Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 060303Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 060235Z NOV 25 – 060303Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Focus remains on synchronized RF rear-area threat and imminent strategic strike.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains focused on the Pokrovsk Salient and the security of its operational rear in Kostiantynivka. Confirmed RF infiltration elements remain active in Kostiantynivka (previous report).

• RF Deep Rear (Tuapse/Volgograd): Remains stressed following successful UAF deep strikes against fuel exports (Tuapse) and Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) targets (Volgograd).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Weather conditions (fog/low clouds) continue to favor RF infiltration operations and potentially degrade UAF Air Defense (AD) sensor performance against the imminent Shahed wave. No change in assessment.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF AD Posture: AD systems remain at maximum alert for the main strategic strike. Initial tracking of Shahed groups is confirmed (previous report).
• UAF Counter-Infiltration: UAF Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) are committed to securing the Kostiantynivka rear area, based on prior confirmed RF presence.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Sustained Hybrid Warfare Capacity: RF continues to seamlessly blend kinetic action (imminent strategic strike, Zaporizhzhia localized attack) with deep-area infiltration and pervasive Information Operations (IO).
2. Global Projection: RF maintains focus on global strategic narratives and state-backed military proxies ("African Corps," 0303Z), reinforcing the narrative of a robust, internationally engaged power despite domestic military setbacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Intentions:

1. Operational Paralysis: RF intent is to achieve maximum disruption of UAF Command and Control (C2) and logistics in the Pokrovsk operational rear via synchronized air strikes and Special Purpose (SpN) raids.
2. Cognitive Neutralization: RF IO seeks to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and economic stability through targeted disinformation campaigns (TASS, 0235Z: debt figures) while projecting domestic strength (African Corps narrative). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Risk Mitigation: The "all-clear" signal ("Отбой желтого уровня," 0302Z) issued by the RF governor (Igor Artamonov) likely signifies a local de-escalation of a specific, localized threat alert within RF territory. This is assessed as standard local operating procedure and does not reflect changes to the strategic threat targeting Ukraine. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF logistics networks remain under significant pressure from the successful UAF deep strikes on Tuapse and Volgograd. RF must now prioritize resource allocation to mitigate the impact on its southern supply lines and MIC production capacity.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains synchronized, driving the dual-axis operational plan (Air Strike + Rear Infiltration). The consistent application of IO and SpN actions suggests effective multi-domain synchronization.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Readiness: UAF is at maximum alert status, focusing tactical assets on counter-infiltration efforts in Kostiantynivka and maintaining high AD readiness across the central and eastern sectors.
• Morale: Public sentiment continues to be stressed by persistent RF aggression and war crimes, as evidenced by domestic media focus (RBC-Ukraine, 0256Z). This requires consistent counter-IO and rapid civil-military support.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: UAF maintains the strategic initiative in deep strike operations (Volgograd/Tuapse impacts).
• Setback: The confirmed presence of RF SpN in Kostiantynivka is an operational setback, forcing the diversion of high-value QRF assets from the line of contact (LOC) to rear-area security.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Immediate resource constraint: The limited availability of mobile SHORAD assets must be centrally managed and allocated now to the specific Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) targets identified as primary risk points for the imminent Shahed wave.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Economic Disinformation (0235Z): TASS is propagating highly exaggerated figures regarding Ukrainian national debt ("Every Ukrainian owes almost $7k").
  • Purpose: To exploit pre-existing economic anxieties, diminish faith in government financial stability, and undermine long-term Western support.
  • Analytical Judgment: This leverages the highest identified threat in the Dempster-Shafer analysis ("Economic Impact: Currency Devaluation in Ukraine," 0.256 belief mass). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF International Projection (0303Z): The focus on the "African Corps" narrative aims to project Russian global influence and normalize the use of state-sponsored mercenary groups, distracting from the immediate operational setbacks in Ukraine.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Domestic Ukrainian media (0256Z) is actively framing RF actions as systemic war crimes (200,000 confirmed). This maintains national resolve but underscores the significant psychological pressure on the populace.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• (No new international or diplomatic developments in this immediate reporting period.)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The current intelligence reinforces the previous assessment of a highly synchronized hybrid assault targeting UAF operational depth. The critical window for the kinetic phase (air strike) is opening now.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 2-6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Unchanged)

1. Strategic Strike Execution (T+0 to T+4H): The primary Shahed wave (est. 50+ platforms) will begin impacting logistics and CNI targets in Dnipro/Poltava/Kharkiv Oblasts, exploiting fog/low cloud cover to degrade sensor performance.
2. SpN Activation in Kostiantynivka (T+1 to T+6H): RF infiltration groups will initiate kinetic actions (raids, ambushes, sabotage) against UAF C2/logistics nodes in Kostiantynivka, leveraging the confusion and resource diversion caused by the simultaneous air strikes.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Unchanged)

• Systemic Rear Disruption and Frontal Exploitation: Successful Shahed strikes degrade primary rail hubs and energy nodes supporting the Pokrovsk salient. RF SpN, utilizing low-emission ISR (fiber-optic UAV), successfully targets and severs the main logistics artery near Kostiantynivka, eliminating a Brigade-level C2 node. The resulting operational paralysis enables a successful, exploitationary RF mechanized breakthrough on the Pokrovsk salient itself.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Ground/SOF): Kostiantynivka Close Combat Priority (IMMEDIATE ACTION).

   • Action: Transition all Kostiantynivka counter-infiltration operations from area denial to active search and destroy missions. Implement strict cordon and search procedures, prioritizing the security of Brigade-level C2 nodes and the main north-south logistics artery immediately. Reinforce the concept that RF SpN must be neutralized before the air strikes peak.

2. J3 (Air Defense): CNI Hardening and Repositioning.

   • Action: Given the opening of the strike window (T+0), EXECUTE final dispersal protocols for all non-essential assets at rail hubs and energy facilities. Focus remaining mobile SHORAD assets exclusively on the top two predicted HVTs (Primary Rail Hub, Primary Energy Node) in the Dnipro/Poltava/Kharkiv operational areas.

3. J2/J7 (IO/PSYOP): Immediate Economic Counter-Messaging.

   • Action: Immediately task the PSYOP group to prepare and disseminate a rapid counter-narrative against the TASS economic disinformation (debt figures). Use verified National Bank data to stabilize the domestic cognitive domain and inoculate the public against further RF economic IO attacks.

//END SITREP//