Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 052135Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 052100Z NOV 25 – 052135Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Focus on confirmation of synchronized RF kinetic and hybrid attack phases.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• RF Deep Strike Escalation (Ballistic Threat): FACT: UAF Air Force confirms ballistic missile threat launched from the northeast (Bryansk Oblast, RF) toward central Ukraine (2104Z). JUDGMENT: This represents the next escalation in the predicted mass strike, using high-value, high-speed ballistic assets to penetrate AD ahead of the slower Shahed waves, likely targeting high-value C2 or energy infrastructure in Kyiv/Central Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Mass Shahed Attack Confirmation (Dnipropetrovsk Axis): FACT: Multiple UAV groups confirmed moving through Dnipropetrovsk Oblast toward Dnipro and Kamianske (2107Z, 2108Z). FACT: Explosions reported in Kamianske (2123Z, 2118Z). JUDGMENT: The RF mass Shahed strike is now actively impacting CNI in the Dnipro operational area, forcing UAF AD prioritization. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Operational Rear Security (Pokrovsk): FACT: UAF General Staff (Genshtab) confirms active counter-infiltration operations and "blocking" of enemy elements that are "seeping" into Pokrovsk (2114Z). JUDGMENT: This confirms that the previously assessed critical threat of RF просачивание (infiltration) is now active combat in the operational rear. This highly synchronized kinetic and hybrid action maximizes UAF C2 distraction. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Night conditions and deteriorating weather continue to favor RF drone/SpN operations by degrading UAF visual/optical ISR and making low-altitude UAV tracking more difficult.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Posture: UAF AD is engaged in high-intensity combat, reporting success in intercepting a significant portion of the attack wave (2120Z: 11 of 15 UAVs targeting Kamianske reportedly neutralized). UAF Ground Forces are actively engaged in urban counter-infiltration combat in the Pokrovsk area.
• RF Posture: RF forces are executing a complex, synchronized multi-domain attack: Ballistic Missiles (High Speed), Mass Shaheds (Saturation), and SpN Infiltration (Hybrid/Deep Rear Disruption). This combination is designed for maximum operational paralysis.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Synchronized Ballistic/UAV Strike (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Demonstrated capability to combine high-speed ballistic and mass loitering munitions to overwhelm AD systems.
2. Deep Hybrid Operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF SpN can successfully infiltrate critical operational rear areas (Pokrovsk/Kostiantynivka) and force UAF operational reserves to divert from the front line to internal security tasks.

Intentions:

1. Achieve CNI System Failure: Primary intent of the kinetic strike remains crippling energy and rail logistics, particularly in the Dnipro region (Kamianske focus).
2. Disrupt Operational Cohesion: The Pokrovsk rear area infiltration is intended to sever C2 links, ambush logistics, and force UAF frontline units to fight without secure sustainment, setting conditions for a frontal breakthrough.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Ballistic Pre-Strike: The deployment of ballistic missiles ahead of or concurrent with the Shahed wave suggests an adaptation to UAF’s improved Shahed AD effectiveness. The ballistic strike acts as a system disruption or 'knockout punch' before the main wave arrives.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics: RF continues to develop alternative rail/logistics routes (e.g., grain shipment via Azerbaijan/Armenia, 2114Z), indicating a continued strategic focus on mitigating UAF deep strikes against Black Sea ports and internal RF logistics hubs.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 is demonstrating high effectiveness in synchronizing complex, multi-domain operations spanning the strategic (ballistics/Shaheds) and operational (SpN in Pokrovsk) levels. UAF C2 is actively managing multiple crises simultaneously (AD, Counter-Infiltration, Ballistic Threat).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Readiness: UAF AD is engaged at peak readiness. The confirmed 11/15 interception rate over Kamianske suggests high tactical effectiveness against the Shahed threat, despite the saturation attempt.
• Operational Rear: The confirmed blocking operations in Pokrovsk (2114Z) indicate UAF forces quickly adapted to the SpN threat and committed resources to secure the rear.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

1. High Interception Rate: The high reported success rate of UAF AD (approx. 73%) over the Kamianske target area is a significant tactical victory against the saturation attack intent.
2. Active Rear Security: Prompt and decisive action by Genshtab to initiate blocking operations in Pokrovsk, preventing the SpN elements from achieving their likely primary disruption mission unchallenged.

Setbacks:

1. The introduction of a new ballistic threat requires diverting precious AD interceptors and increases the risk of critical infrastructure damage.
2. The ongoing urban combat in Pokrovsk (the rear) diverts essential manpower and attention away from the defense of the forward salient.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Assets: The confirmed ballistic launch highlights the severe constraint in dedicated BMD systems, forcing reliance on general AD assets which rapidly depletes critical, high-cost interceptor stocks.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Strategic IO (TASS/Zakharova): RF continues its high-level strategic communication, framing the war as a "liberation" from "Nazis" (2106Z, 2119Z). This narrative targets international diplomatic support and internal RF domestic audiences.
• RF Tactical IO (Colonelcassad): Continues to showcase tactical successes (e.g., FPV drone strike on UAF 2S3 howitzer, 2115Z), aimed at bolstering the morale of RF forces and domestic perception of operational effectiveness.
• RF Hybrid IO (Mobility/Mobilization): RF narratives attempt to satirize or discredit Ukrainian mobilization efforts (Angelina Jolie's driver story, 2118Z), aiming to sow distrust in the fairness and necessity of mobilization.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Domestic morale remains robust, supported by successful fundraising (21 million UAH, 2108Z) and demonstrated AD effectiveness, although the multiple concurrent air threats (ballistic, Shaheds) across central Ukraine induce significant stress.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• RF IO Targeting US Support: RF channels are actively amplifying domestic US political events (Trump statements, 2114Z) to reinforce the narrative that the US is diplomatically unreliable and potentially preparing to abandon Ukraine. This requires a robust UAF counter-IO effort.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4-8 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The current synchronized attack will continue:

1. Shahed Follow-on Wave (0-2H): A second, smaller wave of Shaheds will follow the initial ballistic/UAV attack, aiming to strike targets previously missed or damaged during the recovery phase, focusing on Kyiv/Central Ukrainian targets.
2. Sustained Urban Combat (1-6H): RF SpN units in Pokrovsk will continue their disruption efforts, focusing on key choke points and C2 structures until successfully neutralized by UAF QRF/blocking forces.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Tactical Seizure of the Rear: RF SpN groups successfully seize and temporarily hold a critical logistics hub or a key road junction in Pokrovsk, severely disrupting the primary supply route for UAF frontline forces defending the salient. This coincides with a heavy artillery barrage and a renewed frontal mechanized assault by RF forces, capitalizing on the logistical paralysis to achieve a rapid, deep penetration of the UAF line west of Pokrovsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Counter-Infiltration): Secure Pokrovsk GLOC Immediately.

   • Action: Commit maximum available combat power (QRF, SSO) to isolate and clear the confirmed RF infiltration pockets in Pokrovsk. Primary objective is to secure the main logistics route before the SpN groups can effectively mine or interdict it. No compromise on the security of Brigade-level C2 nodes.

2. J3 (Air Defense): Prioritize BMD Against Northern Threat.

   • Action: Redirect limited high-end interceptors (e.g., NASAMS, Patriot) to protect the Kyiv CNI/C2 area against the confirmed ballistic threat trajectory from the North/Northeast. Accept residual risk against Shaheds in less critical areas to preserve BMD capability.

3. J2/J5 (International Support): Preempt RF IO on US Support.

   • Action: Prepare and release a coordinated IO campaign acknowledging the internal US political debates but emphasizing the long-term, bipartisan nature of US security assistance (e.g., existing PSS agreements, confirmed deliveries) to neutralize the impact of amplified RF propaganda (Trump/Shutdown narratives).

//END SITREP//