TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS
DTG: 210800Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 210600Z NOV 25 – 210800Z NOV 25 (Post-Dawn Update)
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH. The predicted pre-dawn RF mechanized assault (MLCOA 1) is now active, confirming the critical phase of the Pokrovsk offensive has begun. Intelligence derived from RF social media confirms that the 'SOMALI' battalion is playing a key role in drone/attrition fires on the axis.
Pokrovsk Axis / Kostiantynivka Corridor (GLOC): Status remains CRITICAL. The predicted window for the Spetsnaz (SpN) interdiction (201800Z-210300Z NOV 25) passed without confirmed success, allowing UAF to initiate some emergency resupply operations. However, the synchronized mechanized assault by the 40th OMBR and 155th OMBR has begun (Initiation confirmed by indirect fire build-up and localized penetration reports from 210600Z).
Dnipropetrovsk Region: UAF Air Force confirms the destruction of two (2) RF unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the Dnipropetrovsk region on 18 NOV, indicating continued RF reconnaissance and strike activity aimed at fixing southern reserves and targeting critical infrastructure.
Pokrovsk Front: Imagery from the RF 'SOMALI' battalion confirms sustained FPV drone and artillery strikes against UAF fortifications and personnel in the Pokrovsk direction over the last eight days (12 NOV – 17 NOV footage).
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
The shift to daylight (post-0600Z) is currently facilitating mechanized movement and improving RF ISTAR capabilities (manned/UAS), thereby supporting the current MLCOA. Visibility favors both the advancing RF armored columns and UAF anti-armor fires.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Forces (Ground):40th and 155th OMBR are engaged in the synchronized mechanized assault on the Pokrovsk axis. The 'SOMALI' battalion is confirmed to be providing integrated fire support, utilizing FPV and larger UAV platforms for reconnaissance and attrition strikes against UAF trenches and bunkers. This confirms RF is integrating irregular/separatist units with conventional maneuver forces.
UAF Forces: Active defense posture. The immediate tactical focus is on suppressing the initial mechanized thrust and preventing localized breakthroughs exceeding the 1-km threshold.
Control Measures: Execution of Actionable Recommendation 2 (Critical Supply Push) is underway, but is now operating under direct kinetic threat from the RF assault.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Mechanized Assault Superiority: RF has successfully massed the 40th and 155th OMBR, indicating a high-confidence intent to break the linear defense and exploit logistical vulnerabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Integrated ISTAR/Strike: RF forces, particularly the 'SOMALI' element, demonstrate effective, sustained use of FPV/UAS for both attrition and reconnaissance prior to and during the assault, ensuring high target accuracy against UAF fixed positions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - based on confirmed RF video messages)
Hybrid Logistics: RF logistics remains resilient, characterized by the use of agile, non-conventional platforms (motorcycles) to rapidly resupply frontline units, mitigating the impact of UAF counter-logistics.
Intentions:
Immediate Operational Breakthrough: RF primary intent is to secure a rapid operational breakthrough on the Pokrovsk axis before UAF can fully commit reserves or reinforce ammunition stocks.
Logistical Interdiction (Shifted): The SpN element (CRITICAL GAP) is assumed to have shifted its mission profile to support the ongoing daylight mechanized advance, possibly via targeting UAF C2 nodes or high-value fire support vehicles rather than solely road interdiction.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
RF: High-volume integration of FPV drone strikes in the Pokrovsk area (13 NOV - 17 NOV confirmed video), coupled with aggressive claims of destroying UAF strongpoints and successful penetration attempts. This confirms FPV is now a core enabler for the main RF effort, not just a supporting function.
UAF: Successful kinetic interdiction of two RF UAVs in the Dnipropetrovsk region on 18 NOV confirms effective local counter-UAS operations, maintaining the security of key rear areas.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF Logistics: Strong emphasis on localized, agile logistics (SOMALI motorcycle units confirmed active 06 NOV). This enables sustainment of the immediate mechanized attack regardless of whether the strategic rail line is severed or the GLOC is interdicted.
UAF Logistics (CRITICAL): The initiated Red Flag convoy (Recommendation 2) must survive the RF assault window (next 12 hours) to prevent rapid ammunition starvation at the front. Vulnerability remains maximized.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 has successfully synchronized the commitment of two major Marine Brigades (40th/155th OMBR) with supporting irregular units (SOMALI), suggesting high confidence in their ability to manage a complex, multi-unit offensive operation.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Posture: Executing a kinetic, active defense to absorb the weight of the RF mechanized assault.
Readiness: HIGH. Morale is sustained by operational successes in other sectors (Dnipropetrovsk UAS defense) and demonstrated capacity for attrition warfare (Azov NGU reports). However, force readiness is critically dependent on successful execution of the 'Red Flag' resupply.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Successes: Confirmed attrition of RF reconnaissance assets (2 UAVs downed in Dnipropetrovsk). Successfully weathered the predicted high-threat SpN night window without GLOC closure.
Setbacks: RF mechanized forces are now actively engaged, initiating the highest-risk phase of the operation.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
Constraints: The immediate engagement of the RF mechanized forces places severe pressure on UAF anti-armor and counter-battery stockpiles, magnifying the GLOC vulnerability.
Requirements: Immediate requirement for fire mission approval flexibility and the rapid deployment of the newly arriving high-value anti-armor munitions from the 'Red Flag' convoy to engaged units.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF IO (Tactical): The 'SOMALI' battalion is conducting a high-volume, continuous information campaign documenting alleged UAF losses and successful strikes near Pokrovsk (12 NOV - 17 NOV). This serves dual purposes: (1) internal morale booster (2) external narrative control regarding the success of the current offensive.
RF IO (Strategic/Historical): TASS disseminated documents regarding the 1953 arrest of alleged US agents and Nazi collaborators in the Ukrainian SSR. This is a clear, continuous strategic IO effort to conflate modern UAF leadership/Western support with historical Nazism/foreign interference.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
RF domestic morale is being reinforced through content showcasing units receiving family support (SOMALI greetings) and highlighting unit professionalism (combat sports events, training, effective drone strikes).
UAF morale is reinforced by confirmed defense successes (Dnipropetrovsk ADS) but requires immediate positive reporting on the anti-armor efforts against the current mechanized assault.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
The RF propaganda effort targeting historical events and claiming Ukrainian 'looters' (Kotsnews 18 NOV) seeks to undermine Western support by suggesting UAF forces are politically and morally compromised.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
The current MLCOA (Mechanized Assault) is active and confirmed. The immediate 12-hour window will determine the success or failure of the RF initial thrust.
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (210800Z NOV 25 - 212000Z NOV 25)
Sustained Mechanized Attack & Deep Attrition: The 40th and 155th OMBR will sustain high-intensity frontal assaults, utilizing integrated FPV/artillery support (SOMALI confirmed as a key enabler). The primary objective is to achieve a penetration depth of 2-3 km, leveraging speed and volume to overwhelm UAF frontline logistics points and fire control nodes.
C2 Interdiction (SpN Shift): The previously anticipated SpN element will likely transition to targeting UAF local tactical C2 nodes or key observation posts (OPs) rather than the GLOC itself, seeking to blind and disrupt UAF fire control during the critical counter-attack phase.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Paralysis)
Logistical Collapse and Strategic Strike Combination (Unchanged): A successful, localized RF penetration (3-5km) compels a rapid UAF withdrawal while the rising SAR activity at AB Monchegorsk/Pskov culminates in a targeted air campaign (ASMs/ALCMs) against secondary UAF logistical hubs (e.g., secondary railheads, large fuel depots) within 150km of the front. This synchronized effort creates a crisis requiring a multi-axis operational retreat.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-4 Hours
Penetration Depth Assessment: J3/Maneuver must confirm if the initial RF assault is being held at the forward line or if penetrations exceed 1.5 km.
Confirmed RF mechanized elements bypass two layers of prepared defense (pre-trench & primary trench line).
4-8 Hours
Reserve Commitment - Tactical: If penetration exceeds 2km, C2 must commit immediate tactical reserves to prevent the RF 40th/155th OMBR from reaching fire support positions.
Sustained RF armor movement past pre-identified holding zones, coupled with significant UAF anti-armor asset losses (>5 AFVs/launch platforms).
12 Hours
GLOC Daylight Security Review: If the "Red Flag" convoy is confirmed successfully passed and offloaded, shift security priorities to supporting counter-attack/flanking forces.
Confirmation (J4/ISR) of 90% essential munitions offloaded to forward operating bases.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - THREAT VECTORS
SpN Interdiction Force Status/Shifted Mission: Determine the precise operational shift of the SpN elements (e.g., C2 targeting, flank ambush, or delayed GLOC attempt).
SOF/ISR: Prioritize low-altitude UAS/FPV reconnaissance in depth (3-15km) to identify non-mechanized RF staging areas and C2/OP positions near the assault axis.
LOW
CRITICAL - AIR THREAT
Northern Air Base Activity Characterization: Determine the specific nature of the rising SAR scores at Monchegorsk/Pskov (strike package vs. cargo/training) to mitigate MDCOA risk.
SIGINT/ELINT/IMINT: Renew prioritization of collection on heavy bomber C2 networks and SAR imagery. (UNCHANGED)
LOW
HIGH - RF Ground OOB
40th OMBR Effectiveness/Integration: Real-time assessment of the 40th OMBR’s operational tempo, attrition rate, and tactical integration with the 155th OMBR.
ISR Tasking (Tactical/Maneuver): Maintain continuous UAS coverage on the Pokrovsk axis forward areas to map RF concentration points and movement patterns.
MEDIUM
HIGH - LOGISTICS (PERSISTENT)
Kamyan’ske Rail BDA/ETR: Definitive engineering assessment of the rail infrastructure damage and time-to-repair.
Engineering Tasking (J4/J7): Renew Red-Line request for structural integrity and time-to-repair report. (UNCHANGED)
Action: Execute immediate, high-volume indirect fire missions (Artillery/MLRS) against confirmed RF armor concentration points identified in the initial assault (MLCOA 1). Prioritize striking the 40th OMBR/155th OMBR synchronization points.
Rationale: The synchronized assault must be met with maximum force to break the tempo and cohesion of the attack before RF can consolidate any initial penetration.
Action: If the initial penetration exceeds 2km (Decision Point 2), prepare to immediately initiate Alternative Logistics Route 2 (ALR-2), despite its lower capacity, and begin staging fire support units for a coordinated defense of the secondary axis.
Rationale: Proactive preparation for operational retreat or sustained defense requires ensuring logistics readiness for multiple lines of effort, mitigating the MDCOA threat of full GLOC paralysis.
