Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 060600Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 060500Z NOV 25 – 060600Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (The operational phase change predicted has been confirmed. Focus must immediately shift to minimizing collateral damage and neutralizing the rear-area SpN threat.)

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Focus Area 1 (Operational Depth - Kostiantynivka/Pokrovsk Corridor): RF SpN activity remains the critical threat. The operational rear of the Pokrovsk salient is under direct infiltration pressure.
• Focus Area 2 (Deep Rear - Kamyan’ske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast): CONFIRMED KINETIC SUCCESS. Mass RF UAV strikes have caused significant damage and casualties (8 wounded reported) in Kamyan’ske. This directly impacts the critical rail/logistics corridor supporting the Pokrovsk defense.
• Focus Area 3 (Northern Donbas Logistics): NEW LOGISTICAL INTERDICTION. RF IO sources claim Ukraine is halting rail service to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. This, if confirmed, indicates UAF preemptive measure against deep strike/artillery risk or successful RF psychological pressure.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Deteriorating weather (low visibility/cloud cover) continues to favor RF deep strike operations and SpN infiltration movement, contributing to successful UAV penetration of UAF AD layers.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Deep Air Defense: UAF AD units engaged in active defense against mass UAV attack, but penetrations confirmed (Kamyan’ske).
• UAF Defensive (Pokrovsk): Forces maintain position, but resources are increasingly strained by the dual requirement to hold the line and counter deep threats (SpN, UAV strikes).
• UAF Logistics (Northern Donbas): Potential preemptive halt of rail traffic to Kramatorsk/Sloviansk indicates command concerns over asset security in forward logistics hubs. (ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT)

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Synchronized Deep Strike (Confirmed): RF demonstrated the capability to launch large-scale, synchronized mass UAV attacks (Shahed-136/131) against critical logistics centers (Kamyan’ske). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Covert Penetration: RF retains the capability to insert and sustain SpN/infiltration groups deep within UAF operational rear (Kostiantynivka confirmed).
3. Strategic IO/Influence: RF utilizes state media (TASS) and milbloggers (Poddugny) to promote narratives of UAF logistical collapse and equipment failure.

Intentions:

1. Operational Paralysis (In Progress): RF's immediate intention is to disrupt the reinforcement and sustainment of the Pokrovsk salient through kinetic action against CNI (Kamyan’ske) and internal security threats (Kostiantynivka SpN).
2. Collapse of UAF Will: RF IO aims to convince UAF forces in the Pokrovsk area (referred to by RF as Krasnoarmeysk/Dimitrov) that they are encircled and abandoned, maximizing surrender rates. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Deep Kinetic Focus: The shift from targeting frontline military assets to the CNI (power/rail) in Kamyan’ske confirms the operational priority is now paralyzing UAF logistics rather than localized tactical gains.
• Focus on Logistics Interdiction: RF IO reports (Colonelcassad) concerning the halt of rail traffic to Kramatorsk/Sloviansk, even if exaggerated, highlight RF intent to target these critical rail hubs.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• UAF Critical Vulnerability: UAF logistics are under direct kinetic attack in the Dnipro corridor. Confirmed damage in Kamyan’ske necessitates immediate contingency planning for rerouting/securing supplies to the Donbas front.
• RF Sustainment: RF claims of downing 75 UAF UAVs confirm that RF logistics and CNI are under sustained pressure from UAF deep strikes, forcing RF to divert significant AD assets to homeland defense.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 is effectively executing a complex multi-domain plan. UAF C2 is actively managing multiple crises simultaneously (SpN, Mass Strike, Frontal Pressure).

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: UAF is in an active defense/crisis management posture, engaged in counter-AD operations (UAV defense) and counter-infiltration sweeps (Kostiantynivka).
• Readiness Concern (RF Claim): RF analyst (Marochko via TASS) claims only 30% of NATO equipment is prepared for winter, intended to undermine confidence in UAF operational readiness. This remains an analytical gap requiring further validation. (LOW CONFIDENCE in RF source)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setbacks: Confirmed civilian casualties (8 wounded) and infrastructure damage in Kamyan’ske due to successful RF UAV saturation attack.
• Successes: UAF deep strike campaign continues to compel RF to focus AD assets internally (75 UAVs claimed downed).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL SHORTFALL: The successful Kamyan’ske strike reinforces the immediate, critical need for integrated and mobile SHORAD systems specifically designed for low-altitude, high-volume drone threats in adverse weather.
• LOGISTICS: Urgent requirement to deploy logistics contingency plans, including backup fuel, power, and high-security convoys, for the Pokrovsk salient.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Amplification of Disruption: RF milbloggers (Colonelcassad) immediately highlighted the reported suspension of rail traffic to Sloviansk/Kramatorsk, aiming to amplify the narrative of UAF logistical collapse in the Donbas.
• RF Surrender Narrative: Milbloggers (Poddugny) explicitly stated UAF forces in the Pokrovsk area have "no alternatives but captivity or death," attempting to directly influence morale and operational cohesion.
• Domestic Focus (RF): State media (TASS) runs narratives concerning UAF winter readiness shortcomings, while internal channels (ASTRA) highlight the imprisonment of critics, maintaining internal control.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Civilian morale in the Dnipro corridor is severely tested by the renewed, mass kinetic attacks on population centers. UAF command must rapidly communicate successful mitigation efforts to maintain public trust.
• UAF combat morale remains dependent on rapid and decisive action to neutralize the Kostiantynivka SpN threat and secure the logistics corridor. (STERNENKO continues to drive fundraising efforts, indicating public support remains high but requires constant reinforcement.)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The mass CNI strikes are likely to accelerate demands for immediate delivery of high-end Western AD systems.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The predicted MLCOA is currently executing. The next 4-8 hours will be decisive in determining whether the UAF can contain the deep operational disruption.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4-8 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - In Progress)

1. SpN Kinetic Initiation (Imminent): RF infiltration groups in Kostiantynivka will initiate coordinated kinetic actions (IEDs, targeted ambushes, C2/Comms attacks), targeting UAF C2 or logistics convoys as they attempt to reroute/resupply the Pokrovsk front following the Kamyan’ske strike.
2. Frontal Pressure Continuation (Pokrovsk): RF ground forces will sustain high-intensity probing attacks along the Pokrovsk axis, seeking to exploit perceived weakness caused by the commitment of UAF reserves to counter-infiltration/AD duties.
3. Follow-on Deep Strikes: RF reserves the right to conduct immediate follow-up UAV strikes (potentially smaller wave) against secondary logistics targets in the Dnipro corridor (e.g., fuel depots, backup substations) to maximize the operational disruption.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Unchanged, heightened probability)

• Systemic Rear Disruption and Frontal Exploitation: Successful RF SpN operations sever a primary GLOC near Kostiantynivka, causing a temporary logistical collapse. Simultaneously, the UAV strike forces the closure of the Dnipro rail corridor for more than 12 hours. This dual paralysis enables a decisive RF mechanized breakthrough on the Pokrovsk salient, forcing a high-casualty withdrawal and compromising the integrity of the entire Donetsk operational area.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J2 (Counter-Infiltration): Kostiantynivka Clearance Operation (IMMEDIATE EXECUTION).

   • Action: Task dedicated SSO/SOF/GUR teams with integrated AD support to conduct aggressive Search and Destroy (SAD) operations in Kostiantynivka. Prioritize securing the most critical logistics nodes and C2 sites.
   • Rationale: The SpN element is designed to amplify the effects of the UAV strike; its neutralization will restore rear-area operational stability necessary for the Pokrovsk defense.

2. J4 (Logistics): Contingency Activation and Rerouting.

   • Action: Immediately initiate emergency contingency logistics protocols. Temporarily prioritize road-based transport for critical supplies (ammo, fuel) to the Pokrovsk salient, bypassing potentially compromised rail sections near Kamyan’ske. Establish redundant comms lines along all primary supply routes.
   • Rationale: Minimize the time the Pokrovsk defense is starved of resources following the successful RF strike.

3. J3 (Air Defense): Re-task and Harden SHORAD Assets.

   • Action: Re-task all available mobile SHORAD assets (especially those effective against Shahed/low-flying threats) to provide point defense for the main rail GLOC and critical road junctions south of Dnipro and north of Kostiantynivka.
   • Rationale: Prevent follow-on kinetic strikes from achieving a systemic logistical collapse.

//END SITREP//