Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 052030Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 052000Z NOV 25 – 052030Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM (Focus shifts to confirming internal security threats and assessing the RF response to the UAF deep strike in Donetsk.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (Friendly Posture Reinforcement): FACT: UAF 425th Separate Assault Battalion (OShP) "Skelya" posted imagery confirming the raising of the Ukrainian flag over the Pokrovsk City Council building (2022Z). JUDGMENT: This counteracts RF information operations claiming encirclement/imminent capture of Pokrovsk. This indicates UAF retains local control and morale in the immediate vicinity of the critical city. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (RF Kinetic Threat): FACT: UAF Air Force reports imminent threats of KAB (Guided Aerial Bomb) strikes on Zaporizhzhia Oblast (2017Z) and subsequent reports of UAV activity heading toward Tomakivka (2023Z). JUDGMENT: RF is continuing synchronized multi-platform (KAB/UAV) pressure on UAF defensive lines and rear logistics in the south, likely to prevent UAF redeployment to the Donbas sector. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Kyiv Rear Area (Internal Security Incident): FACT: Initial reports of a grenade explosion at the DREAM Yellow shopping center in Kyiv (2020Z) were later updated by Police to confirm the device was an airsoft (strike ball) grenade thrown by an intoxicated individual (2029Z, 2031Z). JUDGMENT: While non-military, the initial report risked severe disruption and played into RF narratives of internal instability. The rapid police correction effectively mitigates the IO impact. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• The existing deteriorating weather conditions continue to favor RF infiltration operations (Kostiantynivka) and UAS strikes (Zaporizhzhia UAV course toward Tomakivka).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Posture: UAF maintains C2 effectiveness and actively uses IO to counter RF claims (Pokrovsk flag raising, 2022Z). UAF AD/ISR is actively tracking new UAV ingress in the Zaporizhzhia sector (2023Z).
• RF Posture: RF IO attempts to reinforce the image of overwhelming operational superiority (Grovka "West" grouping video, 2003Z) while continuing kinetic operations via KAB and Shahed platforms. RF propaganda also heavily focuses on perceived Western political weakness (Trump commentary, 2007Z).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Guided Munitions (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF maintains effective delivery of KABs on static targets in Zaporizhzhia, continuing the rapid destruction of fixed UAF positions and infrastructure.
2. Psychological Warfare (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF continues to rapidly exploit tactical events for IO (e.g., the detailed video showcasing the "West" Grouping, 2003Z), aiming to convey professional superiority and high morale among their forces.

Intentions:

1. Maintain Pressure on Zaporizhzhia: RF intends to fix UAF forces in the south via KAB and UAV strikes, preventing their use as operational reserves for the critical Donbas axis.
2. Counter-UAF IO: RF is aggressively working to discredit UAF forces, including exploiting operational security failures (such as the alleged targeting of the 35th Marine Brigade during a ceremony, 2015Z).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF Targeting of UAF Ceremonies (IO/Tactical Synergy): RF propagandists are claiming a highly successful missile strike on the UAF 35th Marine Brigade on 1 NOV, attributing the success to UAF conducting an exposed "torch ceremony" (2015Z). JUDGMENT: If confirmed, this indicates RF ISR is actively targeting UAF operational security vulnerabilities during routine unit events. This requires immediate review of UAF force protection protocols. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• The confirmed significant destruction of the RF depot in Donetsk (Previous SITREP) has yet to generate immediate observable tactical changes in RF fire support tempo. RF will likely sustain current fire support levels for the next 4-8 hours by drawing on reserves, but a significant decline in availability is predicted thereafter.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 is demonstrating synchronization between strategic assets (KABs, UAVs) and IO platforms. UAF C2 is effective at the tactical level, as demonstrated by the rapid IO response in Pokrovsk. The primary C2 test remains the successful neutralization of the RF SpN threat in Kostiantynivka.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Readiness: High, especially in the Information Domain (IO). The deployment of the 425th OShP flag over Pokrovsk is a strong political and military signal of resolve.
• Vulnerability: Continued vulnerability to RF precision strikes against operational security breaches (e.g., the 35th Brigade incident) and the immediate threat posed by RF infiltration groups.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

1. IO Victory in Pokrovsk: Confirmed continued control of Pokrovsk City Center via imagery (2022Z), neutralizing RF IO claims.

Setbacks:

1. Targeted Exploitation: RF IO is successfully exploiting past UAF operational security lapses (35th Brigade strike report, 2015Z).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Force Protection Discipline: Immediate reinforcement of all UAF force protection protocols, particularly concerning large gatherings, ceremonies, and electronic signature management, following the 35th Brigade incident claims.
• AD Assets: Continued high demand for mobile AD to counter both the imminent mass Shahed strike (MLCOA) and the sustained KAB/UAV pressure in Zaporizhzhia.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO Focus: RF channels (Colonelcassad, 2015Z) are now focusing on two major themes:
  • UAF Incompetence: Claiming successful strikes resulted from UAF operational negligence (35th Brigade ceremony).
  • Western Instability: Highlighting political distractions in the US (Trump's comments, 2007Z) and diplomatic isolation (EU visa restrictions, 2019Z) to portray waning Western support.
• UAF IO Focus: Maintaining high morale and visible control in critical areas (Pokrovsk flag raising, 2022Z). UAF also effectively mitigated a potential internal security crisis (Kyiv grenade incident update, 2029Z).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Public sentiment is likely buoyed by the successful deep strike on Donetsk (Previous SITREP) and the reassuring display of control in Pokrovsk. However, repeated KAB and UAV threats (Zaporizhzhia) maintain a constant state of alert and psychological stress.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• RF media is attempting to leverage EU diplomatic actions (reported cessation of multiple-entry tourist visas for Russians, 2019Z) to portray international division, though this action primarily affects Russian civil society, not state policy.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4-8 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The kinetic synchronization attack is still assessed as imminent:

1. Shahed Saturation (0-4H): The primary RF mass Shahed strike will commence, focusing on CNI and logistics nodes in Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava/Zaporizhzhia Oblasts.
2. Kostiantynivka SpN Execution (2-6H): The RF infiltration groups will launch their kinetic phase, targeting C2 or logistics lines under the cover of the main Shahed distraction.
3. Sustained KAB Pressure: RF Air Force will continue high-tempo KAB strikes in the Zaporizhzhia sector to maintain UAF force fixation.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Operational Security Compromise: A combination of systemic CNI degradation (from Shahed strikes) and a high-value RF precision strike (e.g., Iskander/Kinzhals) that exploits UAF operational security lapses (similar to the claimed 35th Brigade incident) results in the severe incapacitation of a Brigade-level C2 or a major UAF field hospital. This would drastically impact combat effectiveness and morale in the Donbas.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J2/J3 (Force Protection): Mandate Immediate OpSec Discipline.

   • Action: Issue a FLASH message to all UAF units reinforcing strict OPSEC protocols against mass gatherings, ceremonies, and electronic signature use in rear areas. All Brigade-level and higher C2 nodes must immediately rotate to backup/alternate locations.

2. J3 (Air Defense): Dynamic Defense for Zaporizhzhia.

   • Action: Due to the sustained KAB/UAV threat (2017Z, 2023Z), prioritize mobile SHORAD assets for defense of forward logistics hubs and key crossings in Zaporizhzhia Oblast (e.g., Tomakivka area) to maintain operational fluidity in the southern sector.

3. J1/J2 (Information Operations): Exploit Pokrovsk Control.

   • Action: Immediately disseminate the imagery of the UAF flag over Pokrovsk City Council to international and domestic audiences as proof of UAF operational stability and to directly refute RF claims of success in the most critical land sector.

//END SITREP//