TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS
DTG: 210600Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 201800Z NOV 25 – 210600Z NOV 25 (Night Cycle Update)
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM. The critical RF MLCOA window (SpN interdiction) has elapsed without confirmation of a paralyzing kinetic strike, but the high-threat RF mechanized commitment (40th OMBR) remains active. New UAF drone data confirms high attrition rates on the enemy.
Pokrovsk Axis / Kostiantynivka Corridor (GLOC): Status remains CRITICAL. No confirmed, successful RF Spetsnaz (SpN) interdiction of the road network during the predicted peak window (201800Z-210300Z NOV 25). However, the threat remains HIGH as the newly committed 40th OMBR prepares for the mechanized assault phase (predicted pre-dawn).
Donbas Front Line (General): UAF units (specifically NGU Korpus Azov) continue to execute successful FPV/drone attrition strikes against RF fortifications and logistics in the operational area (Confirmed by 03 NOV FPV footage showing strikes on trenches/vehicles).
Logistics & Rear Areas (DPR Occupied): Confirmed power outages affecting approximately 500,000 personnel in occupied DPR territories (ASTRA, 181936Z). This degrades RF operational infrastructure and C2 support capability in the immediate rear, despite potential IO implications.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
The low-visibility window (night) has passed without major RF kinetic success on the GLOC. The transition to dawn (approx. 210600Z) favors mechanized movement, potentially triggering the predicted pre-dawn RF breakthrough attempt.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Forces (Ground): The 40th Separate Marine Brigade (OMBR) and the 155th OMBR remain positioned to execute a synchronized mechanized assault on the Pokrovsk axis. 'SOMALI' battalion is confirmed operating robust, agile logistics (motorcycles, off-road) in heavy terrain, mitigating some effects of UAF counter-logistics operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - SOMALI 180901Z)
UAF Forces: Maintaining an active defense posture, utilizing advanced ISTAR/drone systems to sustain attrition on RF positions (Azov FPV footage, Oct/Nov). UAF focus remains on modernization, NCO corps professionalization, and high-tech deployment (GRC/SHARK Robotics) in various sectors (Kharkiv, Kherson, Donbas).
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
High-Tempo Attrition (Pokrovsk): The combined force of 40th and 155th OMBR is a significant conventional threat, capable of achieving localized superiority, particularly if UAF supplies falter. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Agile Tactical Logistics: RF units utilize decentralized, hybrid logistics (e.g., SOMALI motorcycles for forward delivery) to bypass conventional route denial and maintain frontline resupply in difficult terrain. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - SOMALI 180901Z)
IO / Geopolitical Leverage (CSTO): RF leverages organizations like the CSTO (confirmed recent meetings on counter-narcotics, cyber threats, and military-economic cooperation - ODKB messages, Nov) to reinforce the perception of institutional depth and diplomatic support among allied nations, despite limited direct troop commitment to Ukraine.
Intentions:
Immediate Breakthrough: RF intent remains the synchronized breakthrough on the Pokrovsk axis, using mechanized forces (40th/155th OMBR), immediately following the expected logistical disruption. The absence of a confirmed SpN strike suggests the attack timing may shift slightly or rely on existing forward ammunition caches.
Fix and Isolate: Continued efforts to fix UAF northern reserves (Sumy UAV activity, previous report) and maintain pressure on other sectors (Oskil River area, documented by UAF reports) to prevent reinforcement of the Pokrovsk GLOC.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
RF: Increased visibility of drone effectiveness against UAF fortifications in the Pokrovsk direction (SOMALI 171701Z). This signals an increase in the integration of drone warfare in the Donbas main axis, matching or exceeding UAF FPV capabilities in specific sectors.
UAF: Strong emphasis on civil defense, demining, and essential service resilience (Odesa, Kherson, Kharkiv operational centers - Oct/Nov NGU reports), indicating a focus on maintaining critical national infrastructure resilience against expected RF strikes.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF Logistics (Hybrid): Resilient, utilizing both formal supply chains and robust, agile local/hybrid support (motorcycles, civilian sourcing).
UAF Logistics (CRITICAL): Unchanged. Full operational reliance on the Kostiantynivka GLOC. The window for pre-emptive emergency resupply (Recommendation 2 from previous SITREP) is closing rapidly.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 is demonstrating a commitment to large-scale, synchronized maneuver operations (Pokrovsk Axis reinforcement), suggesting confidence in controlling a complex combined-arms effort.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Posture: Active defense and counter-attrition. The consistent success of NGU units (Azov, Kara-Dag) in eliminating RF armor, logistics, and personnel (Oct/Nov FPV footage) demonstrates high operational tempo and technical superiority in the tactical ISTAR domain.
Readiness: HIGH. Morale is actively supported by public recognition of NCO corps, combat successes, and visible governmental commitment to frontline regions.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Successes:
Confirmed elimination of enemy water-crossing attempts (Oskil River) and logistics trucks (Kara-Dag, 03/20 OCT).
Successful pre-positioning and demonstration of advanced disaster/rescue robotics (SHARK, Magirus trucks) in frontline regions (Kherson, Odesa).
Setbacks: The operational threat level on the GLOC remains maximized due to the lack of confirmed, successful engagement/elimination of the SpN interdiction force, suggesting they may have aborted the attack or are repositioning for a daylight strike.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
Constraints: Persistent GLOC vulnerability. Lack of definitive rail BDA (Kamyan’ske) continues to restrict strategic maneuver options.
Requirements: Critical need for high-resolution ISR confirmation (SOF/UAS) on whether the SpN threat has been mitigated or merely delayed.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF IO: Focus on demonstrating operational resilience (SOMALI agile logistics) and claiming tactical success (SOMALI drone footage Pokrovsk). At the strategic level, RF uses CSTO meetings to project stability and multilateral support, attempting to counter Western narratives of RF international isolation.
UAF IO: Continued emphasis on operational professionalism and resilience. Messaging links military service to post-war careers and showcases high-tech equipment (GRC, SHARK) to maintain domestic confidence and Western support for modernization.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
UAF domestic morale is bolstered by governmental focus on civil defense and infrastructure protection (Kherson, Odesa). RF internal morale is structurally supported by the decentralized logistics network, as shown by the SOMALI activity.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
RF messaging continues to utilize CSTO (Cyber, Military-Economic Cooperation) to subtly shift the narrative from a failing bilateral war to a multilateral security competition.
The continued referencing of US political figures (Trump/Putin commentary, 181937Z) indicates ongoing RF attempts to influence Western public opinion regarding the longevity and efficacy of the conflict.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
The previous MLCOA (Night Interdiction) failed to produce a confirmed kinetic event on the GLOC. This increases the probability of a shift in the RF timeline, potentially prioritizing the pre-dawn mechanized attack, or shifting the SpN operation to a more exposed, daylight ambush window.
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (210600Z NOV 25 - 211800Z NOV 25)
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Mechanized Assault)
Immediate Pre-Dawn Breakthrough Attempt (Synchronized): The 40th and 155th OMBR will commence a heavy preparatory fire phase (Artillery/MLRS) at 210400Z NOV 25 - 210700Z NOV 25, immediately followed by synchronized mechanized assaults along the Pokrovsk axis. RF C2 will attempt to leverage the absence of a confirmed logistical interdiction by assuming existing forward supplies are adequate for the initial push.
Repositioned SpN Interdiction: The SpN element will adapt to the failure of the night attack and reposition for a high-risk, quick strike (vehicle-borne IED or direct fire) against a high-value convoy, leveraging the increased ground traffic during daylight hours (210800Z-211200Z NOV 25).
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Paralysis)
Logistical Collapse and Strategic Strike Combination (Unchanged): A successful SpN closure of the Kostiantynivka GLOC (lasting $>12$ hours) coincides with the simultaneous breakthrough of RF mechanized forces on the Pokrovsk axis. The rising SAR activity at AB Monchegorsk/Pskov (CRITICAL GAP) culminates in a targeted air campaign using cruise missiles (ASMs/ALCMs) against secondary UAF logistical hubs and high-value ADS nodes, forcing an operational withdrawal.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-2 Hours
Frontline Attrition Threshold: J3/Maneuver must confirm if initial RF mechanized attack (MLCOA 1) is being held by attrition fires or if penetration exceeds 1km.
Confirmed RF mechanized elements breach primary trench lines in force, or UAF heavy equipment losses exceed 5 AFVs.
2-6 Hours
GLOC Daylight Security: C2 must decide on force multiplication (e.g., CAS or additional drone support) for daytime convoy protection if SpN threats are confirmed active but repositioned.
Confirmed positive kinetic identification of SpN elements or IED detection/detonation on the GLOC after 210600Z NOV 25.
12 Hours
GLOC Status/Reserve Commitment: If the road is compromised and RF penetration exceeds 3km, J3 must commit operational reserves to prevent secondary line collapse.
Sustained disruption of logistics traffic on the Kostiantynivka GLOC, combined with RF depth of penetration >3km.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - LOGISTICS (PERSISTENT)
Kamyan’ske Rail BDA/ETR: Definitive engineering assessment of the rail infrastructure damage and time-to-repair.
Engineering Tasking (J4/J7): Renew Red-Line request for structural integrity and time-to-repair report.
LOW
CRITICAL - THREAT VECTORS
SpN Interdiction Force Status/Repositioning: Determine the status, whether the element was recalled, eliminated, or has repositioned for a daylight attack.
SOF/ISR: Immediate analysis of overnight thermal/IR data. Prioritize low-altitude UAS/FPV reconnaissance along the Kostiantynivka corridor approach routes (210600Z - 211000Z NOV 25).
LOW
HIGH - STRATEGIC AIR
Northern Air Base Activity Characterization: Determine the specific nature of the rising SAR scores at Monchegorsk/Pskov (strike package vs. cargo/training) to mitigate MDCOA risk.
SIGINT/ELINT/IMINT: Prioritize collection on heavy bomber C2 networks and obtain updated SAR imagery capable of distinguishing ordnance staging/loading.
LOW
HIGH - RF Ground OOB
40th OMBR Integration/Objectives: Precise OOB, operational objectives, and integration level with 155th OMBR (e.g., is 40th the main effort or flanking force?).
ISR Tasking (Tactical/Maneuver): Increase UAS/Manned ISR density on the Pokrovsk axis forward areas to map RF concentration points and movement patterns.
Action: Maintain Hunter-Killer status (Operation VIPER HUNT) for all GLOC security elements, but shift focus to vehicle-borne threats and daylight staging areas (tree lines, built-up areas 5-10km off the road). Utilize daylight ISR (UAS/Manned) immediately to sweep suspected SpN repositioning areas.
Rationale: The threat did not materialize at night but remains active. A shift in the RF plan may utilize daylight to execute a rapid-strike interdiction, requiring a change in security focus from thermal detection to visual/kinetic interdiction of moving vehicles or personnel.
J4 (Logistics): Critical Supply Push (IMMEDIATE - 210700Z NOV 25).
Action: Initiate a protected "Red Flag" convoy push (highest priority) carrying 155mm and anti-armor munitions to forward defensive positions now, capitalizing on the period immediately following the failure of the predicted night SpN attack and before a potential daylight strike.
Rationale: The MLCOA of a major mechanized assault is imminent. Buffering frontline ammunition stocks is the highest tactical priority to ensure forces can absorb the initial RF kinetic thrust.
Action: Place all forward anti-armor assets (ATGM, main battle tank units, indirect fire) on Maximum Readiness (Weapon Tight) status for the anticipated pre-dawn/dawn mechanized attack (MLCOA 1). Prioritize fire mission approval for massed RF armor formations.
Rationale: Maximize responsiveness to the impending, high-volume mechanized attack by the reinforced RF group.
