully target UAF tactical C2/ISR nodes with precision drone strikes, indicating effective counter-ISR capability.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Constraint: The simultaneous threat of a strategic deep strike (Pskov/Monchegorsk), active tactical UAS in the North (Sumy/Poltava), and the Pokrovsk mechanized assault forces a critical distribution decision regarding AD and operational reserves.
• Requirement: Rapid BDA of the TETS strikes is needed to quantify RF power degradation and prioritize future strategic targeting.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Normalization/Cohesion): RF-aligned channels (KIM, Akhmat-associated channels) are heavily promoting domestic events (digital forums, patriotic music, historical commemorations, official meetings with allies like Kazakhstan) to project stability, unity, and technological advancement (Messages 2025-11-06 through 2025-11-16).
• RF IO (Justification/Dehumanization): Consistent use of extreme rhetoric (e.g., claiming UAF forces are "playing Naziism," Message 2025-11-09) and the promotion of hypothetical doomsday scenarios (e.g., nuclear war simulation, Message 2025-11-09) serve to dehumanize UAF forces and normalize the high stakes of the conflict for the RF population.
• UAF Counter-IO Opportunity: The TETS strikes and the subsequent RF emergency declaration provide a clear, demonstrable tactical success that must be amplified to counter RF claims of unstoppable momentum.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF: Morale is likely boosted by confirmed deep strikes. However, the political friction shown in RF media (Ukrainian calls for leadership resignation, Message 2025-11-15) is a continuous RF IO vector aimed at internal UAF dissent.
• RF: Morale appears sustained by the constant flow of localized 'victory' clips (FPV strikes, artillery success) and the state's narrative of stability and high-level diplomatic relevance.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The predicted MLCOA remains the synchronized ground assault predicated on GLOC failure. The UAF TETS strikes may slightly delay the RF timetable but will not change the fundamental enemy intention at Pokrovsk.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours (210600Z NOV 25 - 220600Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Immediate Logistical Interdiction)

1. SpN Interdiction: RF SpN units execute the pre-planned ambush/IED attack on the Kostiantynivka–Pokrovsk road GLOC within the 0-4 hour critical window (before 211000Z NOV 25).
2. Shaping Operations: The 40th and 155th OMBR continue heavy, suppressive indirect fire and localized probing attacks (drone swarms and FPV) in the Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector, maximizing damage to UAF ISR and C2 nodes.
3. UAS Distraction: RF continues the limited UAS strikes (Sumy/Poltava) to tie down Northern AD assets and gauge UAF AD response capacity, diverting attention from the ME.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Breakthrough and Exploitation)

• Operational Reserve Over-Commitment: UAF C2 is forced to commit AD assets (diverted from Donbas) to defend strategic infrastructure (e.g., Khmelnytskyi NPP) against the highly publicized threat from AB Pskov/Monchegorsk. Simultaneously, the SpN interdiction is successful and sustained, and the 40th/155th OMBR grouping launches the main mechanized attack. The lack of forward-cached reserves and AD coverage allows the RF to secure a significant bridgehead (>7km penetration) near Pokrovsk, leading to the collapse of local UAF defensive cohesion.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Operations) / SOF: Execute Hunter-Killer Protocol and Establish Hardened Checkpoints (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Immediately establish hardened mobile security checkpoints/ambush zones on the Kostiantynivka GLOC choke points. Use SOF (Operation IRON CLAW) to actively patrol and preemptively engage all human/vehicle signatures outside of designated UAF movement corridors. Require C2 to confirm two kinetic engagements against SpN elements within the next 4 hours.
   • Rationale: The MLCOA hinges on the GLOC closing in the immediate window (0-4 hours). Aggressive kinetic preemption is the only defense.

2. J5 (Plans) / J7 (AD): Implement MDCOA Diversion Plan (URGENT - Next 12 Hours).

   • Action: Execute the contingency plan to protect one tier-one strategic non-Donbas asset (e.g., energy node west of Dnipro) against a potential strategic deep strike (Pskov/Monchegorsk threat). This forces RF to choose between strategic deep attack and maximizing air support for the Pokrovsk ME.
   • Rationale: Proactive allocation based on MDCOA prevents strategic paralysis if RF executes a synchronized strike.

3. J4 (Logistics): Finalize Forward Caching and Alternate Road Assessment (HIGH - Next 6 Hours).

   • Action: Confirm that the 36-hour emergency stocks (Fuel/155mm) have been successfully positioned forward of the Kostiantynivka choke point. Simultaneously, task J4/Engineer with identifying and preparing the next best, most defensible secondary/tertiary dirt road alternative should the Kostiantynivka road be compromised long-term (>18 hours).
   • Rationale: Contingency planning for prolonged GLOC failure is mandatory given the critical threat.

//END SITREP//