Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 060700Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 060600Z NOV 25 – 060700Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (The synchronized RF effort targeting UAF operational logistics via kinetic and SpN methods is confirmed, demanding immediate C2 response.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Focus Area 1 (Operational Depth - Kamyan’ske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast): CRITICAL LOGISTICS DISRUPTION CONFIRMED. UZ CEO confirms the RF strike targeted the Zaporizhzhia-Kamyan'ske railway station. This directly verifies the successful kinetic interdiction of a crucial rail node linking supply lines from the west to the Donbas front.
• Focus Area 2 (Strategic Depth - Kostroma Oblast, RF): UAF COUNTER-INTERDICTION ESCALATES. Multiple independent sources (ASTRA, UAF channels) confirm a successful UAS strike on the Kostroma GRES (power station), specifically hitting the gas distribution area. This strike, deep within RF territory, significantly extends the operational reach of UAF counter-interdiction efforts and targets RF critical energy infrastructure.
• Focus Area 3 (Tactical Front - Pokrovsk Axis): SITUATION CRITICALLY DYNAMIC. A UAF journalist reports that the situation in Pokrovsk is "changing every minute and is not exhaustive," reinforcing the Genshtab's earlier assessment of extreme intensity (100 engagements/24h).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• The G3 level geomagnetic storm remains active (confirmed by Moscow News source). This factor must be continuously monitored as it degrades the effectiveness of high-precision guidance (KAB/JDAM/Excalibur) and may impact long-range UAF UAS command links, though it also degrades RF AD radar performance. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Air Defense: The Ukrainian Air Force claims 108 enemy UAVs were shot down or suppressed during the reporting period. This indicates an extremely high-volume RF saturation effort (consistent with the MLCOA in the previous report) was met with a successful, albeit costly, AD response.
• RF Information Environment: RF sources (Colonelcassad) are actively displaying captured/shot down UAF UAV debris, likely for morale boosting among "CENTRE" forces, implying tactical AD success in localized areas.
• UAF Forces (Air Assault): DShV units (specifically the 79th Brigade) are confirmed conducting successful close-quarters combat operations, utilizing FPV drones to eliminate RF personnel in heavily damaged areas, indicating high tactical proficiency.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Sustained Saturation Strike: RF demonstrated the capability to launch over 100 UAVs (fact: 108 claimed shot down/suppressed), confirming the scale of the strategic saturation threat predicted.
2. Precision Targeting of CNI: The confirmed successful strike on the Zaporizhzhia-Kamyan'ske rail hub demonstrates RF capabilities in precise deep targeting of logistics choke points.
3. IO Synchronization: RF media continues to amplify narratives of successful elimination of UAF elite units (The Telegraph claim regarding 35th Marine Brigade strike casualties) to induce strategic demoralization.

Intentions:

1. Logistics Paralysis: RF's immediate intention is to maximize the operational impact of the Kamyan’ske rail interdiction, forcing UAF to reroute vital supplies under stress.
2. C2/Logistics Disruption (Hybrid): RF remains committed to the MLCOA of using SpN groups in Kostiantynivka to execute attacks on C2 and road-based logistics before UAF can fully establish alternative routes.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Elevated Strike Volume: The confirmed scale of the recent UAV saturation attack is significantly higher than typical daily volumes, suggesting RF is expending strategic reserves to achieve an operational logistics collapse in conjunction with the Pokrovsk offensive.
• Immediate Targeting of Rail Infrastructure: Confirmation that the rail station was the target in Kamyan’ske, rather than purely energy infrastructure, validates the analysis that RF is prioritizing the severing of the physical supply chain to the Donbas front.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Vulnerability: UAF deep strikes against Volgograd (previous report) and now the Kostroma GRES demonstrate sustained UAF success in targeting RF strategic energy and logistics nodes, which will put pressure on RF defense (AD) and industrial capacity.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 successfully coordinated a massive UAV strike with ongoing high-intensity ground attacks. UAF C2 is currently managing the crisis effectively (108 UAVs neutralized), but remains highly stressed due to simultaneous demands on AD, counter-infiltration, and logistics rerouting.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: Crisis response and active defense. UAF demonstrated high AD readiness against the mass UAV attack.
• Readiness: High readiness of specialist units (DShV 79th Brigade confirmed in aggressive tactical engagement). However, readiness is potentially degraded by confirmed casualties (eight reported fatalities from the RF strike on the 35th Marine Brigade).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Neutralization of 108 enemy UAVs (Air Force). Successful deep strike on Kostroma GRES, extending UAF pressure on RF energy production. Successful tactical counter-attack/clearing operations by the 79th DShV.
• Setbacks: Confirmed major kinetic damage to the Zaporizhzhia-Kamyan'ske railway station, severely constraining primary logistics routes. Confirmed combat losses in the Dnipropetrovsk area (35th Marine Brigade).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Immediate GLOC Assessment: Immediate and detailed engineering assessment of the Kamyan’ske rail damage (CRITICAL GAP) is required to determine the duration of the supply constraint.
• Dedicated C-ISR/SOF: Maximum available assets must be dedicated to securing and clearing the Kostiantynivka operational rear.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Military Morale: RF channels (Colonelcassad) are utilizing captured UAF UAV debris photos to promote tactical victories and reinforce the narrative that UAF UAVs are "collectible items," diminishing the perception of UAF asymmetric capability among RF troops.
• RF Strategic Demoralization: RF sources are amplifying Western media reports (The Telegraph) regarding high casualties among UAF elite drone operators/Marines, intended to erode public trust in UAF C2's ability to protect high-value personnel.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF leadership (Kharkiv Oblast Head Syniehubov) is actively reporting on damage assessment (9 settlements hit), maintaining transparency despite continued RF strikes, which is key for local morale.
• UAF ceremonial actions (Minute of Silence) continue to bolster national unity and commemorate losses.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• CRITICAL DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENT: The EU Council and European Parliament agreed to redirect civilian EU funds for military needs and support Ukraine's accession to the European Defence Fund (TASS source confirms this). This ensures a stable and increasing flow of military and financial aid, providing strategic depth to the UAF defense.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The RF strategy is now fully focused on exploiting the synchronized rear-area disruption (Kamyan’ske rail interdiction + Kostiantynivka SpN threat) to force a tactical collapse at Pokrovsk.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. SpN Kinetic Execution (Kostiantynivka): RF infiltration groups will launch their synchronized attack (IEDs, ambush, or targeting of C2/ASP) on road-based supply lines and C2 infrastructure in the Kostiantynivka area, specifically targeting the now-stressed road bypass routes.
2. High-Intensity Frontal Assault (Pokrovsk): RF ground forces will maintain or increase the tempo of attacks on the Pokrovsk axis to prevent UAF C2 from stabilizing the logistics situation in the rear.
3. Secondary Strike Confirmation: RF ISR will conduct rapid UAS overflights of the Kamyan’ske area to assess damage severity and identify UAF contingency rerouting efforts for immediate follow-up strikes.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

• Operational Rear Collapse: The combined operational effect of the rail strike (Kamyan’ske) and SpN success (Kostiantynivka) delays critical ammunition/fuel resupply to frontline units by over 18 hours. This logistics failure forces UAF units on the Pokrovsk axis to conduct a non-tactical, emergency withdrawal from forward positions, opening a decisive breach (greater than 5km) for RF mechanized forces and jeopardizing the stability of the entire Donbas defensive line.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J4/J3 (Logistics and Security): Execute High-Risk Convoy Protocol.

   • Action: Immediately initiate Operation IRON CLAW: All logistics convoys through Kostiantynivka must move with armored escort (minimum 2x IFV/APC per 5-vehicle convoy) and dedicated overhead FPV/ISR drone coverage.
   • Rationale: The threat environment (Kamyan’ske kinetic + Kostiantynivka SpN) demands maximum force protection for the new road-based GLOCs to prevent the MDCOA of logistics paralysis.

2. J3 (Maneuver): Contingency Planning for Pokrovsk Withdrawal.

   • Action: Order Brigade Commanders on the Pokrovsk front to finalize and rehearse pre-planned, phased withdrawal routes and alternative defensive positions (Line 2 and 3) in the event of confirmed logistics failure or breach.
   • Rationale: Proactive planning mitigates the risk of a disorganized collapse if the MDCOA materializes due to rear-area disruption.

3. J2 (Intelligence/EW): Immediate Prioritization of C-UAS in Critical Areas.

   • Action: Reallocate any remaining dedicated Counter-UAS EW systems to protect the critical C2 and ASPs immediately adjacent to Kostiantynivka.
   • Rationale: Protect high-value assets in the SpN threat zone from opportunistic RF ISR/FPV strikes attempting to support ground infiltration teams.

//END SITREP//