Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 191000Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 180700Z NOV 25 – 191000Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The synchronization of the RF conventional breakthrough effort with the critical SpN GLOC interdiction threat remains the defining operational factor. New messages reinforce UAF tactical efficiency and persistent RF IO efforts focused on internal cohesion and external disruption.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (FEBA): RF force concentration, including the 40th Separate Marine Brigade (OMBR) and 155th OMBR, dictates that this sector remains the primary axis of effort. The operational environment is optimized for high-intensity, combined-arms operations.
• Kostiantynivka Corridor (GLOC): The critical logistical vulnerability remains unsecured. The expected kinetic action by RF Spetsnaz (SpN) during the previous low-visibility window (190700Z) did not materialize, suggesting either postponement, detection/withdrawal, or a change in infiltration route. The threat window has now shifted to the next period of low visibility.
• Northern/Siversk Direction: Confirmed UAF counter-reconnaissance and kinetic engagements by the 90th Separate Air Assault Brigade (OAeMB) 'ONIX' continue to suppress RF attempts to advance or fix UAF reserves in the Siversk region.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Current conditions favor defensive ISR capabilities (thermal/daylight). The imminent transition to the next low-light window (approx. 191900Z NOV 25) will again favor RF SpN infiltration and rapid tactical movement.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces (Ground): Forces are believed to be staging for the synchronized assault (40th/155th OMBR). RF IO highlights the deployment of specific ethnic/regional forces (e.g., Chechen-affiliated units) through highly formulaic praise for leadership (Message: Rayana, BAUDDIN), indicating reliance on specific, potentially higher-readiness formations to spearhead the attack.
• UAF Forces: Deep strike and precision targeting capacity remains high, demonstrated by multiple successful FPV drone strikes by 90th OAeMB 'ONIX' against concealed personnel, bunkers, and equipment (Messages: 10, 13, 17, 26, 30, 31). This confirms UAF proficiency in adapting drone-based ISR-strike cycles for localized attrition.
• Control Measures: Operation IRON CLAW (GLOC security) must be assumed to be compromised or at high risk due to the confirmed persistence of the SpN threat.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Sustained Attritional Targeting: RF forces can maintain a high rate of FPV/loitering munition attacks against UAF targets, exploiting concealment weaknesses, as evidenced by successful drone strikes on bunkers and personnel taking cover (Message: 10).
2. Sophisticated Strategic IO: RF is executing a two-pronged IO strategy: reinforcing internal cohesion (Chechen leadership praise) and preparing external friction points (Polish sabotage claims, anti-Western debt narrative) to complicate UAF logistics and international support.
3. Counter-UAS (Implied): The deployment of advanced Western AD systems (Skyranger 35, reported delivery next week) is a direct counter to RF UAS dominance, confirming RF necessity to adapt tactics or increase jamming capabilities immediately.

Intentions:

1. Achieve Breakthrough via Logistical Strangulation: The primary intent is to temporarily or permanently sever the Kostiantynivka GLOC to paralyze the Pokrovsk defense, enabling the synchronized breakthrough assault by the 40th/155th OMBR.
2. Degrade Strategic Morale: RF IO seeks to undermine UAF statehood and international support by focusing on alleged corruption (NABU leaks - Censor.NET) and creating internal dissatisfaction ("Украина долго в долгу перед Западом").

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF: No major tactical shifts confirmed within the reporting window, only the sustained, heavy commitment of conventional forces (40th OMBR) to the Pokrovsk objective.
• UAF (Observed): UAF units (90th OAeMB) are highly proficient in thermal/FPV drone usage for deep strike missions against dug-in positions, suggesting effective countermeasures against RF concealment and entrenched infantry.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics: IO messaging highlights the importance of providing necessary supplies to troops on the FEBA (Message: Наталья V, 16:09:28), suggesting that logistical reliability remains a key internal focus for the Russian military. The underlying infrastructure crisis in the DNR rear (water/power) remains an unexploited vulnerability for UAF.
• UAF Logistics (CRITICAL): The dependency on the Kostiantynivka GLOC is the singular operational constraint. The threat of SpN interdiction must be considered a matter of hours, not days.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 maintains a coherent, integrated approach across conventional maneuver, SpN targeting, and IO campaigns. This multi-domain synchronization is designed to generate operational paralysis in the UAF defense. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: UAF units are currently positioned in a high-intensity defensive posture, characterized by aggressive deep reconnaissance and rapid FPV strike capability (90th OAeMB). The 3rd Army Corps is actively engaging in internal physical training/morale exercises (Message: 17:01:48), indicating a focus on maintaining unit readiness and physical resilience under sustained combat pressure.
• Readiness: High combat readiness is offset by extreme logistical fragility.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Repeated confirmation of successful FPV strikes by 90th OAeMB on both the Siversk and possibly other axes (Messages: 10, 13, 17, 26, 30, 31). This confirms continuous, effective attrition against RF personnel and low-value armor/equipment.
• Setbacks: The persistent intelligence gap regarding the Kamyan’ske rail BDA/ETR (Section 6) remains an operational planning failure, hindering the establishment of necessary logistical redundancy.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate, high-density counter-SpN deployment along the Kostiantynivka corridor. The delivery of counter-UAS systems like the Skyranger 35 (Message: 19:01:20) must be expedited and secured immediately upon arrival.
• CONSTRAINT: The threat of domestic political disruption, amplified by RF IO (NABU leaks - Censor.NET), requires dedication of STRATCOM resources that could be used for battlefield IO.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Internal Unity/Ethnic Focus): The massive surge of formulaic, often identical praise for regional leaders (Chechnya) suggests a deliberate effort to project internal unity and loyalty among diverse mobilized forces. This is a crucial counter-narrative against perceived ethnic or regional fragmentation within the Russian Army.
• RF IO (Dehumanization): Explicit dehumanizing language regarding UAF units (e.g., calling Azov personnel "not people" - Message: 10:49:35) persists, maintaining the justification for extreme violence and reducing morale pressure on RF troops.
• RF IO (Starlink Disruption): Warnings are circulating in RF-affiliated channels about mandatory Starlink updates causing "brick" failure (Message: 14:50:12). While unconfirmed, this narrative aims to create paranoia and potential operational disruption among UAF users reliant on the platform for C2/ISR.
• RF IO (Cultural Control): The declaration of GSC Game World (creators of S.T.A.L.K.E.R.) as "undesirable" due to alleged funding of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Message: Colonelcassad) confirms RF intent to weaponize cultural products and target foreign/diaspora support networks.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF Morale: Remains high at the tactical level, focused on the effectiveness of units like the 90th OAeMB and the 3rd Army Corps (Messages: 19:02:16, 17:01:48).
• RF Domestic Sentiment: Indications of fatigue and dissent exist, but are largely drowned out by highly coordinated and formulaic pro-war/pro-leadership narratives. The internal focus on logistics (Message: 16:09:28) and the efficacy of new defense ministers (Message: 19:04:07) suggests a management of expectations following perceived military setbacks.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The reported imminent delivery of the Skyranger 35 (next week) is a significant capability boost against RF UAS, but logistics and security on arrival are paramount.
• RF continues to leverage hybrid tactics to slow NATO support (Polish sabotage narrative).

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The core MLCOA remains the synchronized logistical strangulation and conventional breakthrough attempt on the Pokrovsk axis.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Confirmation Window 191900Z NOV 25 - 200300Z NOV 25)

1. Renewed GLOC Interdiction: RF SpN, utilizing the next period of darkness (191900Z NOV 25 onwards), will execute the kinetic strike on the Kostiantynivka GLOC via IEDs, complex ambush, or guided mortar fire, focusing on disrupting the next high-value convoy.
2. Artillery Preparation (Pokrovsk): Massive preparatory fire, targeting known UAF defensive positions and forward logistics points around Pokrovsk, will precede the ground assault by 40th/155th OMBR, timed to coincide with confirmed road closure.
3. IO Amplification: RF will immediately amplify any successful SpN action (road closure, BDA) to generate panic and pressure UAF C2 to release tactical reserves prematurely.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Strategic Air/Hybrid Strike Synchronization: The continued rising activity at AB Monchegorsk and Pskov (Section 2, Previous Report) is confirmed as a strategic indicator. The MDCOA is a combined operational shock: a successful, sustained GLOC closure (>12 hours) coupled with the launch of air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) from northern bases against major UAF Operational Reserves or alternative logistics hubs (e.g., rail yards west of Kramatorsk, or air defense sites covering Dnipro). This aims to prevent UAF from reinforcing Pokrovsk or establishing alternative logistics arteries.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Maneuver) / SOF Command: Execute "VIPER HUNT" Aggressively and Immediately.

   • Action: Immediately deploy an overwhelming force projection along the Kostiantynivka GLOC to execute the Hunter-Killer strategy. Utilize artillery/mortar units on standby to deliver targeted suppression fire (TTL: 15 minutes) on confirmed SpN coordinates provided by ISR/Hunter teams. The GLOC must be secured kinetically.
   • Rationale: The time of attack is predictable (low visibility). Pre-emptive engagement is the only way to mitigate the MLCOA.

2. J4 (Logistics) / Air Defense Command: Prioritize Security for New HVT Assets.

   • Action: Develop and execute a detailed security and concealment plan for the immediate reception and assembly of the Skyranger 35 systems upon delivery (reported next week). Task a dedicated C-UAS/EW defense perimeter around the arrival and transit zone.
   • Rationale: RF intelligence is likely tracking the delivery of high-value C-UAS systems. They will be a priority target for kinetic or SpN attack upon entry into the theatre.

3. STRATCOM / J2: Counter Hybrid Disruption Campaigns.

   • Action: Simultaneously execute two IO campaigns:
     • Domestic Focus: Counter the corruption/NABU leaks narrative by emphasizing transparency and the dedication of UAF soldiers (like the 90th OAeMB) actively winning on the front line.
     • International Focus: Immediately disseminate validated BDA reports on RF infrastructure damage (Khartsyzsk water/DNR power) to international partners to counter RF claims of UAF failure and offset the RF-pushed "Polish sabotage" narrative.
   • Rationale: Protect both the internal fighting will and the critical logistical flow from Western partners.

//END SITREP//