Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 052200Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 052135Z NOV 25 – 052200Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM (Focus shifts from kinetic strike confirmation to BDA and ongoing hybrid operations assessment.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Deep Strike Update (Kamianske): FACT: Local sources report "minus" (interception/destruction) of loitering munitions (mopeds/Shaheds) targeting Kamianske (2142Z). JUDGMENT: This confirms successful tactical AD engagement following the initial saturation strike reported in the previous SITREP. Focus shifts to damage assessment (BDA) on CNI. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Southern ISR Threat (Odesa Coast): FACT: UAF Air Force reports an enemy reconnaissance UAV operating near the Odesa coastline (2136Z). JUDGMENT: This asset is likely conducting pre-strike targeting or post-BDA verification for future kinetic strikes or maritime operations. Requires immediate UAF AD response. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Kherson CNI Disruption: FACT: RF sources (Colonelcassad) claim an emergency shutdown of a high-voltage power line in Kherson Oblast, affecting 300+ settlements and 200,000 personnel/civilians (2145Z). JUDGMENT: This aligns with RF intent to degrade UAF operational stability and CNI across the front lines, potentially in retaliation for UAF deep strikes or as preparation for localized ground action. Requires UAF verification of cause (RF strike vs. technical fault). (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• Donetsk Explosion Event: FACT: Unidentified large-scale explosion documented in the Donetsk region (2137Z). JUDGMENT: While the source implies UAF success ("😎🇺🇦Донецьк"), the event cannot be definitively linked to a specific strike or target without BDA. It indicates continued high-intensity kinetic action in the eastern sector. (LOW CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• The onset of nighttime and continued poor visibility (as noted in the previous Daily Report) favors low-level ISR and continued RF loitering munition operations, despite successful UAF interceptions.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Posture: UAF AD maintains high operational tempo, confirmed by successful interceptions over Kamianske. Forces in the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka rear area (blocking forces) remain tasked with counter-infiltration operations, diverting resources from the front.
• RF Posture: RF forces continue the multi-domain synchronized attack (Deep Strike + Hybrid/SpN Rear Area Disruption). Emphasis appears to be placed on maintaining pressure via low-level ISR (Odesa) and confirmed CNI degradation (Kherson).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Sustained Hybrid Disruption: Demonstrated capability to maintain SpN elements within UAF operational depth (Kostiantynivka/Pokrovsk area) while simultaneously executing widespread CNI strikes.
2. Effective IO/PSYOP: Demonstrated ability to rapidly exploit international political events (Trump statements) and domestic societal issues (Polish healthcare) to influence target audiences.

Intentions:

1. Sustain Operational Paralysis: Maintain internal security pressure (SpN in Kostiantynivka) combined with kinetic CNI strikes (Kherson, Dnipro) to prevent UAF from consolidating forces for a counter-attack or reserve deployment.
2. Degrade International Confidence: RF IO actively seeks to undermine confidence in US political support and exacerbate perceived instability in NATO countries (Poland).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Targeting of Liberated/Contested CNI: The claimed strike/disruption of the Kherson power grid highlights a shift to specifically target infrastructure in recently liberated or heavily contested areas, maximizing civilian impact and destabilization.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• No new information on RF logistics in this reporting period. The previous report's focus on RF attempts to secure alternative logistics via the Caucasus remains relevant for the strategic picture.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains capable of coordinating complex kinetic and hybrid operations. UAF C2 must ensure effective prioritization between AD and crucial rear-area security operations (Kostiantynivka).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Readiness: UAF AD remains effective against the Shahed threat, mitigating the saturation attempt over Kamianske.
• Constraint: The confirmed ISR UAV off the Odesa coast indicates a continuing threat to the Black Sea grain corridor and requires allocation of valuable AD assets to maritime defense, potentially drawing resources from the central strike axis.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

1. Interception Confirmation: Confirmed successful interception of loitering munitions targeting Kamianske (2142Z).

Setbacks:

1. Confirmed CNI disruption in Kherson Oblast (pending verification of cause).
2. The continued presence of RF ISR near Odesa suggests RF maintains adequate deep ISR capability despite UAF efforts.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Real-Time BDA: Immediate BDA for the Kamianske strike and the Ballistic strike (previous SITREP) is required to prevent RF from exploiting missed targets in follow-on waves.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Strategic IO (Trump Amplification): FACT: RF-aligned media (RBC-Ukraine reporting Trump's claim of Putin seeking help, 2137Z) amplifies narratives suggesting direct, exclusive diplomatic channels between Russia and the US, bypassing formal diplomatic structures. JUDGMENT: This is designed to sow doubt among international partners regarding US commitment and signal RF's willingness to dictate terms. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF PSYOP/Morale (Defection/Cultural Warfare): RF channels deploy multiple PSYOP efforts:
  • Defection Narrative: Promoting the story of a soldier from Myrnohrad allegedly defecting and joining RF forces (2203Z). This is a direct attempt to undermine UAF troop loyalty and mobilization efforts.
  • Cultural Provocation: Amplifying a story about a Polish student wearing RF military uniform (2144Z). This aims to increase social friction between Ukrainian refugees and their host countries. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Belarusian IO (Anti-Polish): Belarusian state media content attacking the Polish healthcare system (2143Z) serves RF interests by portraying instability within the EU/NATO bloc. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF domestic morale continues to rely heavily on successful AD actions (Kamianske interception). However, the simultaneous threats (ballistic, Shaheds, rear-area SpN, CNI damage) are likely increasing public anxiety.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The amplified narrative concerning US political figures attempting to unilaterally resolve the conflict creates a perception of diplomatic instability, requiring immediate counter-messaging to reinforce allied cohesion.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4-12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The RF focus will shift from the initial strike wave to exploitation and consolidation:

1. Sustained Rear-Area Action: RF SpN groups in Kostiantynivka will likely attempt a high-profile raid (e.g., C2 node, key logistics convoy) to exploit UAF distraction caused by the missile/UAV strike BDA process.
2. Follow-on ISR/Strike: The confirmed Odesa ISR mission suggests a high probability of follow-on kinetic strikes (UAV or Kalibr cruise missiles) targeting coastal infrastructure or Black Sea transit routes within the next 12 hours.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

• Simultaneous Frontal and Rear Breach: RF forces initiate a massed frontal mechanized attack utilizing heavy KAB support against the Pokrovsk salient MLOC. This is perfectly synchronized with a successful SpN operation in Kostiantynivka that cuts the primary north-south GLOC, leading to fuel and ammunition starvation for frontline units and forcing a tactical retreat under fire.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Rear Area Security): Focus All Effort on Kostiantynivka.

   • Action: Immediately transition the counter-infiltration effort in Kostiantynivka from "blocking" to "elimination." Utilize SSO/GUR assets to conduct high-risk/high-reward raids targeting confirmed SpN locations. Securing the rear is the single highest priority to prevent the MDCOA.

2. J2 (Targeting/BDA): Initiate Priority Damage Assessment.

   • Action: Dedicate all available BDA assets (UAVs, forward observers) to confirming the damage on CNI in the Kamianske/Dnipro axis and verifying the cause of the Kherson power disruption. This BDA is crucial for prioritizing resource allocation (repairs/AD) against the inevitable follow-on strikes.

3. J5/J2 (IO/PSYOP): Direct Counter-Disinformation Campaign.

   • Action: Prepare and release comprehensive counter-narratives to address the RF IO regarding US political instability (Trump claims) and the fabricated defection story (Myrnohrad soldier). The counter-narrative must emphasize the institutional strength of US/NATO commitment and the low reliability of RF defection claims.

//END SITREP//