TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS
DTG: 211900Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 211200Z NOV 25 – 211900Z NOV 25 (Evening Update)
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH. The tactical focus remains heavily weighted toward eliminating UAF C2/ISTAR capabilities and maintaining logistics interdiction pressure, synchronizing with the ground push by the 40th and 155th OMBR near Pokrovsk. New intelligence emphasizes RF psychological operations and continued deep-strike capability against critical infrastructure.
Pokrovsk Axis / Kostiantynivka Corridor: The main operational pressure point. UAF forces confirm high-tempo drone combat. Ukrainian FPV units are actively engaging RF logistics/light vehicles near Kostiantynivka (Reference: UAF FPV footage 161334Z NOV 25 showing successful strike on light vehicle/personnel). This partially mitigates the SpN threat by maintaining kinetic pressure on the logistics routes.
Deep Rear Area (RF): Confirmed disruption of strategic energy infrastructure in Russia. The Ryazan Rosneft Oil Refinery has halted processing for the second time this month (Reference: Tsaplienko report 181959Z NOV 25). This confirms the sustained effectiveness of UAF deep-strike operations, placing long-term pressure on RF strategic sustainment.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
No significant change in weather is reported. The continued prevalence of high-quality drone footage (RF and UAF) confirms conditions remain favorable for intensive ISTAR and drone/FPV operations.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Forces (Ground): The 40th and 155th OMBR continue the mechanized advance near Pokrovsk. RF military bloggers confirm successful precision strikes in the Primorskoye/Zaporizhzhia sector (Reference: RF blog video 181956Z NOV 25, showing thermal strikes on structures), indicating ongoing localized clearing operations supporting the main effort.
UAF Forces (Air Defense/C-UAS): Confirmed active use of FPV assets not just for kinetic strikes on armor/logistics, but also for counter-reconnaissance (Reference: UAF FPV footage 161334Z NOV 25). SBU reports successful interdiction of RF intelligence agents targeting rear airbases and logistics (Konotop, Kharkiv) (Reference: SBU reports 170800Z, 180800Z NOV 25).
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Integrated ISTAR/Strike Coordination: Continued demonstration of the ability to coordinate reconnaissance (e.g., ZALA/Orlan) with tactical ground forces to eliminate HVA (Reference: RF video 180710Z NOV 25, 110th Brigade using thermal/drone targeting).
Hybrid Warfare/Internal Security: RF Intelligence Services (GRU/FSB) maintain a sophisticated network of agents targeting both high-value military objectives (airbases, logistics/rail lines) and civilian critical infrastructure (power plants near Khmelnytskyi NPP, energy facilities in Sumy/Poltava) (Reference: SBU reports 140900Z, 131400Z NOV 25).
Advanced Ground Robotics (Emergent): RF sources are showcasing development and deployment of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for reconnaissance/logistics, specifically by the Zapad Group of Forces (Reference: RF video 181653Z NOV 25). While not yet operationally decisive, this indicates a dedicated shift in force modernization. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Operational Impact)
Intentions:
Achieve Breakthrough via Attrition and Suppression (Pokrovsk): The goal remains to suppress UAF fire and C2 capabilities while committing specialized mechanized units (40th/155th OMBR) to achieve a deep tactical penetration.
Strategic Coercion: Persistent hybrid operations (sabotage/espionage/internal IO) aim to force UAF resources away from the front line to secure the deep rear and maintain civic/political stability.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
RF Adaptation: Increased focus on using captured UAF logistics/mobility systems (M1301 HSV confirmed by RF sources 102048Z NOV 25) and showcasing the development of indigenous light armored vehicles (Ulan-2 151728Z NOV 25). This indicates an attempt to close the tactical mobility gap exposed by UAF FPV dominance.
UAF Adaptation (Hybrid Defense): The SBU is actively dismantling RF agent networks targeting critical infrastructure (Konotop/Kharkiv, etc.), confirming a synchronized counter-intelligence operation designed to protect the rear (Reference: SBU reports 170800Z, 180800Z NOV 25).
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF Logistics (Strategic VULNERABILITY): The confirmed operational shutdown of the Ryazan Oil Refinery (181959Z NOV 25) places critical, non-kinetic pressure on RF military fuel and energy supply chains. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF Logistics (CRITICAL VULNERABILITY): The Pokrovsk supply line remains the critical point. While active UAF FPV combat operations are mitigating the SpN threat, the overall dependence on the single road GLOC remains extreme, exacerbating the impact of any successful interdiction.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 is demonstrating highly centralized tasking for deep reconnaissance (ZALA/Orlan) and deep strikes against HVA (Starlink terminals, C2/ISR positions) (Reference: RF strike on Starlink antenna 151010Z NOV 25). This synchronization supports the hypothesis that the Pokrovsk axis is receiving priority C2 and ISTAR allocation.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Posture: Executing a multi-domain defense incorporating intensive C-UAS/FPV counter-offensives on the tactical level and highly effective counter-intelligence/security operations in the operational rear.
Readiness: High, but strained by the critical need to secure the Pokrovsk GLOC and manage persistent power grid attacks. The National Guard Commander's public statement (181802Z NOV 25) emphasizing the need for "more drones and constant tactical improvement" confirms the necessity of the current FPV-centric defense doctrine.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Successes:
Successful kinetic targeting of RF light vehicles supporting ground elements (Reference: UAF FPV strike 161334Z NOV 25).
Significant operational security success with multiple arrests of GRU/FSB agents targeting rear-area assets (Reference: SBU reports 170800Z, 180800Z NOV 25).
Successful deep-strike campaign targeting RF strategic energy (Ryazan Refinery shutdown).
Setbacks:
Confirmed loss of tactical communication infrastructure (Starlink terminals) due to targeted RF strikes (Reference: RF strike on Starlink antenna 151010Z NOV 25).
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
Constraints: Resources are being diverted to shore up internal security (SBU counter-intelligence operations) and maintain critical infrastructure resilience (power). This diversion inevitably strains frontline logistics and available manpower.
Requirements: As per the NGU Commander's assessment, the immediate requirement is for mass acquisition and deployment of advanced ISR and strike drones to maintain kinetic parity with the RF precision strike cycle.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF IO (Dehumanization/War Crimes Denial): RF sources are heavily disseminating content documenting UAF POW capture and alleged logistical failure, while the SBU releases counter-narratives detailing alleged RF war crimes, including the confirmed use of civilians (including two 13-year-old children) as "human shields" during the assault on Pokrovsk (Reference: SBU video 181400Z NOV 25). This confirms Pokrovsk is not only the kinetic decisive point but also the focus of intense IO warfare over ethical conduct.
RF IO (Internal Morale): RF state media and military bloggers continue to showcase volunteer support (e.g., camouflage netting for 9th Guards Artillery Div 181812Z NOV 25) and force modernization (UGVs, Ulan-2).
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
UAF: Morale is supported by domestic counter-intelligence successes (SBU agent arrests) and confirmation of deep-strike capabilities (Ryazan refinery). However, the extreme allegations of RF war crimes in Pokrovsk are intended to raise public resolve but simultaneously elevate the psychological burden on frontline units.
RF: Morale appears stable, supported by claims of technological parity (UGV development) and documented ground success.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
Confirmed Assistance: Spain has announced military aid to Ukraine exceeding €600 million (Reference: Radio Svoboda report 181846Z NOV 25). This inflow, coupled with previous political agreements, reinforces strategic long-term sustainment despite the current tactical crisis.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
The core threat remains the synchronized ground assault on the Pokrovsk axis, facilitated by deep-strike suppression and logistics interdiction. The new intelligence regarding the use of human shields suggests RF is prepared to utilize extreme measures to secure ground objectives.
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours (211900Z NOV 25 - 221900Z NOV 25)
High-Intensity Mechanized Attack (Pokrovsk): The 40th and 155th OMBR will execute a coordinated, heavy mechanized assault, likely preceded by heavy artillery/loitering munition fire (Lancet/ZALA cycle). This attack will focus on achieving localized penetration (>3km) to force UAF commitment of operational reserves.
Increased SpN/Subversive Activity (Hybrid Domain): RF agents, despite recent arrests, will attempt to execute smaller, coordinated sabotage attacks targeting localized logistics nodes or C2 backups in the rear area to compound confusion during the main ground attack. This includes further attempts to target Starlink/EW assets (Reference: Confirmed CRITICAL ISTAR GAP from previous report).
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Collapse of Key Defensive Sector)
The sustained precision strikes against UAF counter-battery fire and ISTAR assets (P-18, Starlink) successfully blind and neutralize the immediate reserve fire support. The 40th/155th OMBR achieve a successful, sustained breakthrough, resulting in the loss of the key secondary defensive line near Kostiantynivka, directly threatening the operational depth and forcing a major UAF redeployment under duress.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-6 Hours
Main Assault Initiation: UAF must confirm if the assault utilizes the confirmed war crime tactic (human shields) for urban clearance, requiring pre-authorized ROE adjustments.
Confirmed video/audio evidence of RF units using non-combatants in front of combat elements in the Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector.
12 Hours
Logistics Sustainment Test: J4 must confirm that FPV/SpN interdiction efforts near Kostiantynivka have failed to reduce the flow of critical 155mm ammunition below the 72-hour burn rate.
Ammunition stocks for priority UAF artillery batteries fall below 72 hours of combat usage.
24 Hours
Counter-ISTAR Effectiveness: J7/J3 must confirm that active FPV counter-reconnaissance efforts have resulted in a measurable reduction (>20%) in RF ZALA/Orlan operational time or successful acquisition of high-resolution target data.
Confirmed degradation of RF Objective Control (OC) video quality or reduction in Lancet strike accuracy (larger circular error probable - CEP).
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - ROE ADJUSTMENT
RF Intent to Weaponize Civilians (Pokrovsk): Determine the frequency and unit authorization level for the alleged use of human shields (Reference: SBU report 181400Z NOV 25).
HUMINT/OSINT: Collect and cross-reference audio intercepts and prisoner debriefings, focusing on C2/BATTALION commander orders in the 40th/155th OMBR sectors.
LOW
HIGH - NORTHERN AIR BASES
Nature of Rising AB Activity (Monchegorsk/Pskov): Still critical. Distinguish between long-range bomber staging (Tu-22M3, Tu-95) and tactical transport/logistical movement.
IMINT: Prioritize high-resolution SAR or commercial satellite imagery over AB Monchegorsk/Pskov to classify specific aircraft staging and payload types.
LOW
HIGH - TECHNOLOGY
Operational Readiness of RF UGVs: Determine if the UGV technology (Reference: RF video 181653Z NOV 25) is currently deployed to the front and, if so, the primary operational role (ER&E, logistics, or direct fire support).
ISR Tasking (Tactical/Maneuver): Increase UAS/FPV patrols targeting the forward edge of the Pokrovsk advance zone to detect UGV signatures and operational patterns.
Action: Given the credible allegation (SBU, 181400Z NOV 25) of RF using non-combatants as human shields in urban areas (Pokrovsk), J5 must immediately issue and train all engaged units on a clear, legally sound Rules of Engagement (ROE) protocol for this specific war crime scenario to preserve operational effectiveness while minimizing civilian casualties.
Rationale: Failure to address this proactively risks operational paralysis or severe long-term IO/legal repercussions.
Action: Direct all ground commanders to treat operational Starlink terminals and other essential C2/ISTAR antennas as equivalent to ADS systems (e.g., P-18 radar) in terms of protection requirements. Employ the High-Mobility "ADS Escort Teams" (Recommendation 1 from previous SITREP) to specifically screen active communication sites.
Rationale: The confirmed RF strategy of targeting Starlink terminals (151010Z NOV 25) seeks to sever crucial, resilient communications. Protecting these nodes is key to surviving the MDCOA.
Action: While the main threat is the road GLOC, the confirmed RF focus on rail sabotage (Reference: Agent arrests/past attacks) requires J4 to double security patrols along secondary rail routes connecting to operational hubs, preempting RF attempts to complicate future BDA/ETR on the main Kamyan’ske line.
Rationale: RF is using hybrid elements to attack future logistics capacity. Protecting secondary infrastructure preserves redundancy for contingency planning.
