TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS
DTG: 211000Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 210800Z NOV 25 – 211000Z NOV 25 (Mid-Morning Update)
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH. The RF mechanized assault on the Pokrovsk axis remains the decisive operational event. New intelligence confirms continued RF focus on drone superiority and highlights persistent production capacity, which sustains the current attrition model.
Pokrovsk Axis / Kostiantynivka Corridor: RF mechanized assault by 40th and 155th OMBR is ongoing. Penetration depth is the critical measure of success for both sides (See Section 5.3). The sole GLOC remains kinetically threatened by combined RF maneuver and integrated drone/artillery support.
Deep Rear Areas (Logistics/Industrial): RF continues to demonstrate robust UAV development and procurement (ZALA reports 185 complexes being supplied to a leading RF operator). This confirms the long-term sustainability of the RF drone threat, particularly the Lancet/ZALA family, across all sectors (Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Krasnoarmiysk).
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Daylight conditions (Post-0600Z) favor high-resolution ISTAR, utilized heavily by RF's integrated drone assets (ZALA, SOMALI FPV). Conditions support continuous aerial reconnaissance and target acquisition for loitering munitions, increasing the risk to UAF fire support and C2 nodes.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Forces (Ground):40th/155th OMBR maintaining offensive pressure. Tactical C2 appears resilient, successfully coordinating two major formations.
RF Forces (Air/Drone):ZALA/Lancet systems confirmed active across multiple axes (Krasnoarmiysk, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia), targeting high-value UAF assets (Artillery, P-18 Radars). This widespread deployment confirms that the operational priority is the elimination of UAF deep fire support and air defense capability.
UAF Forces: Active defense posture focused on maximizing attrition against RF armor and anti-armor munitions delivery from the "Red Flag" convoy.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Loitering Munition Superiority: RF has demonstrated the operational procedure and technical capacity for mass deployment and precise application of Lancet/ZALA systems against high-value targets (Artillery, Radar). RF claims 4,000 uses of Lancet (17 NOV report), indicating vast operational experience and target identification efficiency. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Sustained Drone Production: ZALA's announcement of a large delivery (185 complexes) confirms that Western sanctions and UAF deep strikes have not critically degraded RF's ability to produce and deploy advanced strike drones. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - based on supplier reports)
Hybrid Recruitment for Production: Investigations into RF recruitment of foreign personnel for drone production (Alabuga) suggest a persistent effort to mitigate domestic labor shortages and maintain critical supply chain capacity. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - IO/OSINT reporting)
Intentions:
Decapitation and Attrition: RF intention is to paralyze UAF tactical fire support and air defense (ADS) assets across the front line using loitering munitions while the ground assault (40th/155th OMBR) seeks breakthrough. The goal is to eliminate UAF capacity to organize coordinated counter-attacks.
Maintaining Operational Tempo: The rapid acquisition of new drone systems indicates intent to maintain or increase the current high operational tempo of offensive operations through enhanced ISTAR/Strike capabilities.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
RF: Increased public reporting (via ZALA/other channels) showcasing successful Lancet strikes against specific high-value UAF assets (P-18 radar on Sumy axis, artillery in Zaporizhzhia). This suggests a deliberate effort to emphasize the drone strike capability as the centerpiece of the current offensive.
UAF: Ukrainian units, including the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade, are actively acquiring and deploying FPV drones (Spilnota Sternenka Fund report). This indicates a rapid tactical adaptation to counter RF drone dominance with local, responsive FPV capabilities.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF Logistics (Strategic): HIGHLY RESILIENT in the drone/loitering munition sector, confirmed by production reports. This ensures a persistent, high-attrition threat.
RF Logistics (Tactical): Focus remains on agile, localized supply for the ground units (motorcycles), allowing the 40th/155th OMBR to sustain the initial assault kinetics regardless of immediate UAF deep fire success.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 is demonstrating effective, multi-domain synchronization, coordinating the Pokrovsk ground maneuver with long-range ZALA/Lancet deployment across other active axes (Krasnoarmiysk confirmed). This disperses UAF defensive efforts and maximizes confusion.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Posture: Executing integrated defense, utilizing tactical FPV systems to respond to RF pressure.
Readiness: Overall readiness is maintained, supported by continuous morale efforts (Veteran games, unit morale videos) and crucial private/charitable resupply (FPV drones confirmed delivered to 110th Brigade). Readiness is critically leveraged against the survival of the 'Red Flag' convoy.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Successes: Successful private sector/charity acquisition of FPV drones for frontline units (110th Brigade). This directly addresses the RF FPV/drone threat by increasing UAF localized counter-strike capacity.
Setbacks: The RF focus on high-value asset elimination (Radar/Artillery) suggests previous UAF counter-battery and ADS positions have been successfully fixed and attrited.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
Constraints: High consumption of anti-armor and counter-battery munitions due to the active RF mechanized assault.
Requirements: Immediate requirement to integrate the newly acquired FPV assets (110th Brigade) into the current defensive plan to target RF high-value fire support vehicles and C2 nodes supporting the 40th/155th OMBR thrust.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF IO (Technical/Industrial): ZALA's reports on production and operational success (4,000 uses, 185 complexes delivered) are intended to project an image of technical and industrial dominance, suggesting the RF war machine is unstoppable by attrition.
UAF IO (Morale/Support): Media reports highlighting veterans' successes (World Abilitysport Beach Games) and public acknowledgment of private drone funding (Spilnota Sternenka) are crucial for maintaining domestic support and morale, emphasizing resilience and community contribution to the war effort.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
UAF domestic morale remains focused on community support and tactical resilience, leveraging humor and recognition of individual unit efforts (110th Brigade video).
RF internal morale is reinforced by visual confirmation of technological superiority and effective strikes against UAF targets across multiple axes.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
The international marketing of RF drone technology (Dubai Airshow 2025) serves the long-term strategic goal of securing export revenue and validating RF military industrial complex, despite sanctions.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
The core MLCOA (Sustained Mechanized Attack) remains active. The next 12 hours will be dominated by the struggle for air superiority (UAS/C-UAS) directly over the penetration corridor.
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (211000Z NOV 25 - 212200Z NOV 25)
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Deep Attrition and Fire Suppression)
Maximum Drone Effort on GLOC Proxies: RF forces will allocate the maximum available FPV, loitering munitions (ZALA/Lancet), and short-range artillery fire (SOMALI/D-30s) against UAF high-value targets (C2, Fire Support, Anti-Armor Teams) along the Kostiantynivka corridor and 2-3km forward of the penetration. The goal is to suppress UAF reaction forces and prevent organized counter-fire on the 40th/155th OMBR.
Exploitation of Penetration: If the penetration exceeds 1.5 km, RF maneuver forces will commit flanking elements (possibly motorcycle logistics teams acting as pathfinders/security) to bypass known UAF strongpoints and secure secondary fire positions for indirect assets.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Paralysis)
Logistical Collapse and Strategic Strike Combination: Unchanged. The only addition is the high probability that the strategic strike against secondary UAF logistical hubs will heavily feature Lancet/ZALA systems if the RF Air Force refrains from committing manned aircraft, leveraging the confirmed production pipeline.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-2 Hours
RF C2/FPV Network Degraded: J3 must confirm significant degradation in RF drone/C2 effectiveness due to Recommendation 2 execution (EW/C-UAS saturation).
Observed loss of synchronization between RF armor movement and targeted fire support (e.g., armor halts without immediate artillery cover).
2-6 Hours
Counter-Attack Initiation: If the penetration is held to <1.5km (Decision Point 1 met), UAF must initiate a limited, rapid counter-attack utilizing fresh anti-armor munitions (from 'Red Flag') and local FPV assets to eliminate RF lead elements.
Sustained RF attrition rate of >1:3 (UAF:RF) in favor of UAF, allowing localized tactical advantage.
12 Hours
Reserve Commitment - Strategic: If the 'Red Flag' convoy fails to deliver the minimum required supply volume and the penetration exceeds 2km, C2 must begin preparation to commit operational strategic reserves to stabilize the front line.
J4 confirmation that less than 50% of critical anti-armor/155mm ammunition has reached forward bases, coupled with confirmed penetration.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - THREAT VECTORS
SpN Interdiction Force Status/Shifted Mission: Still no definitive confirmation on the SpN mission profile after the MLCOA launch. Are they targeting deep C2/fire support?
SOF/ISR: Prioritize low-altitude UAS/FPV reconnaissance in depth (3-15km) to identify non-mechanized RF staging areas and C2/OP positions near the assault axis. Focus: Known UAF Artillery/Radar positions.
LOW
CRITICAL - AIR THREAT
Northern Air Base Activity Characterization: Determine the specific nature of the rising SAR scores at Monchegorsk/Pskov.
SIGINT/ELINT/IMINT: Renew prioritization of collection on heavy bomber C2 networks and SAR imagery. (UNCHANGED)
LOW
HIGH - RF Ground OOB
40th OMBR Effectiveness/Attrition: Real-time assessment of the 40th OMBR's current attrition rate and commitment level.
ISR Tasking (Tactical/Maneuver): Maintain continuous UAS coverage on the Pokrovsk axis forward areas, specifically cross-referencing SOMALI strike videos to assess accuracy and target identification.
Action: Immediately deploy the newly acquired FPV drone assets (e.g., 110th Brigade) against identified RF C2 and high-value integrated fire support assets (Artillery/EW/Mortar positions), rather than solely against frontal armor.
Rationale: Leveraging FPV systems for C2/fire asset decapitation disrupts the complex synchronization required for the 40th/155th OMBR assault, degrading the MLCOA 1 tempo.
Action: Initiate high-speed, intermittent relocation of all remaining priority ADS/Radar systems (including mobile P-18 replacements and counter-battery radars) from established positions to mitigate the confirmed RF targeting capability (Lancet).
Rationale: The persistent and precise threat from Lancet systems (confirmed targets in Sumy, Zaporizhzhia) requires a high-mobility, shoot-and-scoot doctrine for all critical deep-strike enabling assets to prevent MDCOA component success.
Action: Establish a dedicated logistical path for commercial components (FPV batteries, parts, C-UAS jamming equipment) and expedite procurement/delivery, recognizing that localized drone superiority is becoming the primary defensive multiplier against the MLCOA.
Rationale: RF confirmed high-volume drone production. UAF must rapidly scale up its local drone production/acquisition to maintain parity.
