Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 210300Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 211900Z NOV 25 – 210300Z NOV 25 (Night/Early Morning Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH. No major kinetic shifts were observed overnight, but critical new information regarding the RF force commitment (40th OMBR) and increased aerial activity in the deep rear require immediate refinement of the MLCOA. The information environment remains dominated by RF hybrid operations and internal security messaging.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis / Kostiantynivka Corridor: Remains the Main Effort (ME). The reported concentration of the 40th Separate Marine Brigade (OMBR) reinforcing the 155th OMBR (Reference: Previous Daily Report 181900Z NOV 25) suggests preparation for a breakthrough attempt in the Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector. The focus remains the critical Kostiantynivka road GLOC, which is highly vulnerable to the projected SpN interdiction (0-8 hour window remains critical).
• Deep Rear Area (RF Air Bases): Unconfirmed, but persistent SAR/SIGINT indicators show RISING activity at AB Monchegorsk (Score 8.49) and AB Pskov (Score 12.96) (Reference: Previous Daily Report 181900Z NOV 25). This is a critical strategic indicator and an intelligence gap that, if resolved as long-range bomber staging, threatens deep UAF infrastructure (e.g., Khmelnytskyi NPP, rail hubs).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No new weather data contradicts the previous assessment. Conditions remain conducive to high-tempo drone/ISTAR operations (Reference: Previous SITREP 211900Z NOV 25).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces: Confirmed reinforcement of the ME with the 40th OMBR. Reports from a pro-RF source (Батальон "Питерского" Спецназ "Ахмат") document an FPV strike mission targeting UAF logistics and vehicles, specifically mentioning a vehicle associated with the Kraken Unit (Reference: New Message 2025-11-14 10:49:19). This confirms RF's prioritized use of tactical FPV assets against UAF high-value maneuver/logistics targets within the immediate combat zone.
• UAF Forces (Counter-SpN): Operation IRON CLAW (convoy escorts) is active (Reference: Previous Daily Report 181900Z NOV 25), but current force density is assessed as insufficient to preemptively defeat the SpN threat to the Kostiantynivka GLOC.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Massed Mechanized Assault Capability: The combined 40th and 155th OMBR grouping represents a dedicated breakthrough force capable of sustained mechanized action, provided logistics hold. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Sophisticated Hybrid Warfare Integration (IO/C2/Tactics): RF continues to integrate advanced tactical drone strikes (Reference: FPV strike on Kraken-marked vehicle) with strategic hybrid operations (SpN threats to GLOC, alleged war crimes/human shields).
3. Long-Range Aerial Recrudescence (Emergent): The rising activity at northern RF air bases (Monchegorsk/Pskov) suggests the capability for a renewed, focused deep-strike campaign potentially targeting strategic energy or C2 nodes. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Intentional ambiguity is high)

Intentions:

1. Exploit Logistical Failure: RF's primary intention is to execute the ground breakthrough after SpN elements successfully interdict the Pokrovsk GLOC, aiming for an immediate UAF force degradation.
2. Maintain Internal Cohesion: RF media, particularly Chechen-associated channels (K95, Akhmed Dudaev), are focused almost exclusively on showcasing internal stability, civilian events (chess, Taekwondo), and the political legitimacy of leadership, indicating a strong intent to counter internal dissent and project power projection capability through auxiliary forces.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF Tactical Focus: Confirmed FPV strikes directly targeting known UAF high-value maneuver/SOF logistics (Kraken-marked vehicle) (Reference: New Message 2025-11-14 10:49:19). This signals highly precise tactical intelligence sharing (ISTAR-to-Strike cycle) focused on decapitation of maneuver capacity.
• RF Deep Operations: Renewed focus on high-altitude ISR and air-to-air missile testing/deployment (Reference: MiG-31/R-37 launch footage) (New Message 2025-11-11 08:45:53). While not a kinetic strike, this suggests continued air superiority focus and potential preparation for operations against high-altitude UAF assets or long-range reconnaissance missions.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics (Steady): Logistics support to the RF forces (Veche organization medical delivery) confirms ongoing, steady flow of necessary tactical materiel, particularly medical supplies, to Northern Sector units (Reference: New Message 2025-11-18 17:00:26).
• UAF Logistics (CRITICAL VULNERABILITY): The absence of BDA/ETR for the Kamyan’ske rail hub and the continued immediate threat to the Kostiantynivka road GLOC represent the single most dangerous vulnerability to UAF operations on the Pokrovsk axis.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 is demonstrating highly synchronized tactical operations (FPV strikes) and strategic mobilization (40th OMBR commitment). The ability to quickly integrate a major force element (40th OMBR) suggests operational C2 remains robust for the Pokrovsk ME. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: UAF is currently holding, prioritizing C-UAS/FPV combat and rear-area security (counter-intelligence). Defensive posture is now heavily challenged by the confirmed massing of the 40th/155th OMBR.
• Readiness: High, but critical. The shift from passive defense to active "Hunter-Killer" operations against SpN (Reference: Previous Daily Report 181900Z NOV 25 Recommendation) is necessary to survive the projected MLCOA.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Previous successes (SBU arrests, Ryazan Refinery strike) maintain strategic pressure but do not mitigate the immediate kinetic threat at Pokrovsk.
• Setbacks: Confirmed RF success in targeting specific UAF maneuver support units (Kraken-marked vehicle destruction via FPV). This validates the intelligence that RF is successfully targeting UAF mobile logistics.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Constraints: Resources are being stretched between three critical missions: 1) Frontline defense (Pokrovsk); 2) Counter-SpN / GLOC security; 3) Strategic Air Defense against potential deep strikes (Pskov/Monchegorsk build-up).
• Requirements: Immediate acquisition of advanced, high-resolution IMINT/SAR capability to resolve the Northern Air Base activity and the Kamyan’ske rail BDA/ETR.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Internal Unity/Normalization): RF media channels associated with auxiliary forces (Kadyrov/Chechnya) are relentlessly pushing content featuring domestic normalcy (sports, urban development, religious events) and political cohesion (meetings with Cossacks, Federal officials) (Reference: New Messages K95/Dudaev 2025-11-06 through 2025-11-18). Judgment: This serves two purposes: demonstrating governance and available non-conventional force capacity to the RF populace, and countering perceptions of instability caused by battlefield losses.
• RF IO (War Crimes Minimization/Dehumanization): The SBU's previous reporting on the use of human shields (Reference: Previous SITREP 211900Z NOV 25) highlights the extreme nature of the IO battle over ethical conduct in the Pokrovsk urban fight.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF: Morale remains resilient, underpinned by domestic successes and international aid announcements. However, the psychological weight of fighting against RF forces potentially employing non-combatants as human shields is extreme and requires Command emphasis on clear ROE guidance.
• RF: Internal morale appears high, sustained by narratives of success (e.g., FPV strike claims) and strong local leadership visibility (Chechen region). The focus on sports and civilian events masks the human cost of the conflict.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The announced Spanish military aid (Reference: Previous SITREP 211900Z NOV 25) remains critical for long-term sustainment. The RF attempt to amplify alleged sabotage in Poland (Reference: Previous Daily Report 181900Z NOV 25) suggests an ongoing hybrid effort to complicate Western logistics flow.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The key predictive refinement is the increased probability of a severe, strategic-level deep strike, combined with the immediate tactical threat at Pokrovsk. The SpN interdiction window is now critical.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours (210300Z NOV 25 - 220300Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Synchronized Strangulation and Attack)

1. SpN Interdiction (Immediate): RF SpN units execute a complex, short-duration ambush or IED placement on the Kostiantynivka–Pokrovsk road GLOC within the 0-8 hour window, aimed at closing the road for >4 hours.
2. Mechanized Pre-Attack Maneuvers: The 40th and 155th OMBR initiate heavy shaping operations (artillery, mass drone swarms, localized clearing) in the Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector, preparing the ground for the main mechanized assault to immediately follow the logistics disruption.
3. IO Amplification: RF channels will immediately amplify claims of successful GLOC interdiction and UAF logistical failure to degrade frontline morale and operational security.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Strategic and Tactical Paralysis)

• RF achieves synchronized operational paralysis: SpN interdiction is successful and sustained, simultaneously with the launch of a major strategic deep strike (potentially via Tu-95/Tu-22M3 staging from AB Pskov/Monchegorsk, utilizing new capacity indicated by SAR scores) targeting a key UAF energy or rail node outside the Pokrovsk axis. This combined kinetic/logistical strike forces UAF High Command to divert reserves and AD assets away from the Donbas, allowing the 40th/155th OMBR to achieve a sustained operational breakthrough (>5km) near Pokrovsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J7 (Counter-UAS) / J3 (Operations): Initiate Full Hunter-Killer Protocol (CRITICAL - Immediate).

   • Action: Immediately transition all SOF and dedicated security elements (Operation IRON CLAW) in the Kostiantynivka road corridor from convoy escort to active "Hunter-Killer" patrols. Use thermal/FPV assets for continuous, aggressive engagement of any signatures (dismounted personnel, IED planting teams, vehicles) detected in the proximity of the GLOC, preempting the anticipated SpN attack.
   • Rationale: The projected MLCOA is timed to coincide with a logistics strike (0-8 hours). Passive defense is insufficient. Preemption is mandatory.

2. J2 (Intelligence) / J5 (Plans): Adjust MDCOA Contingency Planning (URGENT - Next 4 Hours).

   • Action: Given the critical intelligence gaps on strategic air bases, J2 must provide an immediate worst-case assessment (MDCOA) based on the assumption that AB Pskov/Monchegorsk are staging long-range strike assets. J5 must pre-identify and allocate sufficient SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile) assets to protect the next most critical strategic non-Donbas infrastructure target (e.g., major rail junction west of the Pokrovsk axis or a key transformer sub-station) against a renewed deep strike threat.
   • Rationale: The risk profile for a strategic deep strike has risen significantly. Contingency planning must be proactive.

3. J4 (Logistics): Mandatory Forward Caching Verification (HIGH - Next 6 Hours).

   • Action: Mandate and verify the immediate completion of pre-positioning 36-hour emergency stocks (Fuel/155mm) in hardened caches forward of the vulnerable Kostiantynivka choke point (Reference: Recommendation 2 from Previous Daily Report). Establish a C2 mechanism to verify stock levels hourly.
   • Rationale: This measure is the essential buffer against the highly probable MLCOA (GLOC closure).

//END SITREP//