TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS
DTG: 211200Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 211000Z NOV 25 – 211200Z NOV 25 (Mid-Day Update)
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH. The RF operational approach is confirming a high reliance on drone-assisted precision targeting (Lancet/ZALA) to systematically eliminate UAF high-value assets (HVA) across multiple axes, directly supporting the Pokrovsk breakthrough attempt by the 40th and 155th OMBR.
Pokrovsk Axis / Kostiantynivka Corridor: The kinetic pressure from 40th/155th OMBR remains the decisive effort. RF drone reconnaissance confirms persistent monitoring of this area (Reference: ZALA reports focusing on Krasnoarmiysk/Pokrovsk direction). The defense of the main supply GLOC hinges on the ability of UAF C-UAS/EW systems to break the enemy's targeting cycle.
Wider Front (Kherson/Sumy): New confirmed Lancet strikes against UAF military installations (P-18 Radar on Sumy axis) and artillery/UAV launch sites on the Kherson axis demonstrate RF's capability and intention to shape the battlespace across multiple sectors, dispersing UAF high-value assets and C-UAS coverage.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Clear daylight conditions persist, confirmed by high-quality ZALA visual and thermal footage (Reference: ZALA video targeting Iskander strike). These conditions HIGHLY FAVOR RF ISTAR/Strike coordination, allowing rapid, precision targeting of UAF assets and objective control of RF missile/artillery strikes.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Forces (Air/Drone): Confirmed systematic deployment of ZALA and Lancet systems for:
Reconnaissance and Objective Control (OC): (Reference: ZALA footage of Iskander strike OC).
HVA Elimination: (Reference: ZALA footage of P-18 radar strike, UAV launch site strike).
UAF Forces: Active defense utilizing localized, counter-UAS/intercept drones (Reference: 'Wild Hornets' unit claiming high interception tally). This highlights the tactical necessity of decentralized air defense against mass Shahed attacks.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Integrated ISTAR/Strike Coordination: RF has established a highly effective procedure to integrate ZALA reconnaissance with deep-strike assets (e.g., Iskander-M OTRK or heavy artillery). This significantly reduces the sensor-to-shooter loop for RF high-value fire missions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Targeted C-UAS Degradation: RF is actively targeting UAF drone launch facilities and C-UAS infrastructure (Reference: Lancet strike on UAV launch setup). This adaptation aims to degrade UAF's primary response capability (FPV/C-UAS operations) near the front. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Sustained Ground Assault Support: RF military media (Dva Mayora) is actively fundraising for tactical mobility (Patriot vehicle, quad bikes) and technical equipment (EW, radios) for frontline units (106th Div, 119th Reg, 2nd Artillery Bn). This confirms a decentralized, but supported, effort to sustain tactical ground maneuver capabilities, particularly on secondary axes like Sumy. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Intentions:
Achieve Kinetic and Psychological Dominance: The mass release of ZALA strike footage is intended to project technical dominance and demoralize UAF forces by demonstrating that all HVA (Artillery, Radar, Drone C2) are targetable regardless of camouflage.
Pre-Emptive Degradation of Counter-Attack Potential: RF is focused on destroying UAF enabling capabilities (e.g., P-18 Radar) to blind UAF long-range fire and air defense before committing maximum ground force elements for the breakthrough.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
RF Adaptation: Increased focus on demonstrating Objective Control (OC) for long-range precision strikes (Iskander/OTRK), confirming battle damage assessment and strike accuracy using ZALA systems. This increases the psychological impact of RF deep strikes.
UAF Adaptation: Confirmed effectiveness of dedicated UAF interceptor drone units (STING/Wild Hornets) against Shahed mass attacks. This is a critical defensive adaptation but remains insufficient against loitering munitions and tactical reconnaissance drones.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF Logistics (Tactical/Unit Level): Confirmed reliance on volunteer/private funding (KCPN/Dva Mayora) for key tactical mobility (vehicles) and specialized equipment (EW) at the battalion level (106th Div). While strategic supply remains robust (drone production), tactical units require non-standard supply channels. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 demonstrates effective cross-domain synchronization, linking strategic intelligence (UAF HVA location) with specific strike platforms (Lancet, Iskander) across different Military Districts (Sumy, Kherson, Pokrovsk). This indicates centralized target selection supporting the main Pokrovsk effort.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Posture: Executing deep defense, forced to rapidly relocate or heavily camouflage HVA due to confirmed RF Lancet effectiveness.
Readiness: High readiness for C-UAS/Air Defense is evidenced by successful interceptions (Wild Hornets), but the logistical pressure on key assets remains critical (Radar/Artillery survivability). The need to find new burial grounds in Lviv (Reference: Tsaplienko report) points to sustained casualties that require management of rear-area psychological support.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Successes: Demonstrated tactical success of UAF FPV interceptor drones (STING) against Shahed saturation attacks. Successful, rapid closure of fundraising drives (Reference: Mykolaivsky Vanok, 2h 45m).
Setbacks: Confirmed loss of high-value ADS assets (P-18 Radar) and UAV launch infrastructure due to Lancet strikes on different axes, confirming RF capability to neutralize UAF enabling capabilities.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
Constraints: High strain on the national power grid (RBC-Ukraine report of up to 6 hours without power). This impacts C2 resilience, rear-area logistics, and civilian morale, complicating the overall war effort.
Requirements: Immediate requirement for high-speed relocation platforms and advanced anti-Lancet C-UAS systems to protect the remaining P-18/Counter-Battery assets.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF IO (Kinetic/Technical): Extensive dissemination of ZALA/Lancet strike videos (P-18, UAV launchers, OC of Iskander strikes). Primary Message: RF possesses superior precision strike and ISTAR capabilities, making UAF deep fire support unsustainable.
RF IO (Political/Legal): State Duma Chairman Volodin focuses heavily on domestic legislation (penalties for sabotage/terrorism, cultural protection) and anti-Western rhetoric (criticizing property seizures, Britain), framing the conflict as a defense of Russian sovereignty and culture against foreign aggression/sabotage.
UAF IO (Resilience/Community): Media focuses on high interception rates ('Wild Hornets') and the strength of volunteer efforts (rapid fundraising, morale videos), projecting resilience and community contribution.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
UAF: Morale remains high, supported by tangible success against the air threat and effective charity coordination. However, persistent infrastructure strikes (power outages) and the high cost of the conflict (Lviv burial grounds) pose long-term morale challenges.
RF: Internal morale is reinforced by the perceived technological superiority (drone strikes) and a unified political narrative emphasizing legal/cultural defense.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
The RF Arms Control Delegation in Vienna continues to maintain official presence in international forums (OSCE, UN), attempting to project normalcy and a focus on established security protocols while using these platforms to push narratives related to Nazism (UN resolution) and Western hypocrisy (Lavrov interviews). This suggests a continuous effort to undermine international consensus against RF actions. (Dempster-Shafer analysis suggests HIGH confidence in continued diplomatic engagement/agreement on technical issues, but this is divorced from kinetic reality.)
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
The observed RF focus on eliminating UAF enabling assets confirms the preceding prediction (211000Z NOV 25). The RF priority is suppressing UAF counter-fire capability to facilitate a deep ground push.
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (211200Z NOV 25 - 220000Z NOV 25)
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Continued Suppression and Mechanized Advance)
Sustained Lancet/ZALA Attrition (Pokrovsk and Adjacent Axes): RF will maintain high tempo deployment of loitering munitions and ISTAR drones against UAF C2, logistics caches, and known fire positions along the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka line. The primary tactical goal is the elimination of 155mm artillery batteries currently suppressing the 40th/155th OMBR advance.
SpN Interdiction: The imminent SpN threat against the GLOC near Kostiantynivka (from the 181900Z NOV 25 report) will likely materialize within this timeframe, possibly coinciding with an RF ground assault spike to maximize confusion and prevent UAF reserve commitment.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Paralysis via C2 Decapitation)
RF successfully targets and destroys a UAF Operational Command (OC) C2 node (3rd/4th echelon), leveraging the confirmed precision targeting capability of ZALA/Iskander OC. This simultaneous C2 loss and SpN interdiction would allow the 40th/155th OMBR to achieve a controlled operational breakthrough (>5km penetration) with minimal coordinated UAF response.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-4 Hours
GLOC Integrity Test: J3 must confirm that SpN interdiction (MLCOA 2) has been defeated or sufficiently contained to ensure continuous flow of the 'Red Flag' convoy.
SpN elements detected and neutralized, road closure duration <1 hour.
4-8 Hours
Frontline Attrition Threshold: UAF must confirm the attrition rate inflicted on the 40th/155th OMBR is higher than the rate of loss of UAF HVA (Artillery/Radar).
Confirmed loss of >8 RF armor/mechanized assets (BMP/T-series) versus <1 UAF artillery piece lost.
12 Hours
Operational C2 Survivability: J2/J7 must confirm that critical UAF C2 nodes have relocated or successfully weathered the Lancet/ISTAR surge via EW countermeasures.
Reduction in observed ZALA activity or degradation of video quality in RF media reports.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - ISTAR CYCLE
Lancet/ZALA Targeting Methodology (Real-time): Determine if RF is using pattern-of-life (POL) analysis for C2/HVA, or dynamic tip-and-cue from forward SpN/ISTAR elements.
ELINT/SIGINT: Increase collection on suspected RF forward reconnaissance drone frequencies and attempt triangulation/geo-location of ZALA ground control stations (GCS) in the 5-10km depth.
LOW
HIGH - NORTHERN AIR BASES
Nature of Rising AB Activity (Monchegorsk/Pskov): Clarify if SAR scores (181900Z NOV 25) indicate strategic bomber staging or logistical movement for personnel rotation/conventional assets.
IMINT: Prioritize high-resolution SAR or commercial satellite imagery over Monchegorsk and Pskov to identify specific aircraft types/number and cargo volume.
LOW
HIGH - RF Ground OOB
40th OMBR Integration Status: Determine if the 40th OMBR is operating independently or under integrated C2 with the 155th OMBR, indicating scope of commitment.
ISR Tasking (Tactical/Maneuver): Prioritize SIGINT/COMINT collection between the 40th and 155th axis for C2 linkage identification.
Action: Assign dedicated, highly mobile C-UAS/EW platforms (e.g., electronic suppression vehicles) to continuously escort and screen priority HVA (Artillery/Radar systems) within 5km of the line of contact. This must be the primary defense against the confirmed Lancet precision threat.
Rationale: Fixed positions are non-viable. High mobility and constant electronic screening are essential to defeat the RF ISTAR/Lancet cycle targeting the P-18 replacements and counter-battery assets.
J3 (Maneuver) / SOF Commanders: Reorient FPV/Interceptor Drone Assets to "Counter-Reconnaissance" (URGENT - Continuous).
Action: Direct FPV and interceptor drone units (like the 'Wild Hornets') to prioritize active hunting and neutralization of RF ISTAR drones (ZALA, Orlan) over FPV strikes on minor ground targets.
Rationale: Degrading ZALA's reconnaissance and objective control capability directly limits the effectiveness of high-value RF strikes (Iskander, Lancet) against UAF deep assets, supporting the MLCOA degradation.
Action: Ensure all critical forward C2 nodes operate solely on independent power generation (generators, batteries) with fuel reserves sufficient for a 48-hour power grid collapse scenario, mitigating the effect of persistent RF infrastructure strikes.
Rationale: The confirmed strain on the power grid (6-hour outages) presents a strategic vulnerability. Decentralized, independent power for C2 is necessary to ensure continuity of command during the MLCOA/MDCOA window.
