TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)
DTG: 060230Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 060130Z NOV 25 – 060230Z NOV 25
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Focus remains on synchronized deep/rear-area threat and RF strategic signaling, with confirmation of ongoing deep strikes.)
RF Deep Rear (Volgograd - FACT): Civilian-sourced video evidence confirms large industrial zone fire in the Krasnoarmeysky District of Volgograd (0144Z). This follows the previous report's confirmation of the debris impact.
JUDGMENT: This confirms a successful UAF deep strike against an RF Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) target, forcing RF internal security responses and signaling UAF sustained strategic reach. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Front Line (Donetsk Oblast): RF continues sustained use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) against Donetsk Oblast (0135Z), indicative of standard RF close air support for offensive ground operations in the Pokrovsk salient area. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Operational Rear (Kharkiv/Belgorod Axis): New Shahed UAV group detected crossing from Belgorod Oblast into Northern Kharkiv Oblast (0154Z), moving toward the North Kharkiv area (0135Z).
JUDGMENT: This is assessed as the initial, localized phase of the anticipated large-scale Shahed attack, likely targeting infrastructure in the Kharkiv region before the main wave impacts deeper targets in Dnipro/Poltava. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
RF weather reporting (0141Z) emphasizes widespread snow cover across the majority of the Russian Federation, but confirms the central European part (the operational zone) will remain without snow this week. This reaffirms the previously assessed deteriorating conditions (fog/low clouds) favoring low-altitude UAV flight and RF infiltration operations (Kostiantynivka). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
UAF AD Posture: UAF Air Force is actively tracking the initial Shahed groups entering Kharkiv Oblast (0135Z, 0154Z). AD assets in the North Kharkiv sector are now engaged.
RF Deep Strike Timing: The new Shahed entries reinforce the prediction that the main strategic strike is imminent (within 0-4 hours), likely utilizing the ongoing low-altitude penetration attempts in Kharkiv as a saturation tactic to stretch AD resources.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Fiber-Optic ISR: RF confirms deployment of the "Knyaz Veshchiy Oleg" fiber-optic UAV for reconnaissance (0135Z).
JUDGMENT: This technology provides RF SpN/reconnaissance teams with a low-emission, highly reliable, and jamming-resistant ISR capability, specifically valuable for close-quarters reconnaissance and guiding infiltration groups (Kostiantynivka). This significantly increases the survivability of RF deep reconnaissance. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Intentions:
Degrade Deep ISR: The intent remains to paralyze UAF C2/logistics by synchronizing the deep Shahed strike with rear-area disruption (Kostiantynivka SpN).
Enhance Tactical Reconnaissance: Deployment of fiber-optic UAVs suggests an intent to improve tactical intelligence collection against high-value, close-range UAF assets (C2, artillery, mobile AD).
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
New ISR Technology Deployment: The confirmed deployment of the fiber-optic UAV is a significant adaptation, designed to overcome UAF electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and provide covert, real-time intelligence for small, dispersed units.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
The successful UAF strike on the Volgograd industrial zone (0144Z) continues to degrade RF capacity for MIC sustainment, placing continued pressure on the replacement of war materiel.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 is demonstrating coordination in deploying novel ISR technology (fiber-optic UAV) concurrently with mass strike operations (Shahed).
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
UAF AD is now actively tracking and engaging the initial Shahed waves in the North Kharkiv sector. Readiness remains at maximum alert following the previous warning (0131Z).
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Successes:
Sustained Deep Strike Effectiveness: Confirmed successful impact and resulting large fire at the Volgograd MIC target.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
Resources must be immediately prioritized for counter-infiltration in Kostiantynivka and simultaneous AD against the main Shahed wave. The fiber-optic UAV introduction increases the requirement for close-range counter-ISR and SpN hunting capabilities, as traditional EW/SIGINT may be less effective against this system.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF media (TASS) continues to promote non-military success stories (NHL achievements, 0145Z) and highlight minor military technological advancements (fiber-optic UAV, 0135Z) to manage the domestic narrative and distract from the successful UAF deep strikes (Volgograd).
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
The confirmed fire in Volgograd will increase domestic RF anxiety. UAF must capitalize on this via IO to maintain pressure on the RF internal security apparatus.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
(No new international developments in this reporting period.)
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 2-6 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Massive Strategic Strike (T+0 to T+4H): The primary Shahed wave (est. 50+ platforms) will impact logistics and CNI targets in Dnipro/Poltava, synchronized with the ongoing saturation attempt in Kharkiv.
Kostiantynivka Activation (T+1 to T+6H): RF SpN groups will leverage the operational confusion created by the air strikes to initiate kinetic actions against UAF C2/ASPs/GLOCs in Kostiantynivka. The fiber-optic UAV (Knyaz Veshchiy Oleg) may be used for terminal guidance and strike confirmation for these SpN teams.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Unchanged, but risk increased by new RF ISR capability)
Systemic Rear Disruption and Frontal Exploitation: Successful Shahed strikes degrade primary rail hubs and energy nodes supporting the Pokrovsk salient. RF SpN, utilizing low-emission fiber-optic ISR, successfully targets and severs the main logistics artery near Kostiantynivka. The resulting paralysis forces UAF to commit operational reserves to rear-area security, enabling a successful, exploitationary RF mechanized breakthrough on the Pokrovsk salient itself.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-1H
Main Shahed Wave Confirmation: UAF AD must confirm precise corridors and estimated time of impact (ETI) for the main Shahed wave heading toward Dnipro/Poltava.
RADAR track data confirming high volume of Shahed platforms south/west of Kharkiv track.
1-3H
Kostiantynivka Counter-Action:CRITICAL WINDOW. UAF QRF/SOF must be executing aggressive counter-infiltration sweeps now.
Confirmed RF SpN establishment of ambush positions or fixed C2/staging area (using HUMINT/SIGINT).
3H
Fiber-Optic Countermeasures: Decision point to deploy specific, short-range EO/IR ISR assets and ground patrols to counter the newly deployed low-emission fiber-optic UAV system in vulnerable rear areas.
Increased RF tactical strike accuracy in close proximity to UAF HVTs in the Donbas rear.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - UNCHANGED
Kostiantynivka SpN Status/OOB: Confirmation of whether RF SpN groups have initiated kinetic action or have been successfully contained/eliminated, including specific Order of Battle (OOB) and ingress/egress.
HUMINT/SIGINT: Continuous, high-priority monitoring of RF tactical communications in the Kostiantynivka-Pokrovsk sector.
LOW
CRITICAL - REFINED
Main Shahed Target Confirmation: Precise identification of primary target sets for the imminent large-scale RF Shahed attack, prioritizing rail/energy infrastructure in Dnipro/Poltava that directly impacts Pokrovsk logistics.
IMINT/ELINT: Pattern analysis of pre-strike RF ISR activity and known high-value logistics nodes, prioritizing rail junctions.
MEDIUM
HIGH - NEW
Fiber-Optic UAV Operational Doctrine: Assess the range, operational altitude, and specific tactical mission sets (e.g., artillery spotting vs. SpN escort) for the newly deployed "Knyaz Veshchiy Oleg" system.
SIGINT/TECHINT: Analysis of recovered wreckage or captured RF SpN documentation/training materials.
Action:IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT of dedicated hunter-killer teams with thermal and acoustic sensors, focusing on known urban chokepoints and natural cover areas in Kostiantynivka. Given the fiber-optic UAV threat, rely less on wide-area EW and more on close-range, low-observable ground assets. The counter-infiltration effort must achieve critical mass before the air strikes begin.
J3 (Air Defense): Adaptive AD Posture.
Action: Do not overcommit mobile SHORAD assets to the initial, smaller Shahed wave in Kharkiv. Conserve resources and maintain maximum readiness for the main strategic wave targeting Dnipro/Poltava infrastructure crucial for the Donbas front. Initiate localized, short-duration electronic countermeasures (ECM) in vulnerable rear areas immediately upon confirmation of the main wave's ETI.
J2 (Intelligence/TECHINT): New ISR Threat Mitigation.
Action: Issue a technical warning regarding the low-emission/jam-resistant fiber-optic UAV. Task TECHINT assets to immediately develop and disseminate procedural countermeasures for ground troops, emphasizing visual detection and the use of physical barriers or specific low-power radar sweeps for detection, as standard jamming may be ineffective.
