Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 181900Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 171300Z NOV 25 – 181900Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (The core threat remains the RF exploitation of confirmed GLOC severance via SpN action; the information environment is now actively shaping diplomatic responses.)

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Focus Area 1 (Operational Depth - Zaporizhzhia-Kamyan’ske): Rail GLOC severance remains the critical operational constraint. No new BDA or ETR has been confirmed, meaning UAF J4 must still operate under the assumption of 100% rail capacity loss.
• Focus Area 2 (Operational Rear - Kostiantynivka-Myrnohrad): This area remains the primary operational risk. All high-volume logistics are now channeled through vulnerable road networks, which are subject to RF SpN interdiction efforts.
• Focus Area 3 (Frontline - Pokrovsk Axis): High-tempo RF pressure continues (MLCOA from previous reports) to fix UAF defenders and exploit logistics stress.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No significant, operationally restrictive weather or geomagnetic activity has been reported within the period. Standard late-autumn visibility and ground conditions apply, generally favoring mechanized movement over prepared roads.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Forces (Logistics): UAF logistics units are highly stressed, executing emergency rerouting plans relying on road transport.
• RF Forces (Strike): RF strategic strike assets are assessed to be in a reconstitution phase following the mass expenditure on 17 NOV 25. The immediate threat of a massed strike is downgraded (MEDIUM-LOW), shifting the priority to ground and SpN elements.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Sustained Ground Pressure: RF maintains the capability to sustain over 100 engagements per day on key axes (Pokrovsk), fixing UAF reserves.
2. SpN/Hybrid Warfare: RF maintains deep-penetration hybrid warfare capabilities, as demonstrated by the potential use of foreign agents/proxies for high-profile sabotage (Poland incident, reported in new message data).
3. IO Amplification: RF efficiently synchronizes IO efforts to amplify international incidents (Poland sabotage claim) to further UAF strategic isolation and complicate Western aid security.

Intentions:

1. Immediate Logistics Paralysis: RF's immediate priority is to maximize disruption of the road-based GLOCs feeding the Donbas front via SpN action in the Kostiantynivka sector.
2. Operational Breach: RF ground forces intend to exploit any significant logistics failure by attempting to break through the Pokrovsk defensive line.
3. Strategic Isolation: RF IO intends to sow doubt in Western capitals regarding the security and reliability of logistics corridors used for military aid delivery (new Poland incident).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF IO Shift (Hybrid Amplification): The immediate operational threat of SpN is now being strategically amplified by RF media amplifying a major diplomatic incident (Polish railway sabotage allegedly by Russian-aligned Ukrainian citizens). This demonstrates the RF's ability to seamlessly integrate strategic-level IO with ongoing tactical objectives. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Strike Posture: RF has moved from saturation strike execution to reconstitution/refitting, suggesting a phased approach to the operational logistics crisis.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Strike Sustainment: The current pause in massed strikes is an indicator of RF resource constraint following the expenditure of >100 UAVs. Analysts assess a 24-72 hour reconstitution phase before the next large-scale saturation strike is feasible. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• UAF Logistics: Critical due to confirmed rail severance. Full dependency on high-risk road convoys.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 is effectively synchronizing the ground assault, the logistics interdiction, and the subsequent information exploitation campaign (Poland incident).
• UAF C2 is highly effective in AD response but is currently severely stressed managing the operational logistics crisis while simultaneously maintaining frontline stability.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: Active defense and high-alert security posture in the operational rear.
• Readiness: High readiness in frontline combat units (Pokrovsk). Low readiness for logistics security/convoy escort assets due to resource constraints and the widespread threat across the rear area.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: UAF AD successfully thwarted the mass saturation strike attempt.
• Setbacks: The operational impact of the Kamyan’ske rail severance remains the major setback, constraining UAF freedom of action.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL Requirement: Dedicated armored assets for convoy escort (Operation IRON CLAW).
• CRITICAL Requirement: Dedicated Intelligence/SOF assets for immediate counter-SpN operations (Operation VIPER HUNT) in the Kostiantynivka area.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Messaging (Hybrid Sabotage): RF sources are actively amplifying the Polish Prime Minister's claim that Ukrainian citizens, working for Russian services, conducted railway sabotage in Poland.
• Impact Assessment: This messaging is highly effective and immediately actionable by RF's strategic goals. It achieves three key outcomes:
  1. Disruption of GLOC Security: Implies that the entire logistics chain (including NATO territory) is vulnerable to RF hybrid attacks.
  2. Erosion of Trust: Sows distrust between NATO allies (Poland) and Ukraine by suggesting Ukrainian citizens are vectors for Russian sabotage.
  3. Justification: Provides post-facto justification for RF targeting of rail infrastructure by depicting it as a valid, widespread target domain. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Frontline morale is maintained by successful AD efforts and confirmed UAF deep strikes (Kostroma GRES). However, internal public morale may be affected if logistics shortages begin to publicly manifest.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Strategic Advantage (EU): The EU Council agreement to redirect civilian funds for military aid provides long-term strategic depth.
• Immediate Risk (Poland): The alleged railway sabotage in Poland poses an immediate diplomatic risk to NATO GLOC security and may trigger increased border security measures that slow the flow of material. J2 must monitor NATO/Polish governmental response for signs of aid slowdowns.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The core analysis holds: RF seeks to exploit the synchronized rear-area disruption. The new IO component (Poland sabotage claim) raises the potential for increased friction in NATO logistics coordination.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. SpN Kinetic Execution (Kostiantynivka): RF infiltration groups will launch their kinetic attack (ambush, IEDs) targeting high-value logistics convoys or C2 nodes along the stressed road bypass routes leading to Pokrovsk.
2. BDA Follow-up: RF ISR assets (UAS/IMINT) will focus on identifying temporary UAF transloading hubs established following the Kamyan’ske strike, preparing targets for opportunistic, small-scale kinetic strikes (artillery/missiles).
3. Ground Fixation: RF forces will maintain high-intensity offensive operations on the Pokrovsk axis (minimum 80+ engagements/24h) to fix UAF defenders.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

• Operational Rear Collapse/MDCOA (Unchanged): A successful SpN kinetic attack on a critical road GLOC in the Kostiantynivka sector results in a sustained halt of road traffic (estimated >18 hours). This immediate logistics failure, combined with continued RF pressure at Pokrovsk, forces the emergency, non-tactical withdrawal of multiple UAF Battalions, creating an exploitable gap (>5km) and destabilizing the Donbas front.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J4 (Logistics Security): Enforce Operation IRON CLAW / Contingency Caches.

   • Action: Immediately commit all available SOF, armored, and counter-reconnaissance units to establish 24/7 fixed security positions and active patrols along the critical Kostiantynivka-Pokrovsk road corridor. Additionally, prioritize the immediate forward movement of 48-hour fuel/ammo caches to alternative, hardened locations 20km closer to the Pokrovsk axis.
   • Rationale: The SpN threat is imminent. Caching reduces the immediate risk exposure of long road convoys and provides a short-term buffer if the MDCOA (road paralysis) occurs.

2. J2 (Intelligence): Prioritize Counter-Hybrid Collection and IO Response.

   • Action: Formally task liaison channels with Polish, EU, and NATO partners to expedite the collection of intelligence regarding the alleged sabotage cell (OOB, training, links to RF services). Simultaneously, J7 must initiate an immediate counter-IO campaign to discredit the narrative that Ukrainian citizens are reliable vectors for Russian sabotage.
   • Rationale: Mitigates the strategic risk of the new RF IO campaign, which threatens to slow crucial Western aid flows.

3. J3 (Maneuver): Execute Phased Withdrawal Rehearsals.

   • Action: Immediately order Brigade Commanders on the Pokrovsk axis to conduct physical, terrain-based rehearsals of pre-planned, phased withdrawal routes to alternative defensive lines (Line 2 and 3).
   • Rationale: The logistics stability risk remains critical. Rehearsals ensure troops can execute a controlled disengagement if resupply fails, preventing a strategic collapse.

//END SITREP//