Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 060630Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 060600Z NOV 25 – 060630Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (The operational phase of kinetic attack on rear logistics and coordinated SpN disruption is confirmed and ongoing.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Focus Area 1 (Operational Depth - Kamyan’ske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast): CRITICAL INTERDICTION CONFIRMED. Mass RF UAV strikes resulted in 8 civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. This zone, vital for rail and road supply to the Donbas front (Pokrovsk), is kinetically compromised.
• Focus Area 2 (Tactical Front - Pokrovsk Axis): INTENSITY REMAINS EXTREME. UAF General Staff (Genshtab) reports 100 combat engagements in the last 24 hours, indicating RF maintains relentless frontal pressure, likely seeking to exploit rear-area disruptions.
• Focus Area 3 (RF Deep Rear - Volgograd, Russia): UAF DEEP STRIKE CONFIRMED. RF sources (Voenkor Ryusskoy Vesny) report over five hours of strikes on Volgograd, resulting in one confirmed fatality. This confirms UAF counter-interdiction capabilities deep into RF territory, forcing RF AD diversion.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• The reported G3 level geomagnetic storm (TASS source) poses a potential risk to precision GPS/GNSS navigation systems, including FPV drones, sophisticated guided munitions (e.g., JDAM/KAB kits), and high-frequency long-range communications. This may affect both UAF deep strike planning and RF tactical C2/AD performance in the short term. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• Deteriorating weather (previous reports) continues to favor low-level UAV infiltration.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Air Defense: Actively engaged in defense against ongoing UAV incursions in the Northern/Eastern Chernihiv sector (Air Force update 0614Z NOV 25), indicating RF diversification of strike vectors away from the primary Dnipro logistics corridor following the successful Kamyan’ske strike.
• UAF Counter-Artillery: UAF 'Shadow Unit' reports confirmed destruction of two RF artillery pieces (implied counter-battery fire), maintaining UAF presence in the fire domain.
• RF Ground Forces: High intensity of attacks (100 engagements) on Pokrovsk indicates RF commitment to seizing the objective. RF continues to utilize large numbers of KABs on Sumy and Donetsk Oblasts.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Mass Saturation Strike (Executed): Confirmed successful execution of mass UAV strike against CNI far beyond the frontline (Kamyan’ske).
2. Information Warfare Integration: RF media is immediately synchronizing kinetic success (Kamyan’ske) with psychological operations (Propaganda of "encirclement" and "surrender" at Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeysk). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. Frontal Sustained Attrition: RF retains the capability to sustain extremely high-volume combat operations (100 engagements/24h) in key sectors (Pokrovsk) despite UAF defensive success.

Intentions:

1. Operational Paralysis (Phase II): RF's current intention is to capitalize on the Kamyan’ske strike by intensifying frontal pressure on Pokrovsk, inducing a cascade failure in UAF defense through logistics disruption and rear-area chaos (SpN).
2. Exploitation of C2 Disruption: RF will seek to maximize the psychological impact of POW interviews (Pokrovsk surrender claims) to degrade UAF unit cohesion.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Diversification of UAV Routes: New UAV activity detected over Chernihiv Oblast (0614Z NOV 25) suggests RF is probing new AD gaps or diversifying strategic strike vectors away from the concentrated defense zone around Kyiv/Dnipro.
• Frontline Intensity Metric: The Genshtab report of 100 engagements in the Pokrovsk direction within 24 hours is exceptionally high, indicating a dedicated, major offensive effort.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Vulnerability: Confirmed UAF deep strikes on Volgograd and the earlier halting of Tuapse fuel exports confirm UAF is actively targeting RF strategic sustainment nodes, which will degrade future RF deep strike effectiveness and fuel supply.
• RF Frontline Resupply: RF is actively improving unit capabilities. Footage shows the 7th Guards Air Assault Division receiving a large supply of new DJI Mavic 3 series commercial UAVs, indicating a continuing emphasis on tactical ISR and strike capability at the unit level.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains effective in coordinating multi-domain operations (SpN, mass strike, frontal assault, IO). UAF C2 is highly stressed, managing multiple high-priority crises simultaneously (AD, Counter-Infiltration, Frontal Defense).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: UAF is in an active crisis response posture, focused on damage limitation in the rear and sustained attrition defense on the front.
• Readiness: UAF tactical units (e.g., Shadow Unit) demonstrate high proficiency in counter-battery/FPV drone strikes, offsetting RF artillery superiority.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Confirmed successful targeting of two RF artillery pieces (Shadow Unit). Confirmed successful deep strike against RF territory (Volgograd).
• Setbacks: Confirmed major CNI damage and 8 casualties in Kamyan’ske. Sustained heavy attrition (100 engagements) along the Pokrovsk front.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• AD Assets: Confirmed need for high-density, mobile SHORAD is now urgent, particularly for protecting rail infrastructure and logistics corridors leading into Kramatorsk/Sloviansk.
• Counter-Infiltration Assets: Dedicated SOF/SSO assets must remain committed to the Kostiantynivka area to neutralize the SpN threat that complicates logistics rerouting.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Psychological Warfare (Pokrovsk): RF media is intensely promoting the narrative of UAF encirclement and surrender in Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk), using testimonials from captured personnel. The goal is to induce panic and demoralization among defending UAF units.
• RF Internal Propaganda: TASS is running narratives alleging Western influence campaigns targeting military candidates in the 2026 Duma elections. This serves to reinforce the internal narrative of external threat/sabotage and legitimize internal security measures.
• Hybrid Influence (Georgia): RF milbloggers (Rybar) are running narratives detailing diplomatic rifts between Georgia and the EU, assessed as an effort to promote anti-Western sentiment and potential destabilization in a key neighboring state.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Civilian morale in the Dnipro region is severely tested by the Kamyan’ske strike. UAF C2 must visibly demonstrate effective damage control and the neutralization of the SpN threat to restore confidence in rear-area security.
• UAF domestic support remains high, as evidenced by continued fundraising efforts (STERNENKO).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The mass strikes on civilian logistics nodes will likely increase international pressure for enhanced long-range AD systems (e.g., Patriot, SAMP/T) for deep-rear protection.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The RF objective remains the operational collapse of the Pokrovsk salient via coordinated deep kinetic and hybrid disruption.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. SpN Kinetic Execution: RF infiltration groups in Kostiantynivka will execute their planned kinetic action (e.g., IEDs on supply routes, targeted assassination, or attacks on rear-area C2/artillery) to maximize the disruption caused by the Kamyan’ske strike.
2. Sustained Frontal Attrition (Pokrovsk): RF will maintain the current intensity (approaching 100 engagements/24h) on the Pokrovsk axis, preventing UAF from safely shifting reserves to counter the rear-area threat.
3. Secondary UAV Strikes: RF will follow up with smaller, targeted UAV strikes against identified secondary logistics nodes or power infrastructure in the Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava corridor to assess the resilience of UAF contingency rerouting efforts.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

• Simultaneous Disruption and Breakthrough: The confirmed SpN element successfully disrupts the primary road/rail bypass route near Kostiantynivka, causing a major bottleneck and asset vulnerability. This logistical paralysis allows the high-volume RF frontal attacks on Pokrovsk to achieve a decisive mechanized breach (deeper than 3-4km), leading to the partial encirclement or forced withdrawal of one or more UAF brigades.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J2 (Counter-Infiltration): Kostiantynivka Clear and Hold Operation.

   • Action: Immediately transition the Kostiantynivka operation from 'Search and Destroy' to 'Clear, Cordon, and Hold.' Establish hardened inner and outer security perimeters around C2 and logistics nodes until the SpN threat is fully neutralized.
   • Rationale: Preventing SpN action is now paramount to preserving the flow of supplies to the Pokrovsk front following the kinetic strike on Kamyan’ske.

2. J4 (Logistics): Activation of Emergency Road Bypass (Maximum Priority).

   • Action: Fully activate and staff pre-planned road bypass routes, prioritizing high-security, low-profile convoys for fuel and high-density munitions. Integrate dedicated tactical UAS/FPV coverage along all active GLOCs to provide immediate warning against SpN ambush.
   • Rationale: The rail disruption necessitates an immediate, secure alternative to prevent RF from achieving operational isolation of the Pokrovsk salient.

3. J3 (Air Defense): AD Reallocation to Logistics Points.

   • Action: Shift mobile SHORAD assets (especially Gepard/dedicated AD vehicles) from low-intensity frontal positions to provide point defense for the key road transfer points and backup CNI nodes in the Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava region.
   • Rationale: Defend against the MLCOA of follow-up secondary UAV strikes designed to exploit the current logistics vulnerability.

//END SITREP//